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Abstract
The rst essay examines the allocation of education spending. Human capital investment in early
childhood can lead to large and persistent gains. Beyond this window of opportunity, human
capital accumulation is more costly. Despite this, government education spending is allocated
disproportionately toward late childhood and young adulthood. The consequences of a reallocation
are examined using an overlapping generations model with private and public spending on early
and late childhood education. Taking as given the higher returns to early investment, the model
shows the current allocation may nonetheless be appropriate. With a homogeneous population,
this can hold for moderate levels of government spending. With heterogeneity, this can hold for
middle income workers. Lower income workers, by contrast, may benet from a reallocation.
The second essay provides a detailed review of the human capital proxies used in growth regres-
sions. Economic theory and intuition tells us that human capital is important for economic growth,
and now most empirical growth studies include a human capital component. Human capital is a
complex concept that is dicult to quantify in a single measure. A number of proxies have been
proposed, with most focusing on an aspect of education. The consensus is that human capital is
poorly proxied. For each of the most commonly used measures, I give a description, discuss trends,
summarize the literature and results, compare advantages and disadvantages, and list data sets.
This review will serve as a useful reference for any researcher including human capital in a growth
regression.
The nal essay explores the importance of a variety of human capital measures for growth
using the Bayesian Averaging of Classical Estimates (BACE) approach proposed by Sala-i-Martin,
Doppelhofer, and Miller (2004). BACE combines standard Bayesian methods with the classical
approach to address the problem of model uncertainty. A new data set is constructed that includes
35 human capital variables. The analysis shows that multiple human capital measures are robustly
signicant for growth. Some of these variables are IQ scores, the duration of primary and secondary
education, average years of primary education, average years of female higher education, and higher
education enrollment.
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Part I
Chapter 1: Government Education
Expenditures in Early and Late Childhood
1 Introduction
Research by education specialists, psychologists, and economists is bringing into sharp focus a
fundamental feature of human capital accumulation. Human capital investment in early childhood
can lead to large and persistent gains while investment beyond this window of opportunity yields
diminished returns. Recent work by Cunha, Heckman, Lochner, and Masterov (CHLM 2007)
provides a comprehensive overview of work in the eld.1
One conclusion of their overview is that the process of human capital accumulation is best
modeled as a hierarchical process wherein early childhood education sets the stage for productive
education in late childhood. Skills attained early in life leave a learner better prepared to take
advantage of later opportunities to develop more rened skills. Similarly, late childhood invest-
ment reinforces investment in early childhood. Without follow-up investment, early investment is
unproductive over the longer term.
This complementarity is often neglected when economists model human capital accumulation.
While it is becoming more common to think about a hierarchical education process, this is typically
to distinguish between K-12 and college education.2 CHLM argue that the more meaningful dis-
tinction is between human capital investment during and after \critical" periods for the acquisition
of particular skills. Perhaps the most straight-forward example is the critical period for developing
IQ. By age 10, the IQ of a child is essentially set. Before that time it is more malleable.3 Low
investment in the rst 10 years leaves IQ lower and later investment less productive. At the same
time, low investment later in life fails to exploit the potential to turn IQ into specic life skills.
Since government is a ubiquitous presence in funding human capital production, the nature
of the process might suggest that government should allocate resources disproportionately toward
early childhood education. Presently, it does not. In 2004, about .3% of GDP was spent by
government on pre-primary education in educational institutions for students aged 3-6 while 4% of
1See also Carneiro and Heckman (2003), Knudsen, Heckman, Cameron, and Shonko (2006), and Currie (2001(b)).
2See, for example, Driskill and Horowitz (2002), Su (2004), Kaganovich (2005), Blankenau (2005), and Restuccia
and Urrutia (2004).
3See Jensen (1980) and the discussions in CHLM and Cunha and Heckman (2007).
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GDP was spent by government on K-12 education.4 With the duration of K-12 around six times
that of pre-primary education, this suggests that on a per capita basis government spending on
K-12 education is more than 2.2 times that on pre-primary education. On a per student basis,
the dierence is less pronounced as pre-primary enrollment is lower. Still, pre-primary per student
expenditures are only 63% as large as upper secondary expenditures. Within K-12 education,
spending is again weighted toward the later years. Per student spending on primary education is
about 84% of upper secondary spending.5
Human capital spending is more than just education spending. In addition, government aects
spending beyond its direct payments. A fuller analysis of relative spending levels would consider
health care expenditures, tax breaks for day-care, after school programs, and a variety of related
issues. While a complete accounting is a useful endeavor for later work, the conclusion that gov-
ernment does not spend disproportionately on human capital in early childhood is likely robust to
any fuller analysis.
With spending concentrated in later years and development opportunities arising early, the
allocation of government spending may have important implications. This paper considers the
general equilibrium eects of allocating government expenditures across early and late childhood.
We build a heterogeneous agent overlapping generations model where general human capital is
generated in a two-stage hierarchical education system. The rst period generates early human
capital. An agent's endowment of early human capital depends on an exogenous family eect, rst
stage family spending, and rst stage government spending. The second stage generates general
human capital as a function of early human capital and second stage spending by the family and
government.
Families value consumption and the lifetime income of their ospring. They allocate income
across consumption spending and education spending at the two stages. Government interacts with
households through taxation and provision of education inputs at each stage of childhood. The
provision of education inputs has two consequences. There is a direct eect as inputs increase but
also general equilibrium eects as private education spending adjusts in response. Two questions
4These numbers are not reported directly. However, table B2.2 of OECD Education at a Glance (2007) states that
.4% of GPD is spent in total pre-primary education and 4.4% is spent on K-12 education. Table B3.2a of this same
publication indicates that about 75% of pre-primary and 90% of K-12 funding is provided by government.
5Table B1.1a of Education at a Glance (2007) provides expenditures per student for pre-primary education,
primary education, lower secondary education, and upper secondary education. The gures are arrived at by taking
the ratio and, in the case of pre-primary, weighting it by the relative shares funded by government found in table
B3.2a.
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dominate the analysis. Is it best for government to concentrate its spending on one stage of educa-
tion or to balance expenditures across the two stages? Secondly, if more concentrated expenditures
are best, which level should be the focus of government expenditures?
The intuition is most clear when family and government inputs are perfectly substitutable so
we focus on this case. Roughly speaking, a family prefers balanced spending only if government
spending is high relative to personal income. When overall spending as a share of income is in a
high intermediate range, an agent's income is maximized with government spending concentrated on
early childhood education. When overall spending is in a low intermediate range, an agent's income
is maximized with government spending concentrated on late childhood. Below some threshold
level, the allocation of spending is irrelevant.
Results stem from the nature of human capital development and the crowding out of private
spending by public spending. At high levels of spending relative to income, private spending is fully
crowded out so the level of expenditure is dictated by government choices. In this case, productivity
of public expenditures is key to output. Productivity is highest with a more balanced allocation.
Since public spending is high in relation to the lowest incomes in the economy, this suggests that
low income families are better o with more balanced government expenditures. At low levels of
government spending relative to income, public spending simply displaces private spending, leaving
total spending at each stage unchanged. This suggests that high income families may be unaected
by the allocation.
Between the relative extremes is the case where one type of spending is fully (or largely) crowded
out and the other is not. When the allocation favors late childhood education, family spending
at this stage is fully crowded out by government spending and family spending remains positive
at the early childhood stage. This matches the situation in the U.S. where more than 90% of
K-12 education spending is provided by government. With a disproportionate level of private K-12
spending by higher income families, this implies that some share of the population spends little
or nothing privately on K-12 education. For these agents, an allocation toward early childhood
education crowds out some early childhood spending. Since later spending is zero, there is no
osetting `crowding in' of later spending. While the mix of spending may be more productive,
total education spending decreases. This eect can dominate, leading to lower output. Hence,
concentrated spending can maximize the income of middle income families.
After establishing that middle income families might prefer concentrated expenditure, we show
3
that the preferred stage of concentration depends on family income. While the lower income workers
in this group would prefer government spending concentrated on early childhood education, the
rest prefer a focus on late childhood education. In essence, the larger of the expenditures (public or
private) should be allocated to the most productive stage. For some middle income workers public
spending exceeds private. It is best to allocate this to early childhood. For the more wealthy,
the opposite holds. All told, the current concentration of government spending on late childhood
education can be optimal for some income levels. At other income levels it may not be optimal but
still preferred to more balanced spending. With the most wealthy indierent, this leaves only the
most poor to benet from a reallocation.
We present the model in Section 2 and consider a special case in Section 3. Here agents are
homogeneous and private and public spending are perfect substitutes. Much of the intuition is
captured by this special case. Section 4 demonstrates this point by showing that the results are
little changed in a more general case preserving homogeneity. Section 5 considers heterogeneity.
Section 6 summarizes, provides some more speculative insights on policy implications, and concludes
the paper.
2 The Model
2.1 The Technology of Education
We consider an overlapping generations economy where agents live four periods. In each period,
a mass of new agents, normalized to one, enters the economy and passes through early childhood.
In the subsequent period, these agents are in late childhood. Throughout childhood, agents are
passive economic agents. They receive endowments of human capital in each period but make no
decisions of their own. Agents enter early adulthood in their third period. This is an active period
where agents allocate income as specied below.6 In addition, young adults each have one child.
Thus the young adults in period t are parents to the new agents in that period. The fourth period
of life is late adulthood where agents face a separate allocation decision and are parents to the late
childhood generation.
The agents born in each period may be heterogeneous and are indexed by j 2 J [0; 1]. A
productivity parameter is related to the index through the function aj = a (j) where aj is the
6In an earlier version of this paper, young adults also made a choice to attend college or not. This proves
unimportant for our main points.
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productivity of agent j and 0 < aj  aj0 < 1 for all j < j0. If the middle inequality is strict for
at least one j, j0 pair; there is heterogeneity in productivity. Though not modeled, we assume that
through nature and nurture a child inherits the productivity of her parents. While this overstates
the heritability of productivity, recent evidence suggests considerable dynastic persistence in relative
earnings. For example, Mazumder (2005) estimates the intergenerational elasticity in earnings to
be about .6.7 In our model, inheritance of a is the channel through which such persistence arises.
Agent j in early childhood is endowed with h1j(t) units of early childhood human capital, which
indicates that the endowment is time and agent specic. We hereafter compromise on precision in
favor of aesthetics by suppressing the j and t notation when no confusion arises. The endowment
is a function of ability and resources invested on behalf of the agent in her rst period, i1. In late
childhood, the agent is endowed with general human capital. The size of this endowment depends
on ability, early childhood human capital, and resources invested on behalf of the agent in her
second period, i2. Specically,
h1 = ai
1
1 (1)
h2 =
(
Aa [2i

2 + (1  2)h1]
1
 if  6= 0
Aai
2
2 h
1 2
1 if  = 0
where 1; 2 2 [0; 1] with min [1; 2] < 1,   1; and A > 0 are common across agents and
xed through time while other items are agent and time specic. The parameter A serves as a
scalar in the production of human capital while 1 and 2 govern the curvature of the functions.
The parameter  governs the substitutability of early childhood investment and late childhood
investment in creating human capital. This specication is similar to Cunha and Heckman (2007).
Education investments, i1 and i2, depend on spending by parents and government. We expect
that spending by government and families are largely substitutable as inputs into the production of
human capital. For example, the productivity of otherwise identical books and teachers does not
dier according to the means of nance, and students may learn as much from school eld trips as
from family outings. On the other hand, parents may provide some inputs that do not substitute
well for government inputs. For example, a family may live in a more costly neighborhood in order
to gain educational or peer-eect advantages for the child. To accommodate possible imperfect
7In the U.S., recent estimates are .4 or greater. See, for example, Solon (1999). Solon (2002) provides a review of
elasticity estimates across nations.
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substitutability, we specify
ik =
(
B

fk + (1  ) gk
 1
 if  6= 0
Bfk g
1 
k if  = 0
(2)
for k 2 f1; 2g where f1 and g1 are family and government resources devoted to early childhood
education while f2 and g2 are resources devoted to late childhood education. The specication
requires   1: With  = 0; this is the specication used (for example) by Blankenau (2005), and
with  = 1; this is the specication used by Glomm and Kaganovich (2003).
2.2 The Agents' Problem
Each agent is endowed with one unit of time in each period. Agents receive an income of wh2 in
each period of adulthood.8 Here w is the wage per unit of human capital. With an interest rate
exogenously given by r; the present value of lifetime income is
I = wh2
 
1 + r 1

: (3)
In modeling education choices, it is common to consider the possibility of borrowing constraints.
Such constraints play a key role in a wide variety of recent research. Some examples are Rangazas
(2002) and Restuccia and Urratia (2004). We exclude such considerations for two reasons. First,
we show below that for low income agents most or all education expenditures are made by govern-
ment. Thus low income agents, for whom constraints are most likely to bind, are not interested
in borrowing. Secondly, recent work by Carneiro and Heckman (2002) indicates that few families
are credit constrained in making education decisions later in life. It would be reasonable, still, to
impose credit constraints for those who spend signicantly on children in early childhood. This is
likely to be of modest importance.
We will use b notation to indicate items that relate to the children of the generation being
considered. For example, while I is the income of the generation being considered, I^ is the income
of the ospring.
Each agent has preferences given by
Uj = ln c3 +  ln c4 +  ln I^ : (4)
Here c3 and c4 denote consumption in the third and fourth periods of life, and  < 1 discounts
the future. Aside from own consumption, the agent cares about the lifetime income of her children
8It is simple to allow for human capital to be gained also through experience so that income rises through the life
cycle. As this serves only to scale our results, it is omitted.
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where the term  scales the importance of progeny income. Parents can eect progeny income
through spending on human capital in the rst and second periods of childhood. Combining period
budget constraints and dening  to be the tax rate on income, the agent's allocation problem is
to choose c3; c4; f1; and f2 to maximize equation (4) subject to the relationships in equation (1)
and
I (1  )  c3 + c4r + f1 + f2r ;
c3; c4  0;
f1; f2  0;
I^ = I^

h^2

; h^2 = h^2 (^{1; {^2) ;
{^1 = {^1 (f1; g1) and {^2 = {^2 (f2; g2) :
(5)
2.3 Other Entities
A large number of identical rms employ labor to produce identical consumption goods according
to
Y = ZH (6)
where Z > 0 is a scalar, Y is output, and H is the human capital adjusted labor input of a
representative rm. Since all markets are competitive w = Z will hold in equilibrium.
We assume that government taxes all labor income at the common rate  and uses the revenue to
fund early and late childhood education. Furthermore, government spends equally on all children
over their lifetime. Given this and the normalization of the generation size to one, a balanced
budget requires that
G = g1 + g2 = ZH (7)
where G is total government spending in period t.
It is convenient to scale spending to the size of the economy. We do this by making total
spending in any period proportional to output. Furthermore, we dene  to be the share of G that
is devoted to early childhood education. Thus we set
G = &Y; & Y = g1; & (1   )Y = g2 (8)
where & 2 [0; 1] is the share of output devoted to government education spending.
To complete the model, we assume that agents can borrow and lend in an international market.
Here a unit of the consumption good today purchases a claim to r units in the subsequent period.
This makes the interest rate exogenous as required for analytical tractability.
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2.4 Equilibrium
The dynamics of the model are simple to trace. However, our concern is with comparative statics
and as such we focus on a steady-state equilibrium. In this case, the total amount of labor available
in each period, H2 is
H2 = 2
1Z
j=0
h2jdj (9)
where the 2 reects that two generations are at work in each period.
Denition 1. A steady-state competitive equilibrium in this economy is a wage w, income, alloca-
tions and educational outcomes
n
Ij ; c3;j ; c4;j ; f1;j ; f2;j ; h1;j ; h2;j ; I^j ; h^1;j ; h^2;j
o
8j 2 J , labor supply
and demand fH2;Hg ; and scal instruments instruments f ; &;  ; g1; g2g such that
1. Human capital allocations satisfy equation (1).
2. Each agent takes h1;j ; h2;j , scal instruments, and the choices of others as given and chooses
c3;j ; c4;j ; f1;j ; f2;j to satisfy equation (4) subject to the constraints in equation (5).
3. The rms choose labor inputs to maximize prots, w = Z.
4. Government spending satises equation (7).
5. The labor market clears, H2 = H:
6. Surpluses and shortages in the goods market are accommodated by the international bond
market.9
7. h2;j = h^2;j and similarly other generation specic variables are constant.
3 A Special Case
The model generally requires numerical solutions but insights can be gained by rst looking at a
special case. For this purpose we maintain the following assumption throughout this section:
Assumption 1:  = r = 1;  = 0;  = :5:
Setting  = 1;  = :5 makes government spending perfectly substitutable with private spending
and
ik = fk + gk: (10)
9Implications of the model are qualitatively robust to the closed economy case where the goods market clears.
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Setting  = 0 simplies the human capital expression to
h2 = Ai

1i
2
2 (11)
where  = (1  2) 1 and A = Aa2 2 : Setting r = 1 is an algebraic convenience with little
consequence for any of our results. Using a dierent r serves only to scale some of our later
ndings.
For this section and the next, we also assume that all agents are of equal ability. This requires
Assumption 2:
Assumption 2: aj = aj0 8j and j0 2 J :
3.1 Equilibria
We show below that for any choice of parameters in the steady state, a unique equilibrium exists.
This equilibrium can be one of four types, depending on family education expenditures. In both
early childhood and late childhood, family spending can be zero or positive. To distinguish the
types, we use the notation f = (f1 ; f2 ) to indicate that family spending is positive at both stages
and f = (0; 0) to indicate zero spending at both stages. Similarly f = (f1 ; 0) means that there is
positive family spending only on early childhood while f = (0; f2 ) means positive spending only
on late childhood. With this, we are ready to state Proposition 1:
Proposition 1. If Assumptions 1 and 2 hold, then
f =
8>>>><>>>>:
(f1 ; 0) if   min
h
1  2 (1&) 1 ;  (1  &) ((1 + ) &) 1
i
(f1 ; f2 ) if 1  2 (1&) 1     (1&) 1
(0; 0) if  (1  &) ((1 + ) &) 1    1  2 (1  &) ((1 + ) &) 1
(0; f2 ) if   max
h
 (1&)
 1 ; 1  2 (1  &) ((1 + ) &) 1
i (12)
where 1  1 +  + (2 + ) :
Proposition 1 divides the & 2 [0; 1]  2 [0; 1] space into four regions, each permitting exactly
one of the four types of equilibria. At the border between any two regions, both types of equilibria
are supported but little gained in discussing this knife-edge case and we hereafter omit it. The
rst line of equation (12) shows that for  suciently small, families spend on early childhood but
not on late childhood education. The last line shows that for  suciently large, families spend
on late childhood education but not on early childhood. The second and third lines show that for
intermediate values of  ; families spend at either both or neither level of education. In each case,
the cuto points between equilibria types depend on the level of spending.
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Figure 1: Equilibria. The curves divide the &   space into four regions. Where f = (f1 ; f2 ),
families spend on both levels of education and where f = (0; 0) they spend on neither. Otherwise
they spend on one level of education. Where f = (0; f2 ) they spend on late childhood and where
f = (f1 ; 0) they spend on early childhood.
Figure 1 serves as an example. Here we show the partition of the &   space for a particular
parameterization. We set 2 = :15; which is in the range used by Blankenau and Simpson (2004).
To reect a higher productivity for expenditures in early childhood we set 1 = :3: This gives
 = :225: We set  = :63 to reect an annual discount rate of .97 over 15 years and set  = 1+ :
To see how  and & jointly determine the type of equilibrium, it is useful to consider three
values of &. First, consider & = &1 as an example of a low level of government spending. Tracing
a line from  = 0 to  = 1 at & = &1 in Figure 1, we see that for every  value, f = (f

1 ; f

2 ) :
Thus when government spending is low, its allocation does not inuence the type of equilibrium.
Regardless of the allocation of spending, families top-up government spending at both levels. Next
consider & = &2 as an example of a moderate level of spending. Tracing a line from  = 0 to  = 1,
we see that for  small f = (f1 ; 0), for  large f = (0; f2 ), and otherwise f = (f1 ; f2 ). When
this level of spending is suciently focused on one stage of education, families spend only on the
other stage. When it is split more equally, the dilution results in private spending at both stages.
Finally consider & = &3 as an example of a high level of spending. With focused spending at this
level, families again spend only on the stage neglected by government. However, now with more
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balanced spending f = (0; 0) : That is, when spending is high enough, government spending diluted
across the two levels is still suciently high at both stages to eliminate private spending.
The analysis with & = &1 is valid whenever &  min

2
 1
1 ; 
 1
1

and the analysis with
& = &3 is valid whenever &   ( + 2) 11 : Otherwise the analysis with & = &2 is valid. We can
use this to formalize the denitions of high, moderate, and low spending.
Denition 2. Spending is low when & < min

2
 1
1 ; 
 1
1

; high when & >  ( + 2)
 1
1 ; and
moderate otherwise.
Furthermore, we can think of government spending as focused on a stage of education when it
fully crowds out private spending at exactly one stage of education. In contrast, when spending is
balanced, families spend at both or neither stages, depending on the level of government spending.
With this, we can state Corollary 1.
Corollary 1. If government spending is low, families always spend on both stages of education.
Otherwise, if government spending is focused on one stage of education, families spend only on
the other stage. If government spending is balanced, families spend on both stages with moderate
government spending and on neither stage with high government spending.
Notice that for moderate levels of spending, the range of  values considered balanced spending
decreases with & (i.e. the two bounds are getting closer together). In contrast, when government
spending is high, the range is increasing. The intuition for this result is simple. Moderate spending
is balanced when both & and &(1  ) are small enough that families top-up government spending.
Clearly it is easier to satisfy the conditions simultaneously when & decreases. High spending is
balanced when there is sucient government spending at both levels to fully crowd out both levels
of private spending (i.e. when both & and &(1    ) are large enough). It is easier to satisfy the
conditions simultaneously when & increases.
3.2 Output
The above discussion claries how the equilibrium type depends on the spending level and its
allocation. We now consider how these government choices aect output within an equilibrium
type. Proposition 2 gives the main result.
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Proposition 2. Income is related to government policy according to
I1  2 =
8>>><>>>:
Aw
 
 (1  & (1   )) 12

(& (1   ))2 if f = (f1 ; 0)
Aw () (2)
2 
 (+2)
1 if f = (f

1 ; f

2 )
Aw (& ) (& (1   ))2 if f = (0; 0)
Aw (& )
 
(1  & ) 13 2
2 if f = (0; f2 )
(13)
where 2  1 +  +  and 3  1 +  + 2:
The rst line of equation (13) corresponds to moderate or high spending which is focused on late
childhood education. That is, it considers the case where families spend only on early childhood
education. Government spending on early childhood education is & and output does not depend on
this directly. This is because a unit of spending by government osets a unit that would be spent by
the family at this level, leaving total early childhood spending unchanged. Government spending on
late childhood is given by & (1   ) : This aects output in two contrasting ways. First, an increase
in spending on early childhood increases total education spending as a share of output. If this is
accomplished by an increase in &, the part spent on early childhood is oset by a decrease in private
spending. However, the part spent on late childhood does not crowd out private spending since
family spending at this stage is already zero. If the increase in late childhood spending is instead
accomplished by a decrease in  , the result is similar. The decrease in government spending in early
childhood causes families to spend more at this stage. However, with families already spending
zero on late childhood education, there is not a corresponding decrease in private spending.
The rise in spending relative to output has a positive eect on output. However, another eect
works counter to this. A higher level of spending can be oset by a less productive mix of spending.
When families spend on only one stage of education, it is because that stage is more productive
at the margin. Thus a reallocation of spending in the other direction reduces the productivity of
a given level of spending. Increasing & can cause such a reallocation. A higher &, through higher
taxation, leaves a smaller share of output with families. This reduces what families allocate to
education. Since families are spending only on early childhood, the reduction occurs at this stage.
The net result is a shift in overall spending toward late childhood. A smaller  is another, more
direct, way to switch the mix toward late childhood.
This interplay of the level and mix of expenditures is reected in the rst line of equation
(13). Here & (1   ) has both a positive and negative eect. The eects oset where  (1  &) =
2 ( + 2)
 1 :When this value of  lies in the region allowing f = (f1 ; 0) ; a local maximum arises
at this point.
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Figure 2 aids in the discussion. The rst panel is equivalent to Figure 1 but further divides
the &   space into regions where output is increasing, decreasing, and invariant in  : The solid
curves are as in Figure 1 and thus delineate the four types of equilibria. The dotted lines trace
local output maximizing combinations of  and &: The arrows show directions in which output is
weakly increasing in  and &. As shown in Figure 1, the lower region to the right of 2
 1
1 is
where f = (f1 ; 0) : The dashed line in this region is where  (1  &) = 2 ( + 2) 1 : For smaller
values of & in the region, the level eect always dominates, so that output is increased by increasing
& or decreasing  : For the larger values, the mix eect dominates and output can be increased
by decreasing & or increasing  : For intermediate values of &, beginning at & = 2 ( + 2)
 1 ; the
eects oset at some point over the range of  supporting the equilibrium, giving a local interior
maximum.
The second panel gives similar information from another perspective. This graphs normalized
output, y, for all &;  pairs. Output is normalized by its value at & = 0. The points of inection
correspond to the regions delineated in Figure 1 and the rst panel of Figure 2. The lower right
region corresponds to the lower central region of the rst panel and thus again considers the case
where f = (f1 ; 0) : Consider a value of & just beyond & = 2
 1
1 : Starting at  = 0 and moving
in the direction of an increase in  , we see that output is decreasing in  : At a larger value of &,
output initially rises and then falls as we increase  from zero. This will be true for all values of &
corresponding to those beneath the lower dashed line in the rst panel. Beyond this set of & values,
output is increasing in  :
Results are symmetric when spending is focused on early childhood (the fourth line of equation
(13)) so that families spend only on late childhood education. Government spending on early
childhood is & : An increase in this has a level eect and a mix eect analogous to those discussed
above. The eects oset where & =  ( + 2)
 1 :When this value of  lies in the region allowing
f = (0; f2 ) ; a local maximum arises at this point. In the rst panel of Figure 2, the upper
region to the right of  11 corresponds to f = (0; f

2 ) : The dotted curve of Figure 2 plots where
& =  ( + 2)
 1 : For the lower values of & in the range, the level eect dominates and lowering  
or increasing & increases output as indicated by the arrows. For the higher values of & in this space,
the mix eect dominates and raising  or lowering & increases output: For intermediate values of
&, beginning at & =  ( + 2)
 1 ; the eects oset.
The above discussion covers focused spending. We now turn our attention to balanced spending.
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Figure 2: Output. The arrows in the rst panel show the direction in which & and  can be changed
to increase output: The intersecting arrows on the far left indicate that output is unchanged in
each direction. The second panel shows normalized output over the policy space. Here output is
normalized by the value it would take at & = 0:
The second line of equation (13) corresponds to the case of low to moderate balanced spending. In
this type of equilibrium, output is independent of the mix of spending. Government spending at each
level falls below what the family would choose and thus is topped-up with private spending. Since
private and public spending are perfect substitutes, a unit more or less of government spending
is fully oset by a unit less or more of private spending. Since total spending at each level is
unchanged through policy, human capital and hence output are unchanged. In the rst panel, the
independence of output from policy when f = (f1 ; f2 ) is demonstrated by the lack of a partition
and by the intersecting arrows. These indicate that output is unchanging in each direction. In the
second panel this is demonstrated by the at area at y = 1 for & small or moderate and balanced.
Finally, consider the third line of equation (13) corresponding to the other possibility with bal-
anced spending (the case of moderate to high spending). Here, both forms of private spending are
fully crowded out and government is the sole source of education expenditures. In this case an
increase in & unambiguously increases output. With government providing all education spending,
the mix of expenditures is determined solely by  and not through any general equilibrium adjust-
ments. Thus government spending no longer has an eect on the mix of spending. Furthermore,
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an increase in & cannot crowd out any private spending since there is none.
For a given &, output is maximized when each unit of expenditure is put to its highest use. This
requires that the marginal quantity of human capital generated should be the same for both levels
of expenditure. This occurs where  =  ( + 2)
 1. Note that so long as & is large and spending
is balanced, its optimal allocation is independent of &. This is reected in the rst panel of Figure
2 by the the horizontal dotted line and in the second by the ridge at  =  ( + 2)
 1 :
Figure 2 shows that depending on & there can be several locally optimal values of  . Looking
at the far right of the rst panel, we see that for & large enough, output is always increasing in
the direction of  =  ( + 2)
 1 so this is a global maximum. Moving to the left, another local
maximum arises with  large and further to the left we have yet another local maximum with  
small. As we move further to the left, past the dashed lines, these local maxima occur at corners
where  = 1 and  = 0:
The second panel gives clues regarding the globally optimal  as a function of &. As mentioned
before, when & is small its allocation is unimportant. For a range of &; some sort of focused spending
is always best since balanced spending yields f = (f1 ; f2 ) ; the lowest possible output. For & in a
neighborhood of 2
 1
1 it is best to set  = 0; and for some values of & it is best to set  = 1: Only
for & suciently large is it best to have balanced expenditures. Note in particular that when
f = (f1 ; f2 ) comes into existence, it is dominated in output by both sorts of focused spending.
Figure 3 provides a more clear summary. The lines show the maximum output attainable in
each type of equilibrium over the range of & for which the equilibrium type exists. That is, it
shows output at each of the local maxima existing at each &: This output value is denoted by y:
The solid lines correspond to balanced spending and the dashed lines to focused spending. The
increasing portion of the f = (f1 ; 0) and f = (0; f2 ) curves correspond to cases where output is
locally maximized at a corner ( = 0 or  = 1); and the at portion is where the local maxima are
interior.10
The brackets indicate which type of equilibrium globally maximizes output at each level of &: In
the bracketed range furthest to the left, output is maximized where families spend at both stages.
In the subsequent bracketed range, an equilibrium where families spend only on early childhood
is globally optimal. Next, family spending only on late childhood is globally optimal. Over these
two ranges, then, focused spending is preferred (in terms of output). For the range furthest to the
10The downward sloping portion of these curves reect areas where output is increasing over  over the entire
range but the equilibrium exists over a smaller range of  :
15
Figure 3: Maximum output. The gure shows normalized output across values of & in each type
of equilibrium when  is chosen to yield a local maximum. The brackets show which type of
equilibrium maximizes output globally at the relevant value of &.
right, an equilibrium where families spend at neither level is globally optimal. Only in this range
is balanced spending preferred to focused spending. This result is general and the precise cuto
points can be found. The result is stated more precisely in Corollary 2.
Corollary 2. If  > 2 there exists &y and &y > &y such that output is globally maximized at
f = (f1 ; f2 ) if &  21 ; at f = (f

1 ; 0) if
2
1
 &  &y; at f = (0; f2 ) if &y  &  &y; and at f = (0; 0)
if &  &y:
Findings are symmetric if   211: Thus regardless of the relationship between  and 2;
each type of equilibrium is globally optimal for some value of &. An implication is that focused
spending can dominate balanced spending. When focused spending dominates, the corollary also
shows which level of education should receive the lion's share of funding. One might expect that
with  > 2; education spending should be focused on early childhood where it is more productive.
However, the gure shows that this holds only where &y  &  &y. For smaller values, it should be
focused on the less productive form of education. To see why, note that we are considering cases
where government spends on one stage of education and families spend on the other. The key is to
11For  < 2; the rst lower bound is

1
while f = (f1 ; 0) and f = (0; f

2 ) switch order in the corollary. For
 = 2; &y = &y and both are global maxima with &y < & < &y:
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apply the largest block of funds to its most productive use. Suppose that family spending is higher
than government spending. Then output is maximized where families spend on the productive stage
indicating that government should fund the unproductive stage of education. If instead government
spending exceeds family spending, output is maximized where government spends on the productive
stage.
This provides intuition for the main result but ignores one important consideration. The level
of spending by families is higher when they fund the more productive type of education. Thus
total education spending depends on where families spend. This eect serves to inuence the level
of government spending at which government should fund the productive stage. However, it does
not overturn the key message. For lower levels of government spending, output is higher when
government spends on the unproductive stage and vice versa.
In the gure above, interior solutions are never optimal with focused spending. This is not a
general result. For dierent parameter choices, the intersection of the f = (0; 0) curve with the
f = (0; f2 ) curve can occur at the at portion of the latter. However, this does not change the
above discussion in a substantive way. The only dierence is that in this case focused spending
does not imply a corner solution.
3.3 Utility
The analysis above considers the eect of policy on output. While output is a common concern of
policy makers, utility comparisons are needed to understand the full eect of policy. As such, we
now consider how government choices aect utility within an equilibrium type. Proposition 3 gives
the main result.
Proposition 3. Utility is related to government policy according to
U =
8>>><>>>:

 (1+)
2 (1  & (1   ))1+ I+1+ if f = (f1 ; 0)

 (1+)
1 I
+1+ if f = (f1 ; f2 )
(1 + ) (1+) (1  &)1+ I+1+ if f = (0; 0)

 (1+)
3 (1   &)1+ I+1+ if f = (0; f2 )
(14)
where U is a monotonic transformation of U .
The results are clearly closely related to those for output. The dierence is that except where
f = (f1 ; f2 ), utility maximization considers the eect of taxation on consumption. Consider the
rst line of equation (14). This depends positively on output but is scaled by (1  & (1   ))1+ .
This scalar reects the extent to which consumption is diminished due to the tax burden. While
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Figure 4: Utility. The arrows in the rst panel show the direction in which & and  can be changed
to increase utility: The intersecting arrows on the far left indicate that utility is unchanged in each
direction. The second panel shows normalized utility over the policy space.
the entire tax burden as a share of income is &, & is spent on early childhood education. Since
families also spend at this level, a unit of tax expenditure on early childhood osets a unit of
private expenditure leaving the same share of output available for consumption. Thus the scalar
only reects expenditure on late childhood education. The opposite is true when families spend
only on late childhood education as in the fourth line. Here the scalar reects only government
spending on early childhood. The second line, where families spend at both levels, does not have
a scalar since a unit of government expenditure just osets a unit of private expenditure. In the
third line, the scalar reects total expenditures since there is no crowding out at the margin.
Figure 4 is analogous to Figure 2 but demonstrates normalized utility, u, rather than output.
The dotted lines in the rst panel correspond to the dashed lines in Figure 2 and are retained
to facilitate a comparison between output and utility maximization. The dashed lines show local
optima. When spending is low, output and utility maximization are equivalent since government
spending just osets private spending, leaving all allocations unchanged. With focused spending,
the welfare maximizing levels of & are to the left of those which maximize output. This reects that
some output goes to taxation rather than consumption.
The bigger dierence relative to the output discussion occurs with high balanced spending.
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Figure 5: Maximum utility. The gure shows normalized utility across values of & in each type
of equilibrium when  is chosen to yield a local maximum. The brackets show which type of
equilibrium maximizes utility globally at the relevant value of &.
Here, the level of  that maximizes output also maximizes utility. In the rst panel, this is
demonstrated by the horizontal line at the same level as in Figure 2. In the second panel, it is
demonstrated by the partially visible ridge at this level of  : However, utility is not monotonic in
high balanced spending. It is straightforward to show that the utility maximizing level of spending
is & = ( + 2) ( + 1 + )
 1
1 : Thus in addition to a ridge of local equilibria along the & dimension,
there is a ridge of local equilibria along the  dimension at this value of &. Utility with high balanced
spending is maximized at the intersection of these ridges.
As with Figure 2, we turn to the second panel for insights regarding global maxima as a function
of &. Again each equilibrium type is globally optimal for some range of &. This is seen also in Figure
5, which shows the maximum utility attainable in each type of equilibrium over the range of & for
which the equilibrium type exists. Thus it is analogous to Figure 3. As with output, utility is
maximized rst where families spend on both levels, second where they spend on early childhood,
third where they spend on late childhood, and nally where they spend on neither.
The generalization of this result and the intuition are similar to those regarding output. For
brevity, these are omitted. A key similarity, however, is that for lower levels of spending beyond
2
 1 utility, like output, is maximized where families spend on the more productive level of
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education. For a higher level of spending but below a cuto level, utility is maximized where
families spend on the less productive level. Beyond this, it is optimal that families spend on neither
level. Thus focused spending is output and utility maximizing for small enough & and balanced
spending is output and utility maximizing for large enough &. With utility, the cuto points are
dierent and are denoted by &u and &u:
4 The General Case
The previous section requires several restrictive assumptions. In this section we relax several items
of Assumption 1 and demonstrate that the restrictive model captures much of the key intuition
arising in the more general model.12 Relaxing any of the assumptions requires solving the model
numerically. The rst order conditions for the more general problem are straightforward extensions
of those in the proof to Proposition 1 and are not presented here. For brevity we hereafter focus
on output. From the preceding section it is clear that results regarding utility are similar.
In the rst panel we set  = :95 so that private and government spending are imperfectly
substitutable in the production of human capital. Results are similar to the second panel of Figure
2. The key dierence is a smoothing of the surface between the dierent regions. With imperfect
substitutability, family spending in either category will never go to zero. Thus we no longer have as
sharp a distinction across the regions. However, each policy pair yields results that are qualitatively
similar to the case with perfect substitutability. In particular, for moderate and high government
spending, we have local maxima at several values of  : The global maximum again depends on &
and in the same way as before. However, it is straightforward to show that when human capital is a
Cobb-Douglas combination of private and government spending, output is always maximized when
resources are split relatively equally. From this we conclude that concentrated public spending can
maximize output only in the case where private and public spending are relatively close substitutes.
In the second panel of Figure 6 we additionally set  =  1 so that early and late childhood
expenditures are more complementary than in the Cobb-Douglas case. One dierence is that the
output maximizing level of  shifts to the left (when not a corner). This is because early childhood
spending now has a larger positive eect on the productivity of later spending. Still, the results
mirror those in Figure 2 and the intuition above still serves to understand the results.
12We run a similar experiment to examine changes in r. The results change little, with r simply serving to scale
the output eect. For this reason, the results are not presented here.
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Figure 6: Sensitivity. The rst panel sets  = :95: The second panel additionaly sets  =  1:
5 Heterogeneity
We now consider the impact of policy across a heterogeneous population. As stated in Section
2, heterogeneity is expressed by dierent levels of aj : There are strong similarities between the
heterogeneous family economy and the one family economy discussed above. Since the higher
indexed families will have a higher value of aj , in equilibrium they will also have higher income.
With heterogeneity, the common level of government expenditure for each family will represent
dierent ratios of government spending to individual income. In particular, a common level of
government education spending, &; will represent lower government spending relative to income for
high income families than for low income families. To see it, recall that & is the share of total
output that goes to education. With the population of each generation normalized to 1, lifetime
government education spending per family is &ZH. Since the income of family j is Zh2j ; government
spending as a share of own income for family j is
&j = &
H
h2j
: (15)
It is this &j value that matters to families, rather than & alone.
The distribution of &j clearly depends on & and the distribution of output. This latter item
maps into the distribution of aj : Stated dierently, we can choose the distribution of &j through
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Figure 7: Output and maximum output. The rst panel shows normalized output across the income
distribution (represented by ~&j) as a function or  . The second panel shows normalized output
across the income distribution when  is chosen to yield a local maximum. The brackets show which
type of equilibrium maximizes output globally at the relevant point in the income distribution. For
each agent, output is normalized by output for that agent when & = 0:
choosing the distribution of aj : The relationship will be such that the smallest aj is associated with
the largest &j .
With a few caveats we can provide a dierent interpretation of our earlier ndings. Rather
than considering a representative family at dierent levels of spending, we can consider dierent
families with common government spending. In the earlier analysis H = 2h2 so dierences in
&j are generated by dierences in &: Now we hold & constant and allow dierences in &j though
heterogeneity in h2j :
With heterogeneity, we must turn to numerical results even with the parameter restrictions in
Assumption 1. These results are presented in Figure 7. The rst panel is analogous to the second
panel of Figure 2. The dierence is that the variation in &j is a general equilibrium consequence
of variation in ability. Specically, for this example we assume that ability is uniform over [:5; 5]
and & = :02: We then nd values of fh2;jg 8j 2 J and other endogenous items such that the
denition of an equilibrium is satised. Given fh2;jg 8j we know H and thus can use equation
(15) to nd the distribution of &j : For ease of comparison, we plot a monotonic transformation of
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&j (~&j) against  on the horizontal axes and normalized output along the vertical axis.
13 As before,
output is normalized by what it would be with & = 0:
The rst panel of Figure 7 shows that there are again four distinct regions. These correspond
to the regions in Figure 2. For ~&j small (wealthy families), output is independent of  : For larger
values of ~&j (less wealthy families), output depends on  : In particular, for any level of ~&j there are
up to three local maxima. Which of these is the global maximum depends on ~&j .
The second panel of Figure 7 shows how. It is analogous to Figure 3 and shows the global
maximum income as a function of ~&j : Moving right to left, we see that low income families prefer
relatively balanced spending. When government focuses spending on one level, these families spend
on the other. With low income however, the private spending level is low, resulting in low human
capital and output.
Further to the left, agents prefer focused spending. For the lower income families among these,
output is highest when government focuses on the more productive form of education (large  )
and families spend at the other level. This is because family spending is small relative to focused
government spending and it is best to have the larger amount of spending allocated to its most
productive use. For the next group of families, private spending is large relative to focused gov-
ernment spending. As such, their income is maximized when government spending is focused on
the less productive stage. Finally, for the most wealthy agents, government spending at one stage
simply displaces private spending so that output is unchanging in  .
Because the analogy with the homogeneous case is quite strong, this discussion is quite similar to
the discussion after Figure 2. There are, however, some dierences. The key qualitative dierence
is that in Figure 2 output is non-monotonic in & when f = (0; f2 ) or f = (f1 ; 0) : This is because
in Figure 2 an increase in & requires an increase in taxes which crowds out private spending. In
Figure 7, & is xed so this eect does not arise. Also in Figure 7, with f = (f1 ; f2 ) ; y increases
moderately with &j . This reects that the income tax to nance education is more onerous for
those with larger incomes.
Despite these minor dierences, we can by and large take the discussion regarding output and
utility in the above sections and generalize it to the case where families dier in ability. We need
only to recognize that a level of government spending signies a dierent relevant & for the dierent
families. In general, when there are substantial dierences in income, there will be dierences in
13Specically, the axis is ~&j = a(j) 2 [:5; 5] : This allows for easier comparison and provides the same essential
information since there is a one-to-one correspondence between a(j) and &j .
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preferred policies. In particular, focusing expenditures on late childhood may benet some families
at the detriment of others.
6 Conclusion
Early childhood education builds a foundation of knowledge and habits that makes later education
more productive. Later education gives this foundation value through a realization of potential.
Most prior work abstracts from this hierarchical structure of human capital accumulation. This
paper contributes to a nascent literature that instead makes this structure the focal point of its
investigations. Our purpose is to evaluate the structure of government education spending in a
model of hierarchical human capital accumulation. Currently, government spending favors late
childhood over early childhood. We explore whether a reallocation toward early childhood would
be benecial.
Our general equilibrium environment accounts for crowding out of private spending by public
spending. In our baseline model, private and public spending are perfectly substitutable so that a
unit of government spending osets a unit of private spending. Only when private spending on at
least one stage of education is driven to zero can policy aect output. We show that for low levels
of funding, government maximizes output by funding only the less productive type of education.
For intermediate levels of funding, government should nance only the more productive type of
education. Only when the total level of funding is above a threshold should it fund both.
The rst results are derived in a highly stylized setting. This has the advantage of analytical
tractability. The stylized model also proves sucient for demonstrating the key implications of
the model. Through sensitivity analyses, we demonstrate that relaxing this strict structure leaves
the most interesting results qualitatively unchanged. An exception is the perfect substitutability
of private and public resources. When we make these inputs relatively substitutable, but not
perfectly so, results are largely unchanged. When the inputs are relatively complementary, output
is no longer maximized by concentrated spending.
The nal part of the paper shows that these results can be easily generalized to the case of
heterogeneous agents. The dierent levels of spending in earlier sections correspond to dierent
income levels in the nal section. With a common level of education spending across agents, there
will be agents who privately spend at both stages, one stage, or no stage. The analysis shows that
concentrated spending can be best for some part of the population while inappropriate for the lower
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income agents.
Our concern is the theoretical implications of allocating government education expenditures in
a hierarchical education system. To maintain focus, even our more general model abstracts from
many important considerations. As such, we do not attempt to quantify our ndings through a
careful calibration. Such a quantitative investigation would be a useful next step. There are a
number of issues that might prove interesting in a fuller model. Our model has no physical capital
in production. Thus there is no worry of taxation lowering the capital stock. Our model has
no credit constraints despite their central role in many other studies of education. We do not
consider imperfect inheritance of ability. These omissions could be remedied in a fuller, empirical
investigation. However, we expect that the key intuition developed above will continue to hold and
thus aid in our understanding of the implications of government education spending.
A more complete analysis might also consider a fuller set of policy options. For brevity, we have
restricted attention to the experiments described above. The model, however, is suggestive of other
policy implications. Rather than considering spending policies which are symmetric across the
population, we could consider the eects of progressive spending where government spends more
on those with lower income. This is more reective of the well-known Perry Preschool Project, the
Abecedarian Project (see CHLM (2007)), and Head Start (see Currie (2001b)). Each of these has
targeted low income families and has arguably been highly benecial to the targeted population.
In our setup, we would expect to see expenditures at these levels have the largest impact due
to diminished crowding out and a higher marginal benet to an increment in total spending for
low income households. This would be consistent with the conclusion by Currie (2001a) that
\priority should be given to expanding Head Start rather than funding universal preschool" since
children of the lower income parents are more in need of quality preschool. Furthermore, progressive
spending may have additional economy-wide benets when dierent levels of skill are complements
in production. A potentially fruitful direction for future policy analysis, then, is the exploration of
optimal spending allocation across the income distribution.
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Appendix
Proof of Propositions 1-3. The agent's problem is to maximize equation (4) subject to the con-
straints in equation (5) and the relationships in equations (1) and (2). We impose the last two lines
of equation (5) to arrive at the following Lagrangian:
L = ln c3 +  ln c4 +  ln Aw (f1 + g1) (f2 + g2)2
+ (I (1  )  c3   c4   f1   f2) :
The structure of the problem assures that the rst line of equation (5) will hold with equality and
that the non-negativity constraints in the second line of equation (5) will not bind in equilibrium.
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However, the non-negativity constraints in the third line may bind so we write the Kuhn-Tucker
conditions as
c3 :
1
c3
   = 0 (16a)
c4 :

c4
   = 0 (16b)
f1 :

f1+g1
    0; f1  0; and


f1+g1
  

f1 = 0 (16c)
f2 :
2
f2+g2
    0; f2  0; and

2
f2+g2
  

f2 = 0 (16d)
 : I (1  )  c3   c4   f1   f2 = 0: (16e)
There are four cases to consider.
Let f = (f1 ; 0) : Equations (16a)-(16c) into equation (16e) and the assumption f2 = 0 give
c3 =
I(1 )+g1
2
; c4 = c3; f1 = c3   g1; f2 = 0: (17)
Let f = (f1 ; f2 ) : Equations (16a)-(16d) into equation (16e) gives
c3 =
I(1 )+g1+g2
1
; c4 = c3; f1 = c3   g1; f2 = c32   g2: (18)
Let f = (0; 0) : Equations (16a) and (16b) into equation (16e) and the assumption f1 = f2 = 0 give
c3 =
I(1 )
1+ ; c4 = c3; f1 = 0; f2 = 0: (19)
Let f = (0; f2 ) : Equations (16a), (16b), and (16d) into equation (16e) and the assumption f1 = 0
give
c3 =
I(1 )+g2
3
; c4 = c3; f1 = 0; f2 = c32   g2: (20)
With r = 1, from equations (3), (6), and (9) and the equilibrium conditions that H = H2 and
w = Z we have
Y = I = wh2: (21)
From equations (6), (7), (8), and (21) we have
 = &; g1 = & I; g2 = & (1   ) I : (22)
Next, using the third and fourth items in equations (17)-(20) along with equations (10) and (22)
in equation (11) gives
h2 =
8>><>>:
A (c3)
 (& (1   ) I)2 if f = (f1 ; 0)
A (c3)
 (c32)
2 if f = (f1 ; f2 )
A (& I) (& (1   ) I)2 if f = (0; 0)
A (& I) (c32)
2 if f = (0; f2 ) :
(23)
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Equations (17)-(20) and (22) give
c3 =
8>><>>:
I (1  & (1   )) 12 if f = (f1 ; 0)
I 11 if f = (f

1 ; f

2 )
I (1  &) (1 + ) 1 if f = (0; 0)
I (1  & ) 13 if f = (0; f2 ) :
(24)
Using equations (21) and (24) in equation (23) gives
h2 =
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:

Aw+2
 
 (1  & (1   )) 12

(& (1   ))2
 1
1  2 if f = (f1 ; 0)
Aw+2 () (2)
2 
 (+2)
1

if f = (f1 ; f2 ) 
Aw+2 (& ) (& (1   ))2 11  2 if f = (0; 0)
Aw+2 (& )
 
(1  & ) 13 2
2 11  2 if f = (0; f2 ) :
Using this in equation (21) and simplifying gives equation (13).
Consider circumstances under which equilibrium types exist.
Let f = (f1 ; 0) : Putting equation (16a) into equation (16d), we see that f2 = 0 if c3  g22 :
From the third item in equation (17), f1  0 requires c3  g1 : Using equation (8) and the rst line
of equation (24) along with Y = I, these constraints can be written as
& I

 I (1  &) + I& 
2
 & (1   ) I
2
:
Solving for  ; this can be rewritten to give the rst line of equation (12).
Let f = (f1 ; f2 ) : From equation (18), f1  0 and f2  0 requires
c3  max

g1

;
g2
2

and using equation (8) and the second line of equation (24) this is
I 11  max

& I

;
& (1   ) I
2

:
Solving for  ; this can be rewritten to give the second line of equation (12).
Let f = (0; 0) : Putting equation (16a) into equations (16c) and (16d), we see that f2 = 0 if
c3  g22 and f1 = 0 if c3 
g1
 : Using equation (8) and the third line of equation (24), these
constraints can be written as
I (1  &)
1 + 
 min

& I

;
& (1   ) I
2

:
Solving for  ; this can be rewritten to give the third line of equation (12).
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Let f = (0; f2 ) : Putting equation (16a) into equation (16c), we see that f1 = 0 if c3  g1 : From
the fourth item in equation (20), f2  0 requires c3  g22 : Using equation (8) and the fourth line
of equation (24), these constraints can be written as
& (1   ) I
2
 I (1  & ) 13 
& I

:
Solving for  ; this can be rewritten to give the fourth line of equation (12). It is straightforward
to show that conditions allowing the four cases are mutually exclusive.
Finally, consider utility. From I^ = I; equation (4) and equations (18)-(19), Uj = ln
c1+3 I
:
Thus equation (14) follows directly from equation (24). U = exp (Uj)
  which is a monotonic
transformation.
Proof of Corollary 1. Consider the second line of equation (12). The left-hand-side inequality
holds for all values of  only if &  2 11 : The right-hand-side inequality holds for all values of  
if and only if &   11 : Thus both always hold only if &  min

2
 1
1 ; 
 1
1

. Along with the
denition of low spending, this gives the rst line of Corollary 1. The second line of the corollary
follows from the rst and fourth lines of equation (12) where we see that for  small, families spend
only on early childhood and with  large, families spend only on late childhood. Finally, note that
f = (0; 0) can exist for some  if and only if 1+
1 &
&  1   21+ 1 && : This requires &  +21 .
Similarly f = (f1 ; f2 ) can exist for some  if and only if 1   21& 

1&
: This requires &  +21 :
Along with the denitions of moderate and high spending, this proves the nal line.
Proof of Corollary 2. For brevity, we provide only a sketch of the proof. Throughout, we
consider ~I =
 
Aw
 1
I1  2 rather than I with no loss of generality.
From equation (12), the following equilibria exist for some value of  2 [0; 1] given the values
of & :
f =
8>>>><>>>>:
(f1 ; f2 ) if &  21
(f1 ; f2 ) ; (f1 ; 0) if
2
1
 &  1
(f1 ; f2 ) ; (f1 ; 0) ; (0; f2 ) if

1
 &  (+2)1
(0; 0) ; (f1 ; 0) ; (0; f2 ) if &  (+2)1 :
Dene ~If1 ;0 to be output in f = (f

1 ; 0) when  is chosen to locally maximize output. Stated
dierently, it is the maximum output over the range of  supporting f = (f1 ; 0) given &: Output
is maximized over this range either at  = 0 or where @I@ = 0; with I given by the rst line of
equation (13). From choosing the output maximizing level of  in equation (13) we nd
~If1 ;0 =
(  
 (1  &) 12

&2 if &  2+2
 
2
+2
 12
  2
+2
2
if &  2+2 :
(25)
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Similarly
~I0;f2 =
(
&
 
(1  &) 13 2
2 if &  +2

+2
  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+2
 13 
2
if &  +2 ;
(26)
~I0;0 =

&
 + 2
  &2
 + 2
2
; (27)
and
~If1 ;f2 = ()
 (2)
2 
 (+2)
1 : (28)
Each is continuous. The rst two are initially increasing in & and level out at & = 2+2
and +2
.
The third is increasing in & always and the fourth is independent of &:
Consider starting with & = 0 and increasing &. Initially output is globally maximized at f =
(f1 ; f2 ) since only this equilibrium exists. When ~If1 ;0 comes into existence at & =
2
1
, ~If1 ;0 =
~If1 ;f2
and the ratio of ~If1 ;0 to
~If1 ;f2 is increasing in &: Thus beginning here, (f

1 ; 0) is optimal and beyond
this value of &; f = (f1 ; f2 ) can not be globally optimal.
When ~I0;f2 comes into existence at & =

1
, ~I0;f2 <
~If1 ;0: This is because at this value
~I0;f2 =
~If1 ;f2 and
~If1 ;0 >
~If1 ;f2 . Also, the ratio of
~I0;f2 to
~If1 ;0 is increasing in &: At their maximum values
~I0;f2 >
~If1 ;0: To see this, put & =
2
+2
into the rst line of equation (25) and & = +2
into the
rst line of equation (26) and compare. This is sucient to show that ~I0;f2 =
~If1 ;0 at one value of
&: Call it &y: Beyond &y; f = (f

1 ; 0) cannot be globally optimal.
When ~I0;0 comes into existence at & =
(+2)
1
, ~I0;0 < ~I0;f2 : This is because at this value
~I0;0 = ~If1 ;f2 and
~I0;f2 >
~If1 ;f2 . Also, the ratio of
~I0;0 to ~I0;f2 is increasing in &: At their maximum
values ~I0;0 > ~I0;f2 : To see this, put & =

+2
into the rst line of equation (26) and & = 1 into the
rst line of equation (27) and compare. This is sucient to show that ~I0;0 = ~I0;f2 at one value of
&: Call it &y . Beyond &y; f = (0; f

2 ) cannot be globally optimal.
We have shown that in the range & 2

2
1
; &y

; ~If1 ;0 >
~If1 ;f2 ;
~I0;f2 . To assure a global
maximum, we need to show that ~If1 ;0 >
~I0;0 in this range. Suppose ~If1 ;0 =
~I0;f2 <
~I0;0 at & = &y.
Then ~I0;0 = ~I0;f2 (& = &y) must occur at a lower value of & than
~I0;0 = ~If1 ;0 and before & = &y. This
is because ~I0;f2 <
~If1 ;0 to the left of & = &y and their ratio is increasing in & over this range. At the
point where ~I0;f2 =
~I0;0, it must be that ~If1 ;0 >
~I0;0 so long as & < &y. ~If1 ;0 =
~I0;0 only at a larger
&:
We show that this cannot hold (a contradiction) and that in fact ~I0;0 = ~I0;f2 occurs at a higher
value of & than ~I0;0 = ~If1 ;0 . To show this, we nd the values of & that solve
~I0;0 = ~If1 ;0 and
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~I0;0 = ~I0;f2 and then determine that
~I0;0 = ~I0;f2 occurs at a lower value of & than
~I0;0 = ~If1 ;0 only
if
1 +  + 2
1 +  + 
<

 + 2

 
2

 + 2
2
 2

:
The two sides of this are equal at  = 2: The left hand side is decreasing in : The right hand
side is increasing in : This is not obvious but can be shown to hold. Given this, the inequality
cannot hold for  > 2. Thus ~I0;0 = ~I0;f2 occurs at a higher value of & than
~I0;0 = ~If1 ;0. With this,
we know that ~If1 ;0 >
~I0;0 over & 2

2
1
; &y

and an equilibrium with f = (f1 ; 0) is globally optimal
in this range.
Since ~If1 ;0 =
~I0;f2 >
~I0;0 at & = &y, by continuity and earlier arguments, we know that in a
neighborhood to the right of this ~I0;f2 >
~I0;0 and ~I0;f2 is a global optimum. We also know they
cross as some point &y and beyond this ~I0;0 is globally optimal. This completes the sketch of the
proof.
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Part II
Chapter 2: Measures of Human Capital in
Growth Regressions
7 Introduction
\All who have meditated on the art of governing mankind have been convinced that the fate of
empires depends on the education of youth." {Aristotle
\Education is the most powerful weapon which you can use to change the world." {Nelson Mandela
\Our progress as a nation can be no swifter than our progress in education." {John F. Kennedy
\The future belongs to the nation that best educates its citizens. . . " {President Barack Obama
There is no doubt that education is important. The quotations above illustrate this consensus.
Formal education is a signicant period in most peoples' lives, with the average American spending
about 20% of their existence in school14. In addition to time, a huge amount of resources is devoted
to schooling each year. Spending on public and private education at all levels (pre-kindergarten
to graduate school) in the U.S. was approximately $972 billion for the 2006-2007 school year with
total education expenditures accounting for about 7.4% of U.S. GDP15. In the U.S., local and
state governments are the largest source of these funds with the federal government and individuals
playing smaller roles.
Education is critical in generating human capital. The Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD) denes human capital as the \productive wealth embodied in labor,
skills, and knowledge"16. Human capital is typically considered a main determinant of productivity
and economic growth. This follows the notion that more educated and skilled workers will be more
productive and innovative. Economists recognized the importance of human capital very early
on. In 1776, Adam Smith dened human capital as the \acquired and useful abilities of all the
inhabitants or members of the society"17. In 1890, Alfred Marshall stressed the importance of
human capital by stating, \The most valuable of all capital is that invested in human beings."18
14Author's calculation using 2009 estimated U.S. life expectancy (CIA World Factbook.
www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/us.html) and 2006 U.S. school life expectancy (UNESCO.
www.unesco.org).
15U.S. Department of Education, NCES Digest of Education Statistics 2007.
16OECD glossary of statistical terms. www.oecd.org/glossary.
17Quotation from An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, originally published in 1776.
18From Woessmann (2003){quotation from Principles of Economics, originally published in 1890.
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Human capital can be gained through multiple sources, but the focus of most studies is on formal
education. Education can be inuenced the most by policy and the data is more abundant than
for other aspects of human capital such as training, experience, and environment. Most countries
recognize the value of education and therefore strive to provide quality schooling for as much of
the population as possible. Despite this seemingly common goal, the results across countries are
quite dierent. Governments typically provide the majority of funds to education and set policies
that aect education outcomes. Disparities in priorities are evident through dierences in spending
and its allocation, the organization of the schooling system, and the education services provided.
Furthermore, richer countries tend to outperform poorer countries in most education indicators.
The role of human capital is acknowledged in both the theoretical and empirical economic
growth literature. As discussed by Engelbrecht (2003), the theoretical literature suggests three
main channels through which human capital aects economic growth. First, education increases the
human capital of a country's labor force, and the accumulation of human capital over time positively
aects growth. Second, increases in human capital lead to greater technological innovation. Finally,
higher levels of human capital enhance a country's capacity to understand and implement new
technology.
Empirically, the most common approach for examining the impact of human capital on economic
growth is to estimate growth regressions. The dependent variable representing economic growth
is typically a country's average annual growth rate of real GDP per capita, while the independent
variables vary by author and study. Most research now includes a variable representing human
capital along with other variables considered important for growth.
Examining the importance of education for economic growth has become increasingly popular.
A quick EconLit search with the keywords \human capital" or \education" and \growth" yielded
11,014 articles with 40% of these originating since 200519. While intuition and theory provide
strong support for the importance of human capital and education, the empirical ndings are
less certain. The majority of studies do show that education signicantly impacts growth, but
there are conicting results as well. Despite the mixed empirical results, most are still condent
that education is a worthwhile endeavor. The World Bank asserts that \education is central for
development" and that it \empowers people and strengthens nations"20. The United Nations
Education, Scientic, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) provides the same message, stating
19Calculation was based on an EconLit search on March 26, 2010.
20World Bank. www.worldbank.org/education.
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that education is \key to social and economic development"21.
The studies of the eect of education on economic growth have a far-reaching impact through
the inuence on government policy. Governments face numerous education decisions such as those
regarding resource allocation, laws and regulations, programs oered, and student and teacher
assessment. The results from economic research help guide all of these decisions and can lead to
reform in any area of education. Conicting results make it more dicult for policy makers to
determine the most eective strategies.
There are several explanations for the inconsistent ndings among the growth literature. A
main reason, and the focus of this paper, is the measurement of human capital22. Human capital
is a complex concept that is dicult to accurately represent with a single measure. Quantifying
the knowledge and skills of a nation's citizens is a major challenge faced by researchers.
Including a measure of human capital in growth regressions gained popularity in the 1990's
and is now the standard. Over the years human capital has been quantied in many dierent
ways. These measures typically reect an aspect of formal education, which ignores other sources
of human capital such as training and experience as well as the eect of family and peers. The
best measure for a growth regression is one that most accurately captures the concept of human
capital based on the economic theory to be tested. Unfortunately, the choice of a proxy for human
capital is often determined by data collection and availability. There is a general consensus that
human capital is poorly proxied in much of the research23. While the choice of proxy is critical,
few studies give an explanation for why a particular measure is chosen. Here lies the motivation
for this paper.
School enrollment rates and years of schooling or educational attainment are the most frequently
used proxies for human capital. Over time these measures have been updated, and new proxies
have been introduced. Recently, measures that account for the quality of education, not just the
quantity, have gained popularity24. The evolution has occurred with the increased access to better-
quality and expanded data sets. Improving the measurement of human capital has also been the
focus of many recent studies25.
21UNESCO. www.unesco.org.education.
22Other sources of inconsistency between growth studies are the model specication, the time period, and the
sampled countries.
23See, for example, Woessmann (2003) and Temple (1999).
24See, for example, Hanushek and Kimko (2000) and Barro and Lee (2001).
25Examples include de la Fuente and Domenech (2000) and Cohen and Soto (2007).
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The purpose of this paper is to provide a comprehensive review of the human capital proxies
employed most often in the empirical growth literature. The rest of this paper is organized as
follows. Sections 2 through 8 each give a detailed discussion of a measure of human capital.
In each of these sections, there is a description of the measure along with its current trends, a
summary of the uses in the literature and the results achieved, a discussion of the advantages and
disadvantages, and nally a list of the most common data sets. Section 9 concludes the review.
8 Enrollment
8.1 Description and Trends
Enrollment measures are a common proxy used in the growth literature, especially in earlier studies.
Studies generally use total enrollment rates, gross enrollment ratios, or net enrollment ratios for
either primary or secondary schooling. According to UNESCO, a gross enrollment ratio measures
the ratio of the number of children enrolled at a given level of education regardless of their age
to the number of children in the age range ocially corresponding to that level of education. A
net enrollment ratio, however, only takes into account children enrolled who belong to the ocial
age range for the given level of education regardless of whether younger or older children are also
enrolled. Much of the earlier research relied on enrollment measures to proxy human capital
because the data was widely available and easy to use. The popularity of enrollment as a proxy
has declined with time as data for alternative proxies has become available.
Increasing school enrollment has been a common goal across countries for some time now. On
December 10th, 1948, the General Assembly of the United Nations established the Universal Dec-
laration of Human Rights. Article 26 of the Declaration states that, \Everyone has the right to
education. Education shall be free, at least in the elementary and fundamental stages. Elementary
education shall be compulsory. . . "26. To rearm this promise, the 1990 World Conference on
Education for All ocially declared the commitment of Education for All, which pledged to pro-
vide education to \every citizen in every society". One of the goals set forth was to have universal
primary education (UPE) in all countries by 2015. Progress was slow in the 1990s, so the commit-
ment was renewed at the World Education Forum in Senegal in 2000. Since this time progress has
improved, and the number of children in primary school has greatly increased27.
26Information is from the United Nations. www.un.org/overview/rights.html.
27See the Education for All Global Monitoring Report 2008.
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Total Enroll.
(in millions)
Gross Enroll.
Ratio
Net Enroll.
Ratio
1991 1999 2006 1991 1999 2006 1991 1999 2006
World 598 648 688 98% 99% 105% 81% 82% 86%
Developing Countries 508 561 609 97% 99% 106% 78% 81% 85%
Developed Countries 73 70 66 102% 102% 101% 96% 97% 95%
Countries in Transition 18 16 13 97% 104% 99% 89% 88% 90%
Table 1: Primary Education Enrollment. Source: Education for All Gobal Monitoring Report 2009,
Table 2.3.
Table 1 shows that about 40 million more children were enrolled in primary education in 2006
than in 1999. This increase was mainly attributable to improvements in sub-Saharan Africa and in
South and West Asia28. According to the World Bank, 47 out of 163 countries have achieved the
goal of UPE, 20 are on track to achieve UPE, but 44 (23 of which are in sub-Saharan Africa) will
not meet the goal unless substantial changes are made. So, while access to education is broadening
and enrollment is growing, there is still room for improvement.
There are a many factors aecting enrollment across countries. Much of the improvement in
access and enrollment is attributable to governments making education a higher priority. Increas-
ing participation in education requires legislation and enforcement along with the allocation of
signicant resources. Many countries have now passed compulsory education laws and eliminated
schooling fees. The health of a country's citizens also inuences enrollment. It is not only the well-
being of the children that is important for education participation, but also that of their family
members. The prevalence of diseases such as HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria has prevented
many children from entering school and forced others to dropout. Nutrition and immunizations are
key for increasing enrollment in developing countries. Population growth and age distribution also
aect enrollment rates. Countries with faster population growth and higher percentages of school
aged children will likely have increased enrollment. Finally, the structure and economic well-being
of families impact enrollment. Children from two-parent homes are more likely to attend school,
and children from families where the opportunity cost of their education is highest are less likely29.
When children are in school, they are not producing or earning money for the family. It is nec-
essary to reduce the opportunity cost of sending children to school, perhaps by oering monetary
incentives to parents for their children's attendance.
28Enrollment increased by 42% in sub-Saharan Africa and by a combined 22% in South and West Asia.
29From the Education for All Global Monitoring Report 2008.
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Gross Enroll.
Ratio
Net Enroll.
Ratio
1991 1999 2006 1991 1999 2006
World 98% 99% 105% 81% 82% 86%
Developing Countries 97% 99% 106% 78% 81% 85%
Developed Countries 102% 102% 101% 96% 97% 95%
Countries in Transition 97% 104% 99% 89% 88% 90%
Table 2: Secondary Education Enrollment. Source: Education for All Global Monitoring Report
2009, Table 2.7.
Secondary education enrollment has also seen progress. About 513 million students were in
enrolled in secondary schooling worldwide in 2006. This accounts for approximately 58% of the
population in the corresponding age range and is an increase of 76 million students since 1999.
All developed countries and most countries in transition are close to achieving universal secondary
enrollment, but the same is not true for developing countries30. See Table 2 for secondary education
enrollment ratios for countries at dierent levels of development.
Secondary schooling is often separated into lower and upper levels. Lower secondary along
with primary education is compulsory in most countries. Most exceptions to this trend can be
found in sub-Saharan Africa and South and West Asia. In countries where secondary enrollment
is relatively low, many students dropout after completing lower secondary education31. As with
primary education, despite recent progress, there is still a long way to go to provide all children
with access to secondary education.
8.2 Literature
Enrollment measures have been a popular proxy for human capital, especially in earlier studies. In
the seminal growth study by Barro (1991), a country's initial human capital is proxied as enrollment
in 1960 at both the primary and secondary level. These give the number of students enrolled in
each level relative to the population of the corresponding age group. The study examines the eect
of these measures on the growth rate of real GDP per capital from 1960 to 1985 for 98 countries.
Barro (1991) concludes that initial human capital, at both the primary and secondary level, is
positively related to growth.
Mankiw et al. (1992) also produced an inuential growth study using enrollment data to capture
30Countries in sub-Saharan Africa and South and West Asia are furthest from reaching universal secondary enroll-
ment. Information and data is from the Education for All Global Monitoring Report 2008.
31See the Education for All Global Monitoring Report 2005.
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a country's human capital. Their paper centers on an augmented Solow model with both physical
and human capital as explanatory variables. Human capital is represented by the fraction of the
working age population enrolled in secondary education. The study's cross-country regressions
show, like Barro (1991), that this measure of human capital has a signicant positive eect on
growth from 1960 to 1985. Mankiw et al. (1992) also nd that adding human capital to the model
reduces the impact of physical capital and improves the overall performance of the model.
Empirical studies with cross-country growth regressions have found numerous variables to be
signicant for growth. Levine and Renelt (1992) perform a robustness check on some of the early
ndings to determine how sensitive these results are to changes in model specication. Speci-
cally, their extreme bounds analysis examines the signicance of variables as dierent variables are
included in the growth regression. The results show that the signicance of most results is very
sensitive to small changes in the model. However, the analysis does conrm the ndings of the two
papers above by showing that the 1960 secondary enrollment rate is positively and robustly related
to growth.
Like Levine and Renelt (1992), the purpose of the study by Sala-i-Martin et al. (2004) is to
explore the robustness of explanatory variables used in cross-country growth regressions. They
develop an approach called Bayesian Averaging of Classical Estimates, which is less strict than
extreme bounds analysis. BACE creates estimates by averaging coecients from OLS regressions
across dierent models. Sala-i-Martin et al. (2004) test 67 explanatory variables found to be
signicant in the literature and discover that 18 are signicantly and robustly related to growth.
The primary education enrollment rate in 1960 is shown to be highly important for growth, ranking
2nd based on a goodness-of-t measure. Other education measures are also tested. The higher
education enrollment rate in 1960 ranked 25th, and public education spending in 1960 ranked 48th.
The positive relationship between enrollment and growth has been veried by other studies. Bils
and Klenow (2000) reproduce the results of Barro (1991) using updated data. They conrm that
primary and secondary enrollment rates in 1960 have a positive eect on GDP growth between
1960 and 1990. Bils and Klenow (2000) extend their study to investigate the causality of this
relationship. They conclude that the results partly reect the impact of growth on schooling, not
just the eect of schooling on growth.
Kalaitzidakis et al. (2001) take a dierent approach and examine nonlinearities in the relation-
ship between human capital and growth. They use enrollment rates at the primary and secondary
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level to make the results comparable with earlier studies. The ndings show that enrollment rates
positively inuence growth from 1960 to 1990 and that the eect is linear.
Webber (2002) also nds enrollment to be a signicant determinant of growth. His study shows
that secondary education enrollment is the most important, followed by primary, and then tertiary.
Agiomirgianakis et al. (2002) also proxy human capital using enrollment at the primary, secondary,
and tertiary levels of education. Their analysis focuses on economic growth from 1960 to 1987 for
93 countries. All three measures give positive and highly signicant coecients with larger eects
for higher levels of education.
Finally, a recent study by Keller (2006) examines growth using enrollment data for 1960 to
2000. She nds that enrollment rates in both secondary and higher education have a signicant
positive eect on growth. However, she nds a negative eect for primary education enrollment.
The review above shows that studies using enrollment as a proxy for human capital generally
nd a signicant positive relationship with economic growth. However, as alternative measures of
human capital have been developed and new data has become available, enrollment rates are used
less in the growth literature.
8.3 Advantages and Disadvantages
The primary reason for the use of enrollment data is the accessibility of data sets. Enrollment
data is readily available for a large number of countries and for a long period of time. Enrollment
is easy to measure and less subjective than other human capital variables. For these reasons,
enrollment data exhibits less measurement error than other education data. Another benet of
using enrollment measures is the straightforward interpretation of results.
Many criticisms have been voiced about the use of enrollment as a proxy for human capital. It
is even common for studies using enrollment measures to discuss the weaknesses of the proxy. One
of these is an issue surrounding most human capital proxies. Human capital is comprised of the
knowledge and skills obtained through schooling, experience, training, family, and peers. However,
enrollment captures only formal education. This focus on formal schooling is mostly attributable
to data limitations.
Enrollment is a quantitative measure of education. Quantitative measures of education are
typically described as either ow variables or stock variables. The two types of variables dier
in their contribution to the labor force. Enrollment rates are an educational ow variable that
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Source Details
Mankiw et al. (1992) Enrollment rate at secondary level; 98 counties; 1960 to
1985
Barro and Lee (1993) Enrollment rates at primary, secondary, and tertiary level;
98 countries; 1960 to 1985
Barro and Lee (2000) Update to 1993 dataset; enrollment rates at primary, sec-
ondary, and tertiary level; 98 countries; 1960 to 1995
Agiomirgianakis et al. (2002) Enrollment rates at primary, secondary, and tertiary level;
93 countries; 1960 to 1987
Keller (2006) Enrollment rates at primary, secondary, and tertiary level;
93 countries; 1960 to 2000
Table 3: Commonly Used Enrollment Data Sets.
only measure access to education and ignore the cumulative benets of completing additional years
of schooling. The consensus among the literature is that stock variables are more appropriate for
growth models32. There is a considerable lag between the time of enrollment in school and the
subsequent addition to the human capital of the labor force. Students enrolled in school may or
may not go on to enter the country's labor force. There could also be additions to the labor force
over time that are not represented in the enrollment data. Furthermore, Bassanini and Scarpetta
(2001) claim that reverse causality is less of an issue with stock variables than with ow variables.
Another major issue with enrollment measures is that they do not take into account the quality
of education. As pointed out by Hanushek and Kimko (2000), using enrollment rates to measure
human capital implies that being enrolled in school in Australia is the same as being enrolled in
Zimbabwe or any other country. This is clearly not reality. The quality of schooling varies drasti-
cally across countries. As discussed above, Barro (1991) initially uses enrollment data to examine
the role of human capital in growth. However, in later studies Barro departs from enrollment and
turns to measures that account for the quality of education. Barro and Lee (2001) state that pre-
vious studies using enrollment were awed by ignoring educational quality. Hanushek and Kimko
(2000) also stress that dierences in quality cannot be ignored.
8.4 Data and Summary
As discussed above, enrollment data is readily available. Table 3 lists the most popular enrollment
data sets from the cross-country growth literature. The data sets most frequently cited are those
from Barro and Lee (1993, 2000).
32See, for example, Kalaitzidakis et al. (2001) and Hanushek and Kimko (2000).
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The discussion of the literature shows that enrollment measures are generally positively and
signicantly related to economic growth. The two seminal papers by Barro (1991) and Mankiw
et al. (1992) both nd a signicant relationship between enrollment and growth from 1960 to
1985. Sala-i-Martin et al. (2004) test the robustness of this result and nd that primary education
enrollment in 1960 is a robustly signicant determinant of growth.
Enrollment was considered an adequate proxy for human capital in earlier growth studies.
However, it seems that this acceptance was driven primarily by the accessibility of the data. As
data for alternative measures has become available, the satisfaction with enrollment as a proxy has
declined. Temple (1999) states that enrollment rates should not be used now that other data is
available. A key drawback is that enrollment rates measure access to education rather than the
knowledge and skill accumulated throughout schooling. High enrollment rates do not necessarily
translate into a highly educated labor force. While the trend over time has been to move away
from enrollment measures toward stock and quality measures, some studies still employ enrollment
rates because of the data availability or for comparability reasons.
9 Literacy
9.1 Description and Trends
Literacy rates are common in earlier growth studies, but are now rarely used to measure human
capital. Literacy is most often dened as the ability to read and write, with understanding, a
short, simple statement about everyday life33. From this it is clear country's literacy rate reects
only the basic skills of the labor force. As suggested by Woessmann (2003), literacy rates, like
enrollment rates, are used to proxy human capital mainly because the data is widely available for
many countries and years.
Both UNESCO and the World Bank assert that literacy was largely neglected in the past.
However, literacy is now a part of the United Nations' Millennium Development Goals as well as
the Education for All Goals. The Millennium Development Goal of universal primary education
contains the objective that all children will attend school and learn basic literacy skills. The
Education for All Goal is to reach 50% improvement in adult literacy levels by 2015. Literacy
remains a serious problem worldwide, but especially in the poorest countries.
Large strides have been made, but global literacy progress has recently slowed. The percent of
33The World Bank. www.worldbank.org.
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Adult Lit. Rates
(1985-1994)
Adult Lit. Rates
(1995-2004)
Developing Countries 68% 77%
Developed Countries 99% 99%
Countries in Transition 98% 99%
Sub-Saharan Africa 54% 59%
Arab States 58% 70%
Central Asia 99% 99%
East Asia and Pacic 82% 92%
South and West Asia 48% 60%
Latin America and Caribbean 88% 90%
North America and West Europe 99% 99%
Central and East Europe 96% 97%
Table 4: Adult (15 and older) Literacy Rates. Source: Education for All Global Monitoring Report
2008, Table 2.15.
the world population over the age of 15 with basic reading and writing skills increased from 10%
in the mid-nineteenth century to over 80% in 200534. According to UNESCO, there are currently
776 million adults without fundamental literacy skills, and if countries continue on the same track,
there will still be about 700 million illiterate adults in 2015. The highest levels of illiteracy are
found in sub-Saharan Africa and South and West Asia where 19 countries have literacy rates below
55%. Table 4 gives literacy rates across dierent regions of the world between 1985 and 2004.
Approximately 80% of adult illiteracy is concentrated in only 20 countries, and more than half
is found in just 4 countries{China, India, Bangladesh, and Pakistan. Illiteracy is strongly linked to
poverty and disadvantage. Illiteracy rates are higher where access to schooling is limited and the
quality of education is low. There is also a sizeable gender gap in literacy levels in many countries
with women accounting for 64% of global illiteracy35. This reects the limited access to education
for females in some countries.
The typical literacy measures are based on the percentage of the adult population that is
either literate or not. A new measure was introduced in 1994 with the rst comparative survey
of adult literacy. The International Adult Literacy Survey (IALS) was a combined eort by
governments, statistical agencies, and the OECD. The IALS measures literacy prociency in several
skill categories along a continuum. The IALS tests individuals between the ages of 16 and 65 and
assesses their literacy skill over three areas{prose, document, and quantitative. The study was
34Education for All Global Monitoring Report 2006.
35Education for All Global Monitoring Report 2009.
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administered in 1994, 1996, and 1998 starting with 7 countries in 1994 and building to 23 countries
in 1998. The results from the study show large dierences within and between countries with all
populations showing a signicant proportion of low literacy. The results also show a link between
literacy and family background factors and educational attainment36.
The literacy rate now tends to be higher for the younger generation than for the older. This
attributable to the increased enrollment in schooling along with improvements in the quality of
education. There is a new focus on increasing literacy levels through the expansion of quality
schooling. In addition to providing high-quality primary education, literacy programs need to be
available for adults who never attended school or failed to obtain literacy skills37.
9.2 Literature
Literacy rates are used relatively sparsely in the growth literature. Romer (1989) provides the
most inuential paper using literacy to proxy human capital. However, he stresses that this
analysis could easily be performed with other measures of human capital. He uses the literacy
rate of a country's population to proxy human capital for three main reasons. First, the data is
easy to compile for a large number of countries whereas data for other measures is more limited.
Second, literacy is straightforward to compare across countries. Finally, Romer (1989) ignores other
measures of higher levels of human capital and focuses on literacy to \keep the project manageable".
The results show the initial level literacy (in 1960) has a positive relationship with growth between
1960 and 1985. This is conrmed using consumption of newsprint per capita as an instrumental
variable. In contrast, to the signicant relationship for the level of literacy, Romer (1989) nds
that the change in the level of literacy between 1960 and 1980 is not important for growth.
Due to a lack of data, Azariadis and Drazen (1990) use literacy of a country's population aged
ten and older as a proxy for investment in human capital. The authors clearly state that this was
not their ideal proxy, \. . . realizing that reliable data on some higher level of educational attainment
might be preferable if available". Their study covers 32 countries from 1940 to 1980. The results
show that literacy has no eect on growth in the higher income countries in the sample, but has a
signicant positive eect for the low and middle income countries.
Barro's (1991) study investigates the eect of human capital on growth for 1960 to 1985. Here he
focuses on enrollment as the proxy for human capital, but also examines the eect of other human
36Information regarding the IALS is from the OECD. www.oecd.org.
37See the World Bank Development Report 2007: Development and the Next Generation.
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capital measures such as the adult literacy rate in 1960. He comments that literacy is an appealing
measure because it is a stock measure instead of a ow measure as is enrollment. However, he
recognizes the shortcomings, stating that literacy rates are inconsistent and often inaccurate for
less developed countries. Barro's (1991) results show that when enrollment is included in the
regression, the eect of literacy on growth is negative. But when enrollment is excluded, literacy
has a signicantly positive eect.
In a later study, Barro and Lee (2000) examine the eect of human capital on growth using
educational attainment as their main proxy for human capital. They use IALS scores as a compar-
ison measure for their results. Barro and Lee (2000) nd a signicant relationship between IALS
scores and growth.
Coulombe and Tremblay (2006) also make use of the new IALS data to see the eect of human
capital on growth for 14 OECD countries. They utilize the IALS results to develop a time series of
the literacy level of a country's cohort of labor market entrants in each ve year period between 1960
and 1995. The study shows that literacy has a signicant positive impact on growth. Furthermore,
Coulombe and Tremblay (2006) conclude that their measure of literacy explains growth better than
measures of educational attainment.
A recent paper by Vinod and Kaushik (2007) examines the impact of human capital on economic
growth for 18 large developing countries from 1982 to 2001. They use a country's adult literacy rate
to proxy human capital. Their analysis indicates that human capital, as measured by illiteracy, is
important for growth.
Recognizing the limitation of basic literacy rates, Baten and van Zanden (2008) present a new
data set to proxy more advanced skills. They propose using book production per capita rather
than the usual literacy rates. The time period of their data also makes their study unique. The
authors introduce book production data for 8 European countries from 1454 to 1800. With their
new data set, Baten and van Zanden conclude that human capital has a strong positive inuence
on economic growth prior to 1800.
9.3 Advantages and Disadvantages
As discussed in the literature review, the key advantage of literacy rates is the widespread avail-
ability of data covering many years and a large sample of countries. This accessibility stems from
the ease of measurement at any point in time. In addition, the denition of literacy is common
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across countries. Another benet is that the concept of literacy is easy to interpret and the results
are straightforward to understand.
More importantly, however, is that literacy does appear to give a good indication of human
capital accumulation, especially for developing countries38. Rather than just measuring access to
education as with enrollment rates, literacy provides an outcome measure of schooling. It reects
a country's investment in basic human capital relative to other countries.
In contrast to schooling measures based on student data, much of the literacy data is based
on adults. This has the advantage of translating more directly to a country's labor force. This
reduces error that can arise from students not becoming part of the labor force or others entering
the labor force that did not attend school.
Most studies that employ literacy rates as the measure of human capital do so because of data
limitations. Romer (1989) and Azariadis and Drazen (1990) make it clear that literacy rates were
utilized simply for the ease of use and availability. Both arm that subsequent work would employ
dierent measures.
Literacy is proxy for very basic levels of human capital. This is a more acceptable measure for
developing countries where primary education is still expanding and improving. However, in more
developed countries the literacy rate is often near 100%. So, literacy rates do not reect investments
in human capital beyond basic skills. Basic literacy is only a small part of total human capital.
Using literacy rates ignores the importance of skills and knowledge obtained beyond basic literacy
and assumes that human capital remains constant over time. The IALS data aids in addressing
these deciencies.
There are also concerns about the quality of literacy data, particularly in less developed coun-
tries. In addition, the IALS data is still very limited in terms of the number of participating
countries and time period covered.
9.4 Data and Summary
Data availability is one of the advantages of literacy as a measure of human capital. Several
dierent measures have been used in the literature representing various levels of literacy, from very
basic to more advanced skills. See Table 5 for list of literacy data sets used throughout the growth
literature.
38See Judson (2002) for a discussion.
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Source Details
Romer (1989) Literacy rate; 1960; 94 countries
Romer (1989) Consumption of newsprint per capita; 1960; 94 countries
Barro (1991) Literacy rate; 1960; 98 countries
Azariadis and Drazen (1990) Literacy rate of population aged 10 and older; 32 countries;
1940 to 1980
Barro and Lee (2000) IALS scores; 12 OECD countries; 1994 to 1995
Coulombe and Tremblay (2006) IALS scores; 14 OECD countries; 1994 to 1998
Vinod and Kaushik (2007) Literacy rate of population aged 15 and older; 18 large
developing countries; 1982 to 2001
Baten and vanZanden (2008) Book production per capita; 8 European countries; 1454
to 1800
Table 5: Commonly Used Literacy Data Sets.
All in all, the studies that employ a measure of literacy for human capital nd a signicant
positive relationship with growth. The inuential paper by Romer (1989) shows that a country's
initial level of literacy positively impacts growth from 1960 to 1985, but the change in literacy
between 1960 to 1980 has no impact on growth.
As with enrollment rates, fewer studies use literacy rates as their sole measure of human capital
since data for alternative measures has become more widely available. The fact that literacy
rates reect only very basic skills is a main issue. An important study by Azariadis and Drazen
(1990) illustrates this by nding that literacy is important for growth in low and middle income
countries but not for higher income countries. The adult literacy rate for most developed countries
is close to 100%, so the measure cannot capture dierences in human capital across these countries.
However, recent studies are making use of IALS data as it becomes more widely available. Whereas
literacy rates measure only basic literacy and individuals are classied as either literate or not, the
IALS provides a measure of more advanced literacy skills and gives an individual a score within a
continuum. Coulombe and Tremblay (2006) conclude that IALS scores have a positive eect on
growth in OECD countries.
10 Educational Attainment
10.1 Description and Trends
Educational attainment is the most frequently used human capital proxy in the growth literature.
Attainment variables are stock measures that quantify the accumulation of education. Like en-
rollment, educational attainment focuses only on the formal education aspect of human capital.
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Educational attainment measures gained popularity as problems with enrollment and literacy rates
were discovered and reported. In addition, attainment data is widely available and comprehensive.
Worldwide, educational attainment has seen improvement in recent years. As mentioned
previously, the United Nations Millennium Summit developed 8 development goals in 2000 to be
reached by 2015 with the purpose to end extreme poverty. One of the goals was to ensure that
all children complete a full course of primary schooling39. It is not enough to just get children
enrolled, they also need to stay in school. Many developing countries experience high rates of
grade repetition and dropouts along with late entry into schooling. Therefore, most children in
developing countries are not in the appropriate grade for their age. Students that are older than
the appropriate age are more likely to dropout early, while students that are younger are more
likely to repeat grades. In sub-Saharan Africa, there are 11 countries that have repetition rates for
rst grade above 20%. However, most countries have increased the number of children reaching
the last grade of primary school. In developing countries, the percentage of children that complete
primary education increased from 79% in 1999 to 85% in 2006. Despite the improvements, some
countries are still struggling. The primary school completion rate is less than 87% in about half
of the countries with data in 2004, with the lowest rate of 63% in sub-Saharan Africa followed
by South and West Asia at 79%. The highest levels of completion occur in North America and
Western Europe along with Central and Eastern Europe with a median rate of over 98%40.
The increase in primary education attainment means that more students are making the transi-
tion to secondary education. With the exception of South and West Asia and sub-Saharan Africa,
the median transition rate to secondary schooling is above 90% for all regions. This is due, in large
part, to the elimination of primary school exit exams and the fact that lower secondary education
is now compulsory in many countries. While many students make the transition from primary to
lower secondary schooling, fewer make the transition to upper secondary. Worldwide, the gross
enrollment ratio is 78% for lower secondary education, but just 53% for upper. Students in sub-
Saharan Africa receive, on average, ve to six years less primary and secondary education than
students in Western Europe or the Americas41.
Following the upward trend in primary and secondary schooling, more students are participating
39See United Nations' The Millennium Development Goals Report 2008 for more information regarding the devel-
opment goals. www.un.org/millenniumgoals.
40Information and data is from the Education for All Global Monitoring Report 2008.
41See UNESCO's Education for All Global Monitoring Report 2009 for more information.
48
Yrs. of Sch. Life
Exp. (2001)
Change Since
1990
Prim.
and Sec.
Post-Sec. Total Total
World 9.2 1.1 10.3 +1.0
Sub-Saharan Africa 6.8 0.2 7.0 +1.0
Arab States 9.0 1.0 10.0 +1.4
Central Asia 10.1 1.3 11.4 -0.2
East Asia and Pacic 10.0 0.9 10.9 +1.3
South and West Asia 8.0 0.6 8.6 +1.0
Latin America and Caribbean 11.6 1.4 13.0 +2.6
North America and West Europe 12.8 3.5 16.3 +1.5
Central and East Europe 10.2 2.5 12.7 +1.3
Table 6: Expected Years of Schooling. Source: Education for All Global Monitoring Report 2005,
Table 3.4.
in tertiary education. 51 million more students were enrolled worldwide in 2006 than in 1999, yet
overall the proportion of students with access to tertiary education remains small. Tertiary gross
enrollment ratios range from 70% in North America and Western Europe to 5% in sub-Saharan
Africa42.
In addition to the large dierences in educational attainment across countries, there are also
signicant dierences within countries. Children from low income families complete fewer years
of schooling. Dierences in education systems also aect attainment. A shortage of schools, low
quality education, and a lack of resources can reduce the number of years of schooling children
complete. Other reasons for low attainment levels include poor health, pregnancy, and child labor43.
School life expectancy is a common education statistic dened as the total number of years of
schooling that a child can expect to receive. The measure includes years of schooling completed at all
levels. Repetition adds to school life expectancy in many countries. Throughout the 1990s, school
life expectancy increased by about one year worldwide. The most signicant progress occurred in
countries that already had high school life expectancy, while progress was slower in sub-Saharan
Africa and South and West Asia44. Table 6 shows years of school life expectancy in 2001 for
dierent regions in the world.
There have been many eorts to measure educational attainment. The most common measure
is the average years of schooling of a country's labor force. Dierent age groups are examined,
42Data is from the Education for All Global Monitoring Report 2009.
43Information is from UNESCO's Education for All Global Monitoring Report 2009.
44See the Eduation for All Global Monitoring Report 2005 for more information about school life expectancies.
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but typically the measure is focused on either adults fteen years and older or adults twenty-ve
and older. This is typically calculated using the share of a country's population that successfully
completed a certain level of schooling along with the length of that level. Enrollment rates are
regularly utilized to ll in for missing data. Woessmann (2003) summarizes some of the methods
used to create educational attainment data sets. Attainment and enrollment data can be collected
directly from national surveys and censuses. The perpetual inventory method is often used to
transform school enrollment ratios into average years of education while taking into account data
on repetition and dropout rates and the probability of completion. Finally, the projection method
can be used to forecast average years of schooling based on lagged enrollment ratios.
Barro and Lee (1993, 2000) provide the most commonly used data sets for cross-country edu-
cational attainment. Their measures of average years of schooling are constructed from national
census and survey data. There have been many attempts in the growth literature to update and
improve these data sets45.
10.2 Literature
The majority of empirical growth studies use measures of educational attainment to proxy hu-
man capital. There are numerous data sets covering most countries and dierent periods of time.
Furthermore, a great deal of research is devoted to constructing and improving attainment data
sets.
Psacharopoulos and Arriagada (1986) make one of the rst eorts to create an educational
attainment measure using census data. They provide a data set of years of schooling for the
population aged 25 and older for 99 countries from 1960 to the early 1980's.
Barro and Lee (1993) continue the work of Psacharopoulos and Arriagada (1986) with their
years of schooling data set. They use national census and survey data, lling in the missing data
using literacy and enrollment rates. Barro and Lee (1993) nd that their attainment measure is
signicantly positively related to economic growth. Barro and Lee (2000) update their previous
data set by expanding the number of countries to 142 and the years covered to 1960 through
2000. They construct their data set using the perpetual inventory method. The years of schooling
measure is based on data for the percentage of a country's adult population who successfully
completed a particular level of schooling along with the typical duration of that level of education.
45Examples include de la Fuente and Domenech (2000) and Cohen and Soto (2007), both of which are discussed
below.
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Kyriacou (1991) also develops a data set that has been used in the growth literature. He uses
data from Psacharopoulos and Arriagada (1986) to estimate years of schooling in the labor force
for 120 countries from 1970 to 1985. Kyriacou (1991) examines the importance of initial human
capital as well as the growth of human capital for economic growth. The regression results show a
signicant positive relationship with initial human capital but an insignicant negative relationship
with the change in human capital. This indicates that the level but not the growth of human capital
matters for growth. Kyriacou (1991) gives two possible explanations for the ndings. He suggests
that the output of elasticity of human capital could be positively related to the level of human
capital or that the level of human capital could proxying technology growth.
Lau et al. (1991) use the perpetual inventory method to construct a measure of educational
attainment for 58 developing countries from 1960 to 1986. They use time series data to calculate
the number of years of school completed by the population aged 15 to 64. Using their data, Lau
et al. (1991) conclude that education is an important determinant of growth but that the eect
diers across countries.
The seminal studies by Benhabib and Spiegel (1992a, 1992b) are widely cited. They proxy
human capital with educational attainment data from Kyriacou (1991) for 42 countries. The studies
use two dierent approaches to examine the eect of human capital on growth. They rst look at
the role of human capital as a normal input into production. The results from this specication
match those from Kyriacou (1991), showing that the change in human capital has an insignicant
or negative eect on growth. Next, Benhabib and Spiegel (1992a, 1992b) investigate the role of the
level of human capital in technological progress. The results here suggest a signicant positive role
for human capital. So, the main ndings from Benhabib and Spiegel's (1992a, 1992b) work is that
the level of human capital rather than the change is important for growth.
Nehru et al. (1993) follow the trend of developing new educational attainment data sets by
constructing years of schooling estimates for 85 countries from 1960 to 1987. They use the perpetual
inventory method adjusting for repetition, dropouts, and mortality to nd the accumulated years of
schooling at all levels of education for the population aged 15 to 64. The adjustment for mortality
improved the accuracy of their measure as a proxy for the human capital of a country's labor force.
Gemmell (1996) also develops a data set with attainment measures representing the level of
human capital in 1960 and the change in human capital from 1960 to 1985. In contrast to Kyriacou
(1991) and Benhabib and Spiegel (1992a, 1992b), Gemmell (1996) concludes that both the initial
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stock and the accumulation of human capital are important for growth. More specically, he nds
that primary educational attainment is most important for the poorest countries in the sample,
secondary education is most important for the middle income countries, and higher education is
most important for the OECD countries.
The purpose of Bils and Klenow's (2000) study is to challenge earlier ndings that human
capital leads to economic growth. They calibrate a model to examine how much of this relationship
is actually due to growth leading to increases in a country's stock of human capital. Using a measure
of average years of schooling, Bils and Klenow (2000) conclude that only one-third or less of the
relationship is explained by schooling causing growth. Instead, they nd that the majority of the
relationship is explained by growth causing increased schooling. Therefore, the authors stress the
need to exercise caution when interpreting the results from growth regressions.
Many recent studies have focused on improving the educational attainment data, both in terms
of the quality and the method of construction. De la Fuente and Domenech (2000) modify Barro
and Lee's (1993) data set for 21 OECD countries from 1960 to 1990. Their measure is the fraction of
the country's population aged 25 and older that started each level of education. In order to develop
a higher quality data set, de la Fuente and Domenech (2000) employ new sources of information and
eliminate breaks in the data caused by changes collection standards. Their revised data set yields
a positive relationship with growth for a variety of model specications and passes a robustness
check. De la Fuente and Domenech (2006) provide a further update of their data set and compare
the quality to other data sets. They construct informational content indicators for the alternative
data sets and compare the performance in several specications of growth regressions. The results
show a signicant positive correlation between the quality of the data set as given by the indicators
and the importance of educational attainment in the growth regressions.
Like de la Fuente and Domenech (2000), Bassanini and Scarpetta (2001) develop an average
years of schooling data set focused on OECD countries. Their data covers 21 countries from 1971
to 1998. They also nd that human capital has a signicant positive eect on economic growth in
the OECD countries.
Barro (2001) examines the eect of educational attainment on growth based on gender and level
of education for 1965 to 1995. The only signicant positive eect found is for male attainment at
the secondary and higher level. Female attainment at all levels of education is found insignicant
along with male attainment at the primary level. Petrakis et al. (2002) explore the eect of
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educational attainment on growth based on the level of economic development across countries.
They nd that the relationship varies with the level of development. Specically, primary and
secondary education appear to be more important for growth in less developed countries, while
higher education is more important in developed countries.
Pritchett (2001) uses educational attainment data sets from both Barro and Lee (1993) and
Nehru et al. (1993) to construct estimates of the growth of per worker human capital. Using this
measure, he nds that human capital has no eect on growth from 1960 to 1987. He gives three
possible explanations for the dierences in the eect of human capital on growth across countries.
First, Pritchett (2001) suggests that not all knowledge gained from schooling is used productively.
Second, the demand for educated labor varies across countries. Finally, he states that the dierences
could arise from disparity in countries' education quality.
Bosworth and Collins (2003) continue the discussion of the inconsistencies in the empirical
growth literature. Some of the reasons they give for the varying results are dierences in the
countries in the sample, the time period examined, the specication of the growth model, and
the measurement error in the educational attainment data. They run multiple growth regressions
and use two dierent educational attainment data sets{Barro and Lee (2000) and Cohen and Soto
(2001)46. Cohen and Soto's (2001) data set includes 95 countries from 1960 to 2000 and contains
more recent census data than Barro and Lee's (2000). The two data sets are highly correlated
but Cohen and Soto's years of schooling tend to be higher. Bosworth and Collins (2003) nd the
coecient on the Barro and Lee (2000) measure to be positive and the coecient on the Cohen
and Soto (2001) measure to be negative. However, both are statistically insignicant. The authors
also combine the measures to form a composite variable, which did not produce satisfactory results.
Bosworth and Collins (2003) also calculate a reliability measure for each data set47. Cohen and
Soto's (2001) measure shows higher reliability with a score of 0.63 compared to 0.43 for the Barro
and Lee (2000) measure.
The purpose of Portela et al. (2004) is to show aws in the method used by Barro and Lee
(2000) to develop their educational attainment data set is awed. As mentioned above, Barro
and Lee (2000) and others construct data sets using the perpetual inventory method. Portela et
al. (2004) show that there is a signicant dierence between data directly from census or survey
data and that derived from enrollment data using the perpetual inventory method. They nd that
46An updated version (2007) is discussed later in the section.
47The reliability measure was based on the covariance with the alternative measures divided by its variance.
53
the perpetual inventory method causes education to be underestimated, which can lead to biased
regression results. The authors conclude that once the source of information and measurement
error are taken into account, both the level and the change in education have a signicant eect on
growth.
Baier et al. (2006) also seek to improve Barro and Lee's (2000) data set by incorporating
more years of data. Some of the countries included in their sample have data for as far back as
1900. In addition, their measure of human capital reects not only average years of schooling but
average years employed as well. The authors calculate years of schooling for an employed person
from enrollments at each level of education and the age distribution of the population. Average
experience is calculated as average age less average years of schooling and six years before attending
school. The human capital measure is derived from estimated parameters of earnings regressions.
Baier et al. (2006) conclude that their measure of human capital is important for growth.
Like others, Cohen and Soto (2007) stress that the quality of education data aected previous
regression results. They attempt to improve the quality of the data by using education information
available by age group. This allows them to rely less on assumptions as in some previous data sets
and more on data actually observed. Their measure of average years of schooling is calculated in
the common way by multiplying the population's shares of educational attainment by the appro-
priate duration of each education level. They state that their data is similar to that of Barro and
Lee's (2000), but performs better by taking into account the population's age structure and mor-
tality rates. Cohen and Soto's (2007) growth regressions produce a signicant positive relationship
between human capital and growth from 1960 to 2000.
Hanushek and Woessmann (2008) employ a version of Cohen and Soto's (2007) average years
of schooling data set to estimate multiple growth models. While they conclude that average years
of schooling is important for growth, they nd that the eect is sensitive to how the model is
specied. For example, when the eect of institutional dierences (reected by openness and
security of property rights measures) of a country are controlled for, the eect of years of schooling
decreases and becomes insignicant.
Morrisson and Murtin (2009) seek to ll a gap in the attainment data. There is little data that
exists for early periods of time, so Morrisson and Murtin (2009) gather data for as far back in time
as possible. They develop a data set of educational attainment for 74 countries from 1870 to 2010.
The authors use the perpetual inventory method to construct data for years prior to 1960 and use
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Cohen and Soto's (2007) data set for years after 1960.
10.3 Advantages and Disadvantages
The popularity of educational attainment as a human capital proxy indicates advantages over other
measures. First of all, attainment data is easily obtainable for a broad number of countries and
years and is more complete than most other education data. Furthermore, it is a stock rather than
a ow measure, which is more compatible with economic theory. It accounts for the accumulation
of education across dierent levels rather than just access to education as with enrollment rates.
Finally, educational attainment is easy to measure and to interpret. Since years of schooling is
a fairly straightforward measurement, the data is more abundant and can be more accurate than
that of measures that are more dicult to quantify.
Despite being the most popular measure, educational attainment has its shortfalls. Many of the
criticisms parallel those encountered with enrollment measures. Measures of attainment focus only
on the formal education aspect of human capital, ignoring skills and experience gained outside of
schooling. Perhaps the most important problem, however, is that educational attainment does not
take into account the quality of the education received. Hanushek and Kimko (2000) stress that
quantity measures do not accurately reect cognitive skill, which is most important for productivity.
As mentioned with enrollment, disregarding education quality assumes that a year of schooling is
equal in all countries. In addition, Woessmann (2003) points out that the years of schooling measure
suggests that the same amount of human capital is gained in the rst year of schooling as in the
15th. Neither of these assumptions reect reality.
The quality of the data is another issue commonly discussed in the literature. De la Fuente
and Domenech (2000), Portela et al. (2004), and Cohen and Soto (2007) all maintain that the
poor quality of the data biased the results of previous studies. Much of the data relies heavily
on assumptions and backward extrapolation for missing data. However, data sets have improved
as new historical data has become available. There has also been some criticism of the perpetual
inventory method, which was employed by Barro and Lee (2000) in the construction of their popular
data set. Portela et al. (2004) estimate that the method could underestimate education by about
1/5 of a year for every ve year period.
A number of factors have to be accounted for when constructing an educational attainment
data set. It is important that years of schooling be adjusted for grade repetition, especially in
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less developed countries where repetition rates are higher. Nehru et al. (1993) state that ignoring
repetition can cause enrollment rates, which are often used to calculate attainment, to be over-
stated by as much as 25% in some developing countries. Cohen and Soto (2007) acknowledge the
importance of accounting for dierences in classication systems for education levels. Finally,
overlooking mortality rates can cause an upward bias. Failure to make these adjustments can lead
to inaccurate results.
Another concern, as pointed out by Bosworth and Collins (2003), is that years of schooling
changes slowly, and therefore, growth eects could be dicult to identify in cross-country stud-
ies. This could be a reason why some researchers fail to nd a relationship between educational
attainment and growth.
10.4 Data and Summary
Educational attainment is the most popular measure of human capital, and as such there are
numerous data sets available. Most of these provide measures of years of schooling completed at
dierent levels of education. Barro and Lee (1993, 2001) provide the most widely used data sets
across the growth literature. A list of the most commonly data sets is given in Table 7.
The review above illustrates the popularity of educational attainment as a proxy for human
capital. It has been utilized more often than any other measure mostly because of the availability
of data and easy interpretation of results. As shown above, measures of educational attainment are
used in earlier studies and continue to be used frequently in recent studies. The seminal study by
Barro and Lee (1993) shows a positive relationship between years of education attained and cross-
country economic growth from 1960 to 1985. In the inuential papers by Benhabib and Spiegel
(1992a, 1992b) the level of attainment is shown to have a positive impact on growth whereas the
change in attainment is shown to have an insignicant or negative impact.
There have been many attempts to improve the educational attainment data sets. De la Fuente
and Domenech (2000, 2006) and Cohen and Soto (2007) provide improve data sets that are widely
cited in the growth literature. De la Fuente and Domenech (2000, 2006) nd a positive relationship
between their attainment measure and growth in OECD countries, while Cohen and Soto (2007)
also nd a positive relationship but for a broader sample of countries. Barro and Lee (2000) update
their data set to include average years of schooling for 142 countries from 1960 to 2000. This has
become the most frequently used data set in the growth literature. Overall, studies examining the
56
Source Details
Psacharopoulos and Arriagada (1986) Educational attainment of population aged 25 and older
at six levels of education; 99 countries; 1960 to early 1980s
Kyriacou (1991) Average years of schooling of labor force at primary, sec-
ondary, and tertiary level; 111 countries; 1965 to 1985
Lau et al. (1991) Total years of schooling completed for working age popula-
tion at primary, secondary, and tertiary level; 58 countries;
1960 to 1986
Barro and Lee (1993) Educational attainment of population aged 25 and older
at primary, secondary, and tertiary level for 152 countries;
1960 to 1985
Nehru et al. (1995) Total years of schooling completed for working age popula-
tion at primary, secondary, and tertiary level;85 countries;
1960 to 1987
Barro and Lee (2000) Update to 1993 dataset; educational attainment of popula-
tion aged 25 and older at primary, secondary, and tertiary
level; 142 countries; 1960 to 2000
de la Fuente and Domenech (2000) Educational attainment of population aged 25 and older at
primary, secondary, and tertiary level; 21 OECD countries;
1960 to 1990
Cohen and Soto (2007) Educational attainment of 5-year age groups; 95 countries;
1960 to 2000
Morrisson and Murtin (2009) Educational attainment; 74 countries; 1870 to 2010
Table 7: Commonly Used Educational Attainment Data Sets.
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eect of educational attainment on growth nd a positive relationship.
Measures of educational attainment reect the average amount of schooling attained by a coun-
try's labor force, but ignores the quality of that education. Failing to account for quality dierences
is the primary drawback to using attainment to measure human capital. Many current growth
studies discuss this shortcoming and propose solutions.
11 Test Scores
11.1 Description and Trends
The majority of early growth studies rely on quantitative measures of human capital such as
enrollment or attainment. As discussed above, these were often employed because of the ease
of use and availability. Recently, these measures have been criticized for ignoring the quality of
education. Hanushek and Kimko (2000) stress that quantitative measures assume the amount of
human capital gained from one year of schooling is equal across countries. However, there is huge
disparity in the quality of schooling across countries, and students in dierent school systems will
obtain dierent knowledge and skills. In addition, quantity measures such as years of schooling
are bounded at an upper limit and do not fully reect students' cognitive skill. In contrast, test
scores are less bounded, which allows variation to be more fully reected. Furthermore, the scores
represent cognitive skill from schooling as well as from other sources such as family and peers.
Quality of education is dicult to measure, and multiple methods have been proposed. Barro
and Lee (2001) identify two main types of quality measures{education inputs and education out-
comes. Standardized test scores are a main outcome measure of students' cognitive skills and
achievement. Measures of cognitive skill align best with the concept of human capital in economic
theory. Because of this and the increasing availability of data, test scores are now the most popular
qualitative measure of education. International test score data is becoming more widely available
as more countries participate in testing, but the data is still somewhat limited. The majority of the
tests focus on math, science, and reading. Overall, international test scores show that low academic
achievement is a widespread problem, especially in developing countries.
International standardized testing began in the 1950's with relatively few countries taking part.
The earlier participants were mostly higher income countries, but over time more countries are
participating, including those of low and middle income. The tests are typically administered by
international agencies and most contain both academic questions and life skills questions. The
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three most commonly used tests in the literature are the Trends in Mathematics and Science Study
(TIMSS), the Progress in International Reading Literacy Study (PIRLS), and the Program for In-
ternational Student Assessment (PISA). The TIMSS and PIRLS are conducted by the International
Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement (IEA), while the PISA is administered
by the OECD. The TIMSS tests the mathematics and science skills of fourth and eighth graders
every four years. Forty-ve countries participated in 1995, and this number grew to over 60 for
the 2007 tests. Asian countries had the highest percentages of students reaching the advanced
international benchmark in both math and science. The median percentage of students reaching
the advanced international benchmark in math was 7% for fourth grade and 2% for eighth grade.
The median reaching the science benchmark was 7% for fourth grade and 3% for eighth grade.
Overall, there has been steady improvement in both disciplines at the fourth grade level since 1995,
but there has been little change at the eighth grade level48. The International Assessment of Edu-
cational Progress (IAEP) also conducted two international tests for math and science in 1988 and
1991. These are used frequently in the literature as well.
The PIRLS tests the reading skills of fourth graders and is conducted every 5 years in 40
participating countries. In 2006, 95% of participants showed at least some basic reading skills,
75% reached an intermediate benchmark, and 20% met the advanced international benchmark49.
The PISA assesses the science, math, and reading abilities of 15 year olds. In 2000, 43 countries
participated, followed by 41 in 2003, and 57 in 2006. While some countries have shown improvement,
progress has been at overall for OECD countries50.
Intelligence quotient (IQ) tests are another form of standardized testing designed to assess
cognitive ability. Psychologists created these tests and have made improvements throughout the
twentieth century. IQ test scores are obtained from several standardized tests that cover a broad
range of skills51.
11.2 Literature
Recognizing the importance of distinguishing between the quantity and quality of education is be-
coming increasingly common. While it is clear that the quality of education diers across countries,
quality is dicult to measure. On way to reect the quality of education is through direct measures
48This data was obtained from the IEA website. www.iea.nl.
49IEA PIRLS 2006 International Report. www.iea.nl.
50More information regarding PISA can be found on the OECD website. www.oecd.org.
51See Lynn and Vanhanen (2002) for a detailed discussion of IQ tests.
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of cognitive skills. International standardized test scores and IQ test scores have both been used
to measure cognitive skills.
Most of the studies that employ test scores as a proxy for human capital are relatively recent.
International test score data is still limited but is becoming more readily available for a larger
sample of countries.
An early study by Lee and Lee (1995) compares quantity and quality measures in growth
models. They use data from the 1970 to 1971 First International Science Study conducted by the
IEA to measure human capital along with quantitative measures. The test scores reect science
achievement in secondary school for 17 countries. The authors nd that the quantitative measures
of education become insignicant after including the test score measure in the model. In addition,
the inclusion of test scores substantially improves the performance of the model.
Hanushek and Kimko (2000) stress the importance of taking the quality of education into
account when examining economic growth. They assert that cognitive skill, math and science
knowledge in particular, is the most relevant component of human capital. This cognitive skill is
not fully captured in quantitative measures of human capital such as enrollment and attainment.
Hanushek and Kimko (2000) develop a measure of cognitive skill using international test scores in
math and science. They combine all math and science test score data available for each country from
6 standardized tests from 1965 through 1991. Complete test score data was only available for 31
countries, so the authors expand the sample by imputing missing values from test score regressions.
Hanushek and Kimko (2000) rst examine test scores as the dependent variable. They nd the
main determinants to be primary school enrollment, population growth, and regional dierences,
while the quantity of schooling, education expenditures and resources, and pupil-teacher ratios are
unimportant. Hanushek and Kimko (2000) next examine economic growth as the dependent variable
and conclude that test scores have a \consistent, stable, and strong relationship with economic
growth". Furthermore, they nd that the quality (test score) coecient remains signicant even
when the coecient on the quantity measure of schooling becomes insignicant. Their results
survive robustness checks and dierent empirical specications.
The purpose of Barro and Lee's (2000) study is to provide a new and improved data set for
educational attainment. They examine the impact of this measure of human capital on economic
growth from 1960 to 1995 and compare the results to those using alternative human capital mea-
sures. One of these alternative measures is international test scores. Like Hanushek and Kimko
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(2000), Barro and Lee use only math and science scores. More specically, their data set is com-
prised of scores from the TIMSS for 7th grade students in 1994 and 1995. The sample of countries
is substantially smaller when test scores are used as the human capital proxy compared to when
years of schooling are used. Barro and Lee (2000) conclude that both years of schooling and test
scores are important for growth, with both giving valuable information concerning a country's stock
of human capital.
The primary goal of Barro and Lee's (2001) study is to nd the determinants of education
quality. They expand on Hanushek and Kimko's (2000) test score data set. The analysis examines
the factors aecting a country's quality of education as measured by international test scores as well
as dropout and repetition rates. The test score data is compiled from scores on exams conducted in
various years between 1964 and 1998 in science, math, and reading for several dierent age groups in
primary and secondary schooling. Barro and Lee (2001) estimate an education production function
where test scores are a function of a variety of family factors and resources devoted to schools.
They nd that family factors such as income have a strong eect on test scores. Years of education
attained by adults also shows a signicant positive eect. Pupil-teacher ratios have a negative
relationship with test scores, and primary school teacher salaries have a positive but less signicant
relationship. Education spending per student and school term length are found to be insignicant.
Barro's (2001) study recognizes the importance of considering quality when examining the eect
of human capital on growth. He compares the regression results when using years of schooling to
proxy human capital to the results when using test scores. Barro (2001) utilizes the test score data
from Barro and Lee (2001) described above. His study shows that science and math scores have
a signicant positive eect on growth. Reading scores alone show a negative eect but it becomes
positive when included along with math or science scores. Barro (2001) concludes that while both
the quantity and quality measures are important for growth, quality (as measured by test scores)
is much more important than quantity (as measured by years of schooling).
Bosworth and Collins (2003) expand the Hanushek and Kimko (2000) math and science test
score data set to include 48 countries over 1960 to 2000. Bosworth and Collins (2003) nd that test
scores have a signicant positive eect on growth. They also nd that the inclusion of the quality
measure eliminates the signicance of educational attainment, a result similar to Hanushek and
Kimko (2000). However, Bosworth and Collins (2003) show that the signicance of the quality
measure is not robust to the inclusion of certain explanatory variables. For example, the test scores
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become insignicant when a variable measuring the quality of governing institutions is added.
Woessmann (2003) presents a review of human capital proxies commonly used in the growth
literature. He arms that it is important to account for cross-country quality dierences through
measures of cognitive skill. Woessmann (2003) develops a quality weight by normalizing Hanushek
and Kimko's (2000) test score measure for each country to the measure for the U.S. This gives
a quality-adjusted measure of human capital by weighting each year of schooling in a country.
Woessmann (2003) concludes that dierences in human capital measured by the quality-adjusted
years of schooling explain more than half of the dierences in growth across countries. This is
substantially higher than for measures not adjusted for quality.
Jamison et al. (2007) contribute to the test score literature by using a larger sample of countries
and allowing for heterogeneity in country eects. Their test score data set includes 62 countries
from 1960 to 2000. The larger sample of countries is indicative of the growing availability of test
score data. The study examines the eect of two quality measures{math test scores and U.S. labor
market returns to education by country of immigrant origin. The test score data used is the average
of math scores on all international tests in which a country participated. Jamison et al. (2007) nd
the test score measure to have a signicant positive eect on growth, while the returns to education
measure is found to be insignicant.
In a recent, Hanushek and Woessmann (2008) expand the Hanushek and Kimko (2000) test
score data set to encompass 50 countries. Their measure of cognitive skills is an average of a
country's math and science scores on all available international tests. Hanushek and Woessmann
(2008) nd that test scores have a strong and statistically signicant positive eect on growth
between 1960 to 2000 when controlling for initial GDP and years of schooling. This result passes
extensive robustness checks.
In addition to the standardized tests discussed above, IQ tests are also used as a measure of
human capital. Lynn and Vanhanen (2002) provide the most popular IQ data set. They assemble a
data set of national average IQ scores across the 20th century for 81 countries. Ram (2006) uses this
data in the augmented Solow model from Mankiw et al. (1992). He compares the growth eects of
three alternative human capital proxies{IQ, life expectancy, and secondary school enrollment. Ram
deduces that IQ is the strongest of these for explaining growth. When both IQ and the secondary
enrollment are included in the model, IQ exhibits high signicance while secondary enrollment is
insignicant.
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Jones and Schneider (2006) also make use of Lynn and Vanhanen's (2002) IQ data set. They
show that the IQ data is positively correlated with both Barro and Lee's (2001) and Hanushek and
Kimko's (2000) test score measures, which indicates that they measure similar skills. Furthermore,
they point out that IQ has been ignored as a measure of human capital even though the data is
more widely available than international standardized test score data. Jones and Schneider (2006)
use the Bayesian Averaging of Classical Estimates (BACE) approach introduced by Sala-i-Martin
et al. (2004) to determine the signicance of IQ for economic growth. The BACE results show
that IQ is highly robustly signicant for economic growth.
11.3 Advantages and Disadvantages
International test scores are thought to indicate dierences in the quality of education across coun-
tries. This is a considerable advantage over quantitative measures since ignoring quality dierences
can lead to inaccurate results. Using measures that only account for the quantity, and not the
quality, of education makes the incorrect assumption that the benets received from education are
equal across all countries. In addition, test scores have the benet of being able to capture as-
pects of human capital gained from sources outside of schooling such as parental and environmental
factors.
Furthermore, the quantitative measures of years of schooling and enrollment rates are restricted
by an upward bound that many developed countries have met or are close to meeting. This restricts
the amount of variation that these measures can reect. Test scores are less bounded and therefore
have another advantage of allowing the dispersion that exists across countries to be more fully
reected.
The most noteworthy problem with test scores as a proxy for human capital is the limited
availability of the data. International standardized testing is a relatively recent development and
while the number of participating countries is increasing, data is still sparse. Barro and Lee (2001)
point out several other issues with international test score data. First, countries have diering
education curricula, and test scores can reect these dierences. Multiple concerns arise from the
sample of students being tested. It is dicult to test a nationally representative sample of students
in each country, which can lead to biases from sample selection. In addition, it is tough to monitor
how the tests are administered to students and to control for quality. In other words, it is a big
challenge to standardize standardized tests. Finally, as with any type of data, errors can arise
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Source Details
Hanushek and Kimko (2000) International math and science test scores; 39 countries;
1965 to 1991
Barro and Lee (2001) International math, science, and reading test scores; 58
countries; 1964 to 1998
Lynn and Vanhanen (2002) Average IQ test scores; 81 countries; 1910 to 1990
Bosworth and Collins (2003) International math and science test scores; 84 countries;
1970 to 2000
Jamison et al. (2007) International math test scores; 62 countries; 1960 to 2000
Hanushek and Woessmann (2008) International math and science test scores; 77 countries;
1960 to 2000
Table 8: Commonly Used Test Score Data Sets.
due to problems with data collection. This becomes an even bigger problem since sample sizes are
relatively small.
Concerns have also been raised regarding the use of IQ scores as a measure of human capital.
Perhaps the most notable criticism is from Gould (1981), who claims that IQ tests are based
on incorrect assumptions and that general intelligence cannot be accurately reected in a single
number. He further suggests that IQ scores can be used for \scientic racism". While there is a
large literature suggesting that IQ and other standardized tests are racially biased, there is also a
large literature disputing the claim52.
11.4 Data and Summary
The limited nature of test score data is the primary problem with using test scores as a measure
of human capital. Standardized testing is relatively new, so data is limited in both the number
of countries and years covered. Furthermore, few countries participated in these tests early on
and most of those participating were highly developed countries. Over time, more countries have
started to take part, and data for a broader set of countries is becoming available. Table 8 gives
sources for test score data sets used in growth studies.
The use of test scores to proxy human capital is becoming increasingly popular. The largest
problem with measures used earlier in the growth literature is that they only account for a country's
quantity of education, and not the quality. However, the consensus is that measures of human
capital need to reect quality. Test scores are thought to account for the quality of education
by measuring cognitive skills. The inuential paper by Hanushek and Kimko (2000) stresses the
52See Jencks and Phillips (1998) for more information about racial bias in testing. Neisser et al. (1995) is an
example of a study concluding that IQ tests are not racially biased.
64
importance of accounting for the quality of education through the use of test score data. They
show that math and science test scores have a strong positive impact on cross-country growth from
1965 to 1991. Barro (2001) also provides an important study showing that test scores are a more
important determinant of growth than is educational attainment. In general, the studies that
employ test scores to measure a country's human capital nd a signicant positive relationship
with economic growth.
12 Pupil-Teacher Ratios
12.1 Description and Trends
Teachers are the most valuable resource in a student's education. Therefore, it seems that smaller
class sizes would be benecial for students. Small classes give students more opportunity for
participation and interaction with the teacher. The pupil-teacher ratio reects the total number
of students relative to the total number of teachers at a given level of education. According to the
United Nations, the target pupil-teacher ratio for reaching universal primary education by 2015 is
40:1 or lower.
When used as a proxy for human capital, the pupil-teacher ratio is typically intended to reect
the quality of education. It is often considered an objective input measure that reects how edu-
cation resources are invested. The use of the pupil-teacher ratio did not arise until later in the
literature due to data limitations.
There are considerable dierences in pupil-teacher ratios across and within countries. Devel-
oping countries tend to have higher ratios than developed and transition countries. The disparity
within countries is generally due to dierences between areas that are rich or poor and urban or
rural53. Pupil-teacher ratios have fallen signicantly over time for OECD countries. For primary
education, the ratio decreased from 30 to 16 between 1960 to 1990 and from 18 to 13 for secondary
education. Developing countries did not experience the same level of improvement. From 1960
to 1990, the primary pupil-teacher ratio dropped from 38 to 33, but increased from 19 to 21 for
secondary education54. Recently, progress has slowed in all countries with little change in the ratios
since 1999.
It is clear from Table 9 that there are severe shortages of teachers in sub-Saharan Africa and
53See UNESCO's Education for All Global Monitoring Report 2009 for more details about dierences in pupil-
teacher ratios across countries.
54Data is from Barro and Lee (2001).
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Primary PT
Ratio
Secondary PT
Ratio
1999 2006 1999 2006
Developing Countries 27 28 21 20
Developed Countries 16 14 13 13
Countries in Transition 20 18 11 10
Sub-Saharan Africa 41 45 24 27
Arab States 23 22 16 16
Central Asia 21 19 11 12
East Asia and Pacic 22 20 17 17
South and West Asia 37 40 33 30
Latin America and Caribbean 26 23 19 16
North America and West Europe 15 14 14 13
Central and East Europe 19 18 13 11
Table 9: Pupil-Teacher Ratios. Source: Education for All Global Monitoring Report 2009, Table
2.18.
South and West Asia. These high ratios are partly attributable to the failure to keep up with the
rising school enrollment levels. Afghanistan, Chad, Mozambique, and Rwanda each have primary
pupil-teacher ratios greater than 60:155.
High ratios typically indicate insucient expenditure on education or weak incentives for teach-
ers such as low salaries. It is important to remember that it is not just the number of teachers
that is important but the quality of those teachers as well. Many countries are hiring unqualied
contract teachers to reduce costs and increase the teaching force56.
12.2 Literature
There are obvious dierences in the quality of schooling across countries. Quality is typically
proxied using measures of cognitive skill or using measures of education inputs. Pupil-teacher
ratios are one of these input measures. It seems intuitive that resources devoted to schools should
improve the quality of education received. Specically, we would expect that students in schools
with smaller class sizes to have higher achievement. However, the empirical literature investigating
the importance of pupil-teacher ratios has produced mixed results.
While this review centers on cross-country growth, studies focusing on the U.S. provide useful
insight into the impact of pupil-teacher ratios. Card and Krueger (1992) nd that men born
between 1920 and 1949 who attended schools with lower pupil-teacher ratios experience a higher
55Statistics are from UNESCO's Education for All Global Monitoring Report 2009.
56Information is from Education for All Global Monitoring Report 2009.
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return to education. Bratsberg and Terrell (2002) also discover an important role for class size in
their study of U.S. immigrants. They show that U.S. immigrants from a source country with low
pupil-teacher ratios achieve a higher return to education. A recent study by Baldwin and Borrelli
(2008) corroborate this result by nding a negative relationship between pupil-teacher ratios and
economic growth in the U.S. between 1998 and 2005. In contrast, Betts (1995) concludes that
pupil-teacher ratios and other input measures are not an important source of disparity in quality
across schools in the U.S. Heckman et al. (1996) also fail to nd a relationship between pupil-teacher
ratios and earnings of white males born in the U.S. between 1910 and 1959.
As just mentioned, pupil-teacher ratios are typically used to reect the quality of education.
Several studies examine whether the ratios are actually an important determinant of quality at all.
Barro and Lee (2001) demonstrate that school resources do in fact improve school quality as mea-
sured by international test scores. In particular, they nd lower pupil-teacher ratios to be especially
important for student achievement. Hanushek and Kimko (2000) also investigate the determinants
of test scores, but reach dierent conclusions. They nd various measures of school resources to
be relatively unimportant for student performance. An unexpected positive relationship is shown
to exist between pupil-teacher ratios and test scores. From this result, the authors deduce that it
is unlikely that pupil-teacher ratios reect any quality dierences across schools. Hanushek (2004)
reiterates this nding by pointing out that despite considerable decreases in pupil-teacher ratios
along with other increases in resources, student achievement has not improved.
There are relatively few cross-country economic growth studies that use pupil-teacher ratios
as the sole proxy for human capital. Barro (1991) tests the impact of human capital on growth
using enrollment rates to proxy a country's human capital. Acknowledging the importance of
dierences in education quality, Barro (1991) furthers the study by examining the relationship
between pupil-teacher ratios and growth. His results indicate that primary school pupil-teacher
ratios are signicantly negatively related to growth, while secondary school ratios are insignicant.
Subsequent work by Barro (2001) that examines the impact of education on growth shows similar
results regardless of the proxy employed{test scores, pupil-teacher ratios, years of schooling, or
dropout rates. He nds that each of these plays an important role in explaining economic growth.
Hanushek and Kimko (2000) compare the results of dierent model specications for determining
the eect of education on growth. They look at models with and without test scores as a measure
of school quality and with and without school input measures. They nd a signicant negative
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Source Details
Barro (1991) Pupil-teacher ratio at primary and secondary level; 88
countries; 1960
Barro and Lee (2001) Pupil-teacher ratio at primary and secondary level; 105
countries; 1960 to 1990
Table 10: Commonly Used Pupil-Teacher Data Sets.
coecient for primary school pupil-teacher ratios when the test score measure of quality is omitted,
while the coecient for secondary school pupil-teacher ratios is positive and insignicant. When
test scores are included in the model, the eect of primary school pupil-teacher ratios becomes
insignicant.
12.3 Advantages and Disadvantages
Pupil-teacher ratios can be used as qualitative measure of education, and as pointed out earlier,
it is important to account for the quality of education in a proxy for human capital. Baldwin
and Borrelli (2008) call attention to the fact that pupil-teacher ratios help signal how education
spending is allocated. While much of the literature suggests that test scores are the better measure
of quality, it is possible that pupil-teacher ratios and other input measures capture some aspects
of education that test scores do not. Furthermore, students' test scores can be inuenced by many
other factors such as various family characteristics, making it dicult to discern how much of the
eect on growth is attributable to education. Another benet of pupil-teacher ratios is that they
are easy to measure and not subjective. This helps reduce measurement error in the data.
The inconsistent results regarding the importance of pupil-teacher ratios for education quality
and growth reduce condence in the measure. Heckman et al. (1996) suggest that measures of
school quality may simultaneously change due to budget constraints, and as a result, give conicting
information. They use the example that an increase in teacher salaries may occur at the same time
as an increase in pupil-teacher ratios so that schools can stay within their budget. In this case, one
measure signals an increase in the quality of education while the other signals a decrease.
12.4 Data and Summary
Barro and Lee's (2001) widely used data set provides cross-country data for a variety of human
capital related measures. This data set is the main source for pupil-teacher ratio data. Details
regarding pupil-teacher ratio data sets can be found in Table 10.
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Relatively few studies use pupil-teacher ratios to measure human capital in cross-country growth
regressions. The seminal work of Barro (1991) nds a signicant negative relationship between
primary education pupil-teacher ratios and growth from 1960 to 1985, but nds an insignicant
relationship for secondary education pupil-teacher ratios. Another important study by Hanushek
and Kimko (2000) shows that primary education pupil-teacher ratios are important for growth until
test scores are added to the growth regressions. Hanushek and Kimko (2000) agree with Barro
(1991) that secondary education pupil-teacher ratios are unimportant for cross-country economic
growth. Overall, the growth literature shows a negative relationship between primary education
pupil-teacher ratios and a country's economic growth.
Whereas pupil-teacher ratios are seldom used as the sole proxy for human capital in growth
studies, the measure has been used often as a determinant in studies of the return to education in
the U.S. The results of these studies are inconsistent. Some nd a signicant negative relationship
between pupil-teacher ratios and the return to education, while an equal number nd an insignicant
relationship.
13 Education Expenditures
13.1 Description and Trends
Spending on education is another class of measures frequently used to proxy the quality of education.
These measures typically focus on government expenditures rather than household spending for
several reasons. First, governments provide the largest share of education funds. Second, studies
tend to focus on government spending because it can be aected most by changes in policy. Finally,
data for government expenditures is more readily available than that for household expenditures.
Governments of all countries play an important role in providing education. As mentioned
already, governments are the main source of education resources. There are many uses and types of
public education expenditures. For example, money spent on education can be used for teacher and
sta salaries and benets, school buildings and facilities, services such as meals and transportation,
various education programs, and materials such as textbooks and computers57. However, most
studies do not distinguish between the dierent types of education spending. An exception is that
some studies use only teacher salaries as that is where the largest proportion of education spending
57The OECD Education At a Glance 2008 lists types and uses of education spending.
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Total Govt. Exp. on
Educ. (% GNP 2006)
Total Govt. Exp. on Educ.
(% Total Govt. Exp. 2006)
Min. Median Max. Min. Median Max.
Developing Countries 1.4 4.4 10.8 4 16 31
Developed Countries 1.2 5.3 8.3 6 12 17
Countries in Transition 2.4 3.9 6.6 9 17 20
Sub-Saharan Africa 1.4 4.4 10.8 4 18 30
Arab States 1.6 4.6 7.7 10 21 31
Central Asia 2.4 3.4 5.3 9 - 19
East Asia and Pacic 1.8 - 10.8 9 - 25
South and West Asia 2.6 3.3 8.3 11 15 19
Latin America and Caribbean 1.2 4.1 10.8 9 15 26
North America and West Europe 2.3 5.5 8.3 9 12 20
Central and East Europe 3.6 5.3 6.6 6 13 20
Table 11: Total Government Expenditure on Education. Source: Education for All Global Moni-
toring Report 2009, Tables 3.1 and 3.2.
is devoted58. Like other measures of quality, expenditure data has become more abundant over
time but is still limited.
Increasing the amount of government spending allocated to education is priority for achieving
universal primary education and the Education for All goals. There are large dierences in public
education expenditures across countries. Low income levels and poverty lead to budget constraints,
and can limit resources allocated to education. Low levels of education spending can also reect a
lack of government commitment to education. UNESCO asserts that a minimum threshold must
be met to provide students with adequate materials facilities. However, high levels of spending do
not guarantee successful student outcomes.
In general, higher income countries tend to devote about the same share of government budget
to education. Governments in developing countries have made education a higher priority and have
devoted more resources, but spending in some countries is still very low.
Table 11 shows education expenditures for dierent regions. The table should, however, be
interpreted with caution because there are many countries without data. Lower income countries
tend to spend substantially less on education primarily because tax revenue is lower. In addition to
the amount spent, the allocation is also important. The distribution of resources among dierent
levels of education is strongly related to enrollment. In countries where post-primary enrollment
is small, most of the education budget is allocated to primary education. Conversely, countries
58Examples include Card and Krueger (1992) and Heckman et al. (1996).
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with high post-primary enrollment devote less to primary education. The proportion of spending
devoted to primary education is about 50% for low income countries, but just 25% for high income.
Teacher salaries account for the largest share of education spending. UNESCO reports that
about half of the countries for which they had data in 2006 spent more than 75% of their education
budget on teacher salaries. However, this large proportion does not mean that teachers are overpaid,
but rather that education is underfunded. In general, teacher pay is lower than comparable jobs
and is often at or below the poverty line. Low salaries compromise the quality of education for
several reasons. Some teachers are forced to take on second jobs, which reduces time devoted to
instruction. Low pay can also lead to low motivation and morale. Finally, low salaries do not
attract the highest quality applicants. So, governments face an important trade-o between cost
and quality. Paying low salaries allows for the hiring of more teachers but at the expense of the
quality of education.
The salaries of teachers are very low in many developing countries in particular. In most sub-
Saharan African countries and in South and West Asia, teacher pay is below the poverty level. In
addition, salaries in Latin America and Central Asia are typically above the poverty line but are
signicantly lower than those for comparable professions59.
13.2 Literature
The recent growth literature stresses the importance of incorporating the quality of education
into measures of human capital. It seems natural to assume that resources devoted to education
would have an eect on schooling quality. Hence, it is quite common for researchers to use a
measure of education resources to proxy the quality of education. There have been various measures
of education resources used, with education expenditures among the most popular. While the
intuition that resources should increase education quality seems logical, the empirical relationship
is somewhat controversial given the conicting results.
Many studies that argue against the importance of education resources for student outcomes.
In Hanushek's (1986) study of schooling in the U.S., the relationship between resource measures of
school and teacher characteristics and academic achievement is explored for the time period of 1960
to 1983. He nds that there is no relationship with resource measures such as expenditures per
student. Hanushek and Kimko (2000) reiterate this nding and stress that school resources are not
59See the Education for All Global Monitoring Report 2009 for more information regarding teacher pay across
countries.
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an appropriate proxy for education quality. Their study explores the determinants of education
quality by testing the eect of multiple measures of schooling resources along with test scores.
The coecients on both measures of expenditures{current public expenditure per student and
total education expenditure as a share of GDP{are statistically signicant but with an unexpected
negative sign. Hanushek and Kimko (2000) conclude that while quality is an important determinant
of growth, education resources are not an important determinant of quality.
In their sensitivity analysis, Levine and Renelt (1992) test the robustness of education spending
as a determinant for growth. The extreme bounds analysis shows that the ratio of government
education expenditures to GDP is not robust to changes in model specication. Therefore, Levine
and Renelt (1992) conclude that spending is not a signicant determinant of growth for the time
period between 1960 and 1989.
Barro and Lee (2000) also investigate the factors that contribute to dierences in education
quality. They examine the eect of various education resources on test scores. Total education
spending per student is shown to have a positive eect, but is statistically insignicant. When
three more measures are added (pupil-teacher ratio, teacher salaries, and school term length), the
coecient on the spending variable is still insignicant but becomes negative.
Kalaitzidakis et al. (2001) reach similar conclusions by examining the eect of multiple human
capital proxies on growth. They nd an insignicant eect for low levels of government education
spending and a negative eect for higher levels.
In contrast to the studies discussed so far, Oketch (2002) nds a signicant role for education
expenditures in his study of African growth. He examines how spending on basic and advanced
education as a percent of GDP aects growth for 47 African countries from 1960 to 1998. The
results show that spending at both levels of education has a positive and statistically signicant
eect on growth.
Keller (2006) also nds a signicant role for spending. She studies the importance of three
dierent human capital measures{enrollment rates, government expenditures as a percent of GDP,
and government expenditures per student as a percent of GDP per capita. The regression results
show that expenditures per student is positive and signicant at the primary level, positive but
less signicant at the secondary level, and negative and signicant at the higher level. In regards
to overall government education spending, the results are mostly insignicant with a positive co-
ecient at the primary level but negative coecients at the secondary and higher levels. Keller
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(2006) concludes that expenditures are better targeted towards primary education, especially when
resources are scarce.
Blankenau et al. (2007) examine the relationship between government education expenditures
and growth while taking into account the government's budget constraint. They nd that including
the budget constraint has important implications for the relationship. When the budget constraint
is not considered, government education expenditures appear to have no eect on growth. However,
when the budget constraint is accounted for, public education spending is shown to have a signicant
positive eect on growth for high income countries. They nd no relationship between spending
and growth for poorer countries.
The goal of Al-Yousif (2008) is to determine if a relationship exists between human capital as
measured by education spending and growth for six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries.
He employs two measures of spending{government education spending per worker and the ratio
of government education spending to GDP. The results from the Johansen Cointegration tests
indicate that human capital is cointegrated with growth regardless of which measure is used. The
Granger-Causality tests give mixed results regarding the relationship between human capital and
growth. Al-Yousif (2008) summarizes that the results are country-specic and also vary depending
on which spending measure is utilized.
As mentioned above, some studies use teacher salaries as a measure of education spending. The
majority of these examine the relationship with individual earnings rather than overall economic
growth. Yet, these studies can provide useful insights regarding the importance of teacher pay. Card
and Krueger (1992) use teacher salaries in their analysis of the eect of schooling quality on the
rate of return to education for men born in the U.S. between 1920 and 1949. They hypothesize that
higher salaries would attract better teachers thereby improving schooling quality and increasing
the return to education. The ndings conrm their hypothesis.
Betts (1995) tests the eect of schooling quality on earnings in the U.S. between 1979 and
1990. He uses three measures of quality including the salary of beginning certied teachers with
a bachelor's degree. He nds each of his quality measures to be insignicant for earnings. This
conclusion is echoed by Heckman et al. (1996). Their study focuses on the choice of the functional
form for modeling the eect of schooling quality on earnings. They include four measures of quality{
two pupil-teacher ratio measures, term length, and relative teacher pay. None of these measures
prove to be signicant for earnings.
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The main purpose of the study by Barro and Lee (2001) is to nd the signicant determinants
of education quality by examining the relationship between test scores and a variety of school and
family input measures. They use real primary teacher salaries as one of their input measures.
The motivation behind this measure is that higher salaries should attract higher quality teachers
who will have a larger impact on student achievement. The results support this notion, showing
that primary teacher salaries have a signicant positive eect on test scores. In addition to test
scores, repetition and dropout rates are also used as measures of quality. The use of these measures
leads to dierent results. Teacher salaries are found to be insignicant for the repetition rate and
signicant but negative for the dropout rate.
13.3 Advantages and Disadvantages
Employing a measure of education spending as a proxy for human capital is considered a way to
account for quality dierences in education across countries. It makes sense intuitively that spending
on education should aect quality and therefore growth. However, the eect of education spending
on the quality of schooling is controversial topic considering the mixed results from studies over
time.
Government spending on education is an objective measure that is easier to quantify than
many other human capital variables. Spending measures are also straightforward to interpret and
compare across countries.
Rangazas (2005) highlights that education spending is likely to be allocated quite dierent
between poor and rich countries. In poorer countries, increases in spending would probably be
used hire teachers, increase the length of schooling, or provide basic supplies. In richer countries,
increases in spending would more likely be used for increasing technology or decreasing class sizes.
Furthermore, spending in poorer countries is more focused on younger students since there are
fewer students attending secondary and higher education.
Overall spending on education is dicult to measure for several reasons. Mankiw et al. (1992)
point out that diculty arises because education spending comes from many sources including all
levels of government and from families. These various sources cause discrepancies in spending data
in used in the literature. Family spending data in particular is scarce primarily due to measurement
diculty.
A major drawback of education spending measures is that they do not reect the eectiveness
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Source Details
Levine and Renelt (1992) Ratio of government education expenditures to GDP; 119
countries; 1974-1989
Barro and Lee (2001) Expenditures on public education and subsidies for pri-
vate education from all levels of government for primary,
secondary, and tertiary schooling; 105 countries; 1960 to
1990
Barro and Lee (2001) Ratio of real expenditures on education per pupil to real
GDP per capita; 105 countries; 1960 to 1990
Barro and Lee (2001) Average real salary of primary school teachers; 105 coun-
tries; 1960 to 1990
Keller (2006) Public education expenditures as a share of GDP at pri-
mary, secondary, and tertiary levels; 74 countries; 1960 to
2000
Keller (2006) Public expenditure per student as a share of GDP per
capita at primary, secondary, and tertiary levels; 93 coun-
tries; 1960 to 2000
Table 12: Commonly Used Education Expenditure Data Sets.
of how the resources are used. The allocation and use of funding is important, not just the amount.
Additionally, Woessmann (2003) and Hanushek (2004) both suggest that teacher salaries are not
good proxies for education quality since there is limited evidence of a positive relationship with
test scores.
13.4 Data and Summary
As with other measures, Barro and Lee (2001) provide the main source for education spending
data. This data set includes cross-country data for both government education expenditures and
teacher salaries. Keller (2006) provides government spending data for a longer time period. See
Table 12 for more information about these data sets.
The results from examining the eect of education spending on growth are quite mixed, with
multiple studies nding an insignicant or negative relationship. This has led many to discount
education spending as an appropriate proxy for schooling quality. Funds for education come from
a variety of sources, including state, local, and federal governments as well as from private sources.
Most spending measures focus on government spending since this data is easier to collect than that
for family education spending. Furthermore, most spending data reects the amount of resources
devoted to education, but not how eciently these funds are used. These complexities likely
contribute to the inconsistent results in the growth literature.
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Human Capital Measure
Articles
Reviewed
% Finding Sign.
Growth Rel.
Enrollment 9 100%
Literacy 7 100%
Educational Attainment 25 90.5%
Test Scores 12 100%
Pupil-Teacher Ratio 10 100%
Education Expenditures 12 57%
Overall 81 91.2%
Table 13: Summary{Number of Articles Reviewed and the Percent Finding a Signicant Relation-
ship with Growth.
Studies examining the determinants of education quality typically nd that education expen-
ditures are not a signicant factor. For example, the inuential work by Hanushek (1986) shows
that education spending is unimportant for U.S. student achievement. Barro and Lee (2000) come
to the same conclusion for cross-country test scores.
14 Other Measures
A variety of other measures are used to proxy human capital in the literature, but are used with
less frequency than those discussed above. These proxies are typically other measures of teacher
or school characteristics such as teacher education level and certication, teacher experience, term
length, and compulsory schooling laws. The focus of this review is on the most popular human
capital measures, and as such, these are omitted from this paper.
15 Conclusion
The notion that human capital is important for growth is certainly not new. The 1776 work of
Adam Smith introduces the concept and describes the importance of an individual's human capital
as, \Those talents, as they make a part of his fortune, so do they likewise that of the society to
which he belongs." Becker (1964) later coined the term human capital and pioneered the inclusion
of human capital in a theoretical model of growth. As discussed in Agiomirgianakis et al. (2002),
Lucas (1988) and Romer (1989) were also inuential in modeling the relationship of human capital
and economic growth. However, it was not until the 1990's that studying the empirical relationship
became popular.
A proxy for human capital must be chosen in order to examine the empirical relationship
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between human capital and economic growth. This is a dicult task due to the complex and
intangible nature of human capital. There has been a progression over time in growth models
from simply including a measure of human capital to including the best measure that most closely
matches with the theory. In early studies, the choice of proxy was limited by data availability. As
time has passed, more data has become accessible, and existing measures of human capital have
been improved, and new measures have been introduced.
Table 13 summarizes the review. The most popular proxies for human capital are enrollment
rates, measures of educational attainment, and, more recently, test scores. Enrollment rates were
prevalent in early studies mainly because it was the measure for which the most data was available.
However, there are problems with using enrollment rates to proxy human capital. Enrollment
rates measure only the access to education and do not reect the completion or accumulation of
schooling. Therefore, the human capital of a country's labor force is not likely to be accurately
reected. Furthermore, enrollment rates give no indication of the quality of schooling to which the
students have access.
Measures of educational attainment were developed to reect the accumulation of human cap-
ital. These are the most commonly used proxies for human capital. Measures of attainment
typically give the average years of schooling completed for a country's adult population. This mea-
sure aligns better with economic theory than do enrollment rates, but the quality of schooling is
still not taken into consideration. The important work of Hanushek and Kimko (2000) emphasizes
that ignoring quality implicitly assumes that a year of schooling in every country provides the same
benet to growth. This is certainly not the case as there are vast dierences in the quality of
education received across countries.
It seems clear that quality should be considered, but quality is very dicult to measure. For
this reason, many studies still employ educational attainment measures and, to a lesser extent,
enrollment rates in growth models. However, many recent studies focus on accounting for quality
when examining the impact of human capital on growth. Currently, the most common way to
measure the quality of a country's education is through international test scores. The main problem
with test scores is the lack of data. International standardized testing is a relatively new concept
with very few countries participating early on. As more data becomes available and more countries
participate, test scores will be used more often, and the results will be more reliable.
This review serves multiple purposes. It provides a reference for future studies of growth. It
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will aid in the selection of a human capital proxy by giving the pros and cons of the alternative
measures and the data sources available. Very few studies oer an explanation of their choice of
human capital proxy. It is the hope that this review will give authors a basis for their selection.
A main conclusion to be drawn from this survey is that human capital matters for growth.
Regardless of which measure is used, the majority of studies nd a signicant relationship between
education and economic growth. It is clear that a measure of human capital should be included
in growth models.
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Part III
Chapter 3: Determining the Importance of
Human Capital for Growth Using a Bayesian
Averaging of Classical Estimates Approach
16 Introduction
The literature aimed at nding the determinants of economic growth is vast. Much of this em-
pirical research follows the seminal work of Barro (1991). The basic methodology is to estimate
cross-country growth regressions where growth is a function of a variety of independent variables.
Economic growth is typically measured as a country's growth rate of real GDP per capita. However,
the possible explanatory variables for growth are virtually unlimited. As pointed out by Sala-i-
Martin et al. (2004), which will hereafter be referred to as SDM (2004), the number of possible
regressors is greater than the number of countries for analysis. This makes model specication
extremely dicult. Researchers are left to select, often arbitrarily, a few explanatory variables to
include in growth regressions. This relatively small number of regressors is used to determine the
statistical signicance of a particular variable for growth.
The growth literature has produced a large number of variables deemed signicant for growth.
Durlauf, Johnson, and Temple (2005) count 145 dierent variables found to be signicant at least
once in the literature. Brock and Durlauf (2001) attribute this multitude of regressors to the \open-
endedness" of economic growth theories. In other words, the theoretical growth literature is not
specic or clear enough about the determinants of growth.
Estimating growth regressions started gaining popularity in the 1950's and continues to be
popular today. Dobra et al. (2005) nd that the empirical growth research from the 1950's
through the 1980's, focused on only ve explanatory variables. Eicher et al. (2007) state that this
changed in the 1990's as the number of possible explanatory variables increased rapidly due to the
rush of new growth theories. Model uncertainty has been a major issue in the growth literature
ever since.
It is dicult to have condence in the results from empirical growth studies given the over-
whelmingly large number of dierent variables found to be signicantly related to growth. Classical
approaches involve including all possible independent variables in the regression and then letting
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the data work through them. This is not viable for cross-country growth since the number of po-
tential regressors is greater than the number of countries with sucient data. Hence, there is no
consensus on how to model economic growth.
There have been multiple attempts to solve this model uncertainty problem. Some of these
studies propose methods to assess how condent we should be in the results from growth regressions.
Leamer (1983, 1985) stresses that the sensitivity of results to changes in model specication needs
to be studied in a systematic way. In regards to ndings from previous growth studies, Leamer
(1985) states that, \A fragile inference is not worth taking seriously." He proposes a method called
\global sensitivity analysis" to examine whether results hold up to changes in the explanatory
variables included in the model. His method is a form of extreme bounds analysis where results
are determined to be robust or fragile based on the interval of inferences derived from dierent
model specications. A variable is deemed robustly signicant for growth only if the number
of alternative specications tested is \wide enough to be credible" and the resulting interval of
inferences is \narrow enough to be useful" (Leamer 1985).
Granger and Uhlig (1990) extend the work of Leamer (1983, 1985) by introducing \reasonable
extreme bounds analysis". Their method is similar in examining the extreme values of coecient
estimates for a certain variable when dierent independent variables are included in the model.
However, Granger and Uhlig (1990) point out that some of the estimates examined in Leamer's
work come from models with a low R2. They attempt to improve the extreme bounds analysis by
focusing only on models that have a good t60.
Levine and Renelt (1992) also perform a version of extreme bounds analysis to determine if
results from previous growth studies are robust to changes in regressors. They identify the highest
and lowest coecient estimates from all possible linear combinations of explanatory variables61.
They conclude that a variable is robustly related to growth if the two extreme bounds values of the
coecient are signicant and of the same sign. Levine and Renelt (1992) nd that virtually none
of the variables are robust to changes in model specication.
Levine and Renelt's (1992) results can be interpreted as an indication that very few variables
are important for growth. Sala-i-Martin (1997) gives an alternative explanation|that the extreme
bounds test is too strong for variables to pass. Instead of labeling variables as \robust" or \not
60Models with an R2 above a certain threshold are considered a good t.
61The regressions are comprised of a set of independent variables that are always included and a combination of
up to three other independent variables.
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robust", he assigns a level of condence to each potential determinant. The entire distribution
of coecients from regressions including dierent combinations of independent variables is exam-
ined62. Sala-i-Martin (1997) nds 22 out of 59 variables to be signicantly correlated with growth,
compared to only one variable when using the extreme bounds test.
SDM (2004) further update the literature by proposing another way to overcome the model
uncertainty problem. The starting point of their method is to admit that there is not just one
\true" growth model. So, rather than trying to nd a single correct model, they nd probabilities
of being correct for dierent possible models. This is clearly a deviation from classical approaches
that focus on a single model. SDM (2004) develop a technique called Bayesian Averaging of
Classical Estimates (BACE). This method combines the Bayesian method of averaging estimates
across models with classical ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation. A fully Bayesian approach
requires specifying the prior distribution of all variables in each model. This is very dicult and
has prevented Bayesian methods from gaining widespread popularity. BACE avoids this problem
by requiring the specication of only one prior|mean model size. This relies on the assumption
of diuse priors for the rest of the variables63. Two advantages result from this assumption. First,
classical OLS estimation stems from the assumption of diuse priors. So, this makes the results
from BACE easier to understand since they are derived from familiar OLS estimates. Second,
diuse priors limit the eect prior information has on results. This is a benet because prior
information tends to be somewhat arbitrary.
SDM (2004) use BACE to examine the importance for growth of 67 variables previously found to
be signicant in the literature. A variable is deemed robustly signicant for growth if the probability
that a variable should be included in the model increases after the prior inclusion probability has
been updated with the data. In other words, a variable is signicant for growth if condence of
its inclusion in the model grows after seeing the data. SDM (2004) nd 18 of the variables to be
important for growth.
For this paper, I employ the BACE method, but with a sharper focus on the importance
of human capital for growth. SDM (2004) include only three human capital variables in their
analysis with two of these being enrollment measures. The recent human capital literature has
shown that enrollment rates do not accurately represent a country's human capital. Therefore, it
62Like Levine and Renelt (1992), Sala-i-Martin has a set of three variables that are included in every regression
and the remaining regressors vary.
63Diuse priors indicate there are no prior beliefs.
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is necessary to include other measures of human capital into the BACE framework to determine
the eect of human capital on growth. To do this, I develop a new data set of 35 human capital
measures. Using this additional human capital data set, I nd that some of these measures are
indeed important for growth and should therefore be considered for inclusion in growth models.
These signicant human capital variables include IQ scores, average years of higher education for
the female population, average years of primary education, duration of primary and secondary
education, and higher education enrollment.
16.1 Importance of Human Capital
Human capital is the knowledge and skills embodied by a country's labor force, and economists
recognized its importance very early on. Adam Smith rst dened human capital in 1776, and
Alfred Marshall stressed its value in 1890 saying, \The most valuable of all capital is that invested
in human beings."64 Human capital is attained through a variety of sources|education, training,
experience, peers, and family. However, most of the focus is on the formal education aspect since
education can be inuenced the most by policy and data is more abundant.
Few would argue with the fact that education is important. The World Bank asserts that
\education is central for development" and that it \empowers people and strengthens nations"65.
Education is critical in generating human capital, and human capital is typically considered a main
determinant of productivity. This follows the notion that more educated and skilled workers will
be more productive and innovative.
The role of human capital is acknowledged in both the theoretical and empirical economic growth
literature. As discussed by Engelbrecht (2003), the body of theoretical research indicates three
main channels through which human capital, and education in particular, aects economic growth.
First, education increases the human capital of a country's labor force, and the accumulation of
human capital over time positively aects growth. Second, increases in human capital lead to greater
technological innovation. Finally, higher levels of human capital enhance a country's capacity to
understand and implement new technology. In line with growth theory, most empirical growth
research now includes a variable representing human capital along with other variables considered
important for growth.
What is less certain is how to measure human capital. Human capital is complex and therefore
64From Woessmann (2003){quotation from Principles of Economics, originally published in 1890.
65World Bank. www.worldbank.org/education.
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dicult to accurately represent in a single measure. Including a human capital measure in growth
regressions became increasingly popular in the 1990's with the emergence of new growth theories.
Since this time, human capital has been measured in many dierent ways66. As just mentioned,
these measures typically reect some facet of formal education. The two used most often have
been school enrollment rates and years of schooling or educational attainment. Over time these
measures have been updated, and alternatives have been introduced. Recently, measures that
take into account the quality of education, not just the quantity, have gained popularity67. The
measurement of human capital has evolved over time as access to better-quality and expanded data
sets has increased. Furthermore, improving the measurement of human capital has been the focus
of many studies68.
Multiple measures of human capital have been found to have a signicant relationship with
growth. As discussed above, the wide variety of results makes it dicult to be condent in any one
study. The goal of this paper is to determine which of the many measures of human capital are
robustly signicant for growth within the BACE framework. The rest of the paper is organized
as follows. Section 2 provides a description of the data used in the analysis, followed by Section 3
which discusses the BACE methodology. Section 4 gives the results, and Section 5 concludes.
17 Data
The data used in this analysis is from multiple sources. I use SDM's (2004) data set of 67 possible
growth determinants along with my newly compiled human capital data set. The human capital
data set is comprised of 35 variables including measures such as enrollment rates, years of education
attained, pupil-teacher ratios, and IQ scores. When possible, these measures are decomposed
by level of schooling and gender. The BACE model developed by SDM (2004) imposes some
constraints on the data used for analysis. The data used for my study follow these restrictions laid
out by SDM (2004). First, the explanatory variable data needs to be from the beginning of the time
period examined, or as close as possible to that year. The time period for this analysis is from 1960
to 1996, so all variables are 1960 values (or the closest year available). As suggested by SDM (2004),
this constraint makes the regressors \state variables" and helps avoid endogeneity in the model.
The downside of this restriction is that some variables have to be ignored or excluded if data is only
66See my dissertation chapter titled \Measures of Human Capital in Growth Regressions" for a review.
67See, for example, Hanushek and Kimko (2000) and Barro and Lee (2001).
68Examples include de la Fuente and Domenech (2000) and Cohen and Soto (2007).
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available for later years. The most notable exclusion in my analysis due to this restriction is that
of test scores. International standardized testing has only recently become widespread. In 1960,
very few countries participated in these tests, so data is extremely limited. This omission of this
variable is a concern because test scores to measure human capital has become increasingly popular.
However, my analysis does include a measure of average IQ scores, which is a good alternative for
international test score data.
The second constraint imposed on the data is the requirement of a balanced data set. This
assures an equal number of observations (countries) for each possible regression. Making the data
set balanced means dropping any observation that has missing data for any of the variables included
in the analysis. Therefore, all countries included in the analysis have data for every explanatory
variable (and dependent variable). Some variables with a large amount of missing data are omitted
because they lower the sample size too much. Some of these human capital variables are repetition
rates, measures of government spending, teacher salaries, and test scores. The balanced data set
requirement causes the sample size of countries to be relatively low. There is a trade-o between the
number of countries in the sample and the number and variety of independent variables included
in the analysis.
The dependent variable is the typical measure of growth used in the literature|the annualized
growth rate of real GDP per capita. This is the same measure used in SDM (2004) and measures
the rate of economic growth from 1960 to 1996. The data originally comes from the Penn World
Table Version 6.0 from Heston et al. (2001). Set 1 and Set 3 regressions include all of SDM's
(2004) variables, while Set 2 includes the variables found signicant. SDM's (2004) data set
encompasses a wide variety of variables covering topics such as location, government, religion,
language, education, and economy. See Table A1 of the appendix for the list and description of
the SDM (2004) variables69.
The new human capital data set includes an array of education related measures from multiple
sources. I divide these into 3 categories{attainment and enrollment variables, input and policy
variables, and outcome variables. The attainment and enrollment category includes two popular
quantitative measures of schooling{educational attainment and school enrollment rates. Educa-
tional attainment is the measure of human capital used most often in the growth literature. It
typically reects the amount of education accumulated in a country's labor force, but ignores the
69See SDM (2004) for more details about their data set.
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quality of that education. The attainment measure compiled for this data set is the average years of
schooling completed by a country's population aged 25 and older. There are separate variables for
the male and female population and each level of education{total, primary, secondary, and higher.
The attainment data is from the widely used data set from Barro and Lee (2000). SDM (2004)
do not use any measures of educational attainment, but do include two enrollment measures{the
primary education enrollment rate and the higher education enrollment rate. Enrollment rates give
the percentage of the appropriate aged population enrolled in the corresponding level of schooling.
Enrollment rates also ignore quality, and reect only access to schooling, not the accumulation
of education. Enrollment measures have become less popular in growth studies as new data and
measures have been introduced. SDM (2004) exclude the enrollment rate in secondary education
even though several important studies have found the variable to be important for growth70. My
data set includes the secondary education enrollment rate from Sala-i-Martin (1997). See Table
14 for the list of attainment and enrollment variables included in the human capital data set. The
table gives each variable's description, source, and summary statistics.
The input and policy category includes a variety of measures reecting educational policies and
resources devoted to schooling. The data set includes variables regarding government education
spending, teacher salaries, pupil-teacher ratios, and time spent in school. Input and policy measures
are typically used to represent the quality of education received in a country. They are thought
to reect government commitment to education. SDM (2004) include one measure of government
education spending in their analysis. My human capital data set includes 14 of these measures
compiled from UNESCO and Barro and Lee (2001). See Table 15 for a list of these variables along
with the description, source, and summary statistics.
The last category of human capital variables includes schooling outcome measures. These are
also often used to reect a country's quality of education and are gaining popularity in the growth
literature as more data becomes available. The recent literature is moving away from strictly
quantitative measures of education to those that account for quality. In particular, test scores are
now the most popular outcome measures. However, test score data is still limited both in terms of
the number of countries and years covered. My human capital data set includes outcome measures
such as repetition and drop-out rates, IQ scores, standardized test scores, and illiteracy rates. See
Table 16 for details regarding these variables.
70See, for example, Mankiw et al. (1992).
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Human Capital Variable Description and Source Mean Std.
Dev.
Min. Max.
Sec. Educ. Enroll. Rate Enrollment rate in secondary
educ. in 1960. Sala-i-Martin
(1997).
0.21 0.21 0.00 0.86
Avg. Years Educ. Avg. years of educ. in popula-
tion aged 25+ in 1960. Barro
and Lee (2000).
3.35 2.52 0.07 9.56
Avg. Years Prim. Educ. Avg. years of primary educ. in
population aged 25+ in 1960.
Barro and Lee (2000).
2.60 1.85 0.05 7.32
Avg. Years Sec. Educ. Avg. years of secondary educ.
in population aged 25+ in 1960.
Barro and Lee (2000).
0.66 0.82 0.01 4.59
Avg. Years High. Educ. Avg. years of higher educ. in
population aged 25+ in 1960.
Barro and Lee (2000).
0.08 0.10 0.00 0.53
Female Avg. Years Educ. Avg. years of educ. in female
population aged 25+ in 1960.
Barro and Lee (2000).
2.92 2.59 0.01 9.47
Female Avg. Years Prim. Educ. Avg. years of educ. in female
population aged 25+ in 1960.
Barro and Lee (2000).
2.31 1.96 0.01 7.33
Female Avg. Years Sec. Educ. Avg. years of secondary educ.
in female population aged 25+
in 1960. Barro and Lee (2000).
0.55 0.75 0.00 3.93
Female Avg. Years High. Educ. Avg. years of higher educ. in
female population aged 25+ in
1960. Barro and Lee (2000).
0.05 0.09 0.00 0.49
Male Avg. Years Educ. Avg. years of educ. in male
population aged 25+ in 1960.
Barro and Lee (2000).
3.78 2.54 0.14 9.65
Male Avg. Years Prim. Educ. Avg. years of primary educ.
in male population aged 25+ in
1960. Barro and Lee (2000).
2.88 1.80 0.08 7.30
Male Avg. Years Sec. Educ. Avg. years of secondary educ.
in male population aged 25+ in
1960. Barro and Lee (2000).
0.78 0.95 0.02 5.48
Male Avg. Years High. Educ. Avg. years of higher educ. in
male population aged 25+ in
1960. Barro and Lee (2000).
0.10 0.12 0.00 0.60
Table 14: Attainment and Enrollment Human Capital Variables.
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Human Capital Variable Description and Source Mean Std.
Dev.
Min. Max.
Prim. Educ. PT Ratio Pupil-teacher ratio in primary
educ. in 1960. Barro and Lee
(2001).
36.90 11.05 18.60 95.30
Sec. Educ. PT Ratio Pupil-teacher ratio in secondary
education in 1960. Barro and
Lee (2001).
19.13 6.03 6.60 34.30
Govt. Prim. Educ. Spend. Real govt. current primary
educ. spending per pupil in
1965. Barro and Lee (2001).
377.16 504.23 33.00 3,241.00
Govt. Sec. Educ. Spend. Real govt. secondary educ.
spending per pupil in 1965.
Barro and Lee (2001).
826.19 623.06 47.00 2,852.00
Govt. Prim. Educ. Spend. to
GDP
Ratio of govt. primary educ.
spending to real GDP per
capita in 1965. Barro and Lee
(2001).
13.35 7.07 4.00 33.50
Govt. Sec. Educ. Spend. to
GDP
Ratio of govt. secondary
educ. spending to real GDP per
capita in 1965. Barro and Lee
(2001).
61.67 79.16 3.80 364.50
Prim. Educ. Days Number of school days per year
in primary educ. in 1960. Barro
and Lee (2001).
197.48 16.18 135.00 240.00
Prim. Educ. Hours Number of school hours per
year in primary educ. in 1960.
Barro and Lee (2001).
983.47 156.43 589.00 1,600.00
Prim. Educ. Avg. Teacher Sal. Avg. real salary of primary
educ. teachers in 1965. Barro
and Lee (2001).
8,584.627,398.59810.00 4,7391.00
Prim. Educ. Avg. Teacher Sal.
to GDP
Avg. real salary of primary
educ. teachers to GDP in 1965.
Barro and Lee (2001).
425.04 312.57 54.00 1,948.00
Prim. Educ. Entrance Age Primary educ. entrance age in
1970. UNESCO.
6.17 0.63 5.00 7.00
Prim. Educ. Duration Primary educ. duration in
1970. UNESCO.
5.96 0.72 4.00 8.00
Sec. Educ. Entrance Age Secondary educ. entrance age
in 1970. UNESCO.
12.19 0.97 10.00 14.00
Sec. Educ. Duration Secondary educ. duration in
1970. UNESCO.
6.19 0.89 4.00 9.00
Table 15: Input and Policy Human Capital Variables.
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Human Capital Variable Description and Source Mean Std.
Dev.
Min. Max.
Prim. Educ. Rep. Rate Repetition rate of primary
educ. in 1965. Barro and Lee
(2001).
11.49 9.10 0.00 29.00
Sec. Educ. Rep. Rate Repetition rate of secondary
educ. in 1970. Barro and Lee
(2001).
10.00 6.53 0.00 30.00
Prim. Educ. Drop Rate Drop-out rate of primary educ.
in 1970. Barro and Lee (2001).
29.35 25.39 0.00 92.00
IQ National avg. IQ from 1910
to 1990's. Lynn and Vanhanen
(2002).
83.28 11.95 63.00 107.00
Test Scores Avg. test scores in math
and science for primary to sec-
ondary educ. Hanushek and
Woessmann (2009).
4.51 0.60 3.09 5.45
Illiteracy Rate Illiteracy rate in 1970 of popu-
lation aged 15+. UNESCO.
48.83 27.58 1.80 94.25
Male Illiteracy Rate Illiteracy rate in 1970 of male
population aged 15+. UN-
ESCO.
40.58 25.30 1.18 89.45
Female Illiteracy Rate Illiteracy rate in 1970 of fe-
male population aged 15+. UN-
ESCO.
57.09 30.72 2.28 98.77
Table 16: Schooling Outcome Human Capital Variables.
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Three sets of regressions are examined in this analysis. The rst includes all SDM (2004)
variables along with the additional human capital variables. The second set includes only the
variables SDM (2004) found signicant and the human capital variables. The data set for the
rst set of regressions has a total of 92 variables. The sample size for this set of regressions is 50
countries. The data set for the second set of regressions has 45 variables and a sample size of 51
countries. The balanced data set requirement is the main reason for the relatively small sample of
countries examined in these sets of regressions. Countries with missing data for any of the variables
are dropped, which led to the exclusion of about 90 countries. The majority of countries remaining
in these samples are considered developing or emerging as opposed to advanced71. Eighty-four
percent and 82% of the countries included in Set 1 and Set 2 respectively are classied as developing
or emerging. The list of countries for each data set are similar and can be seen in Table A2 of
the appendix. The composition of the sample of countries should certainly be considered when
evaluating the results. In follow-up work, it would be useful to ll in missing data so the analysis
could examine a more complete and representative sample of countries.
The third set of regressions examines each additional human capital variable individually. Each
is added separately to the full set of SDM (2004) variables. Therefore, 35 sets of regressions are
run{one for each new human capital variable. The sample of countries diers by the human
capital variable added. Again, each set of regressions includes only the countries for which data
is available for all variables. The sample sizes for these sets of regressions are notably larger than
Set 1 and 2 since their are fewer explanatory variables. The number of countries examined in each
set of regressions is shown in Table 19 in the Results section. The sample of all possible countries
includes 139 countries of which 98 (71.5%) are considered developing or emerging. The list of all
possible countries is shown in Table A3 of the appendix. Each set of regressions in Set 3 includes
a sub-sample of these countries.
18 Methodology
The goal of this paper is to nd which human capital variables are robustly signicant for cross-
country economic growth. As discussed above, model specication uncertainty exists in empirical
studies of growth because the number of possible explanatory variables exceeds the number of
71This based on classications by the IMF. The IMF divides countries into two major groups: advanced or emerging
and developing. The main criteria for the classication are income per capita, export diversication, and degree of
integration into the global nancial system.
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countries. I use SDM's (2004) BACE approach to address this problem. The BACE methodology
acknowledges and integrates model uncertainty into the framework.
As the name implies, BACE is a blend of Bayesian and classical estimation techniques. More
specically, BACE combines the Bayesian concept of averaging across models with classical OLS
estimation. In contrast to the classical approach which conditions on one "true" model, BACE does
not declare a single model as correct. Instead, BACE gives probabilities for the dierent possible
models.
The methodology below is restated from SDM (2004). BACE is a form of Bayesian Model
Averaging, which is a framework based around model uncertainty. Bayesian approaches are an
extension of Baye's Rule, which is given by
g( j y) = f(y j )g()
f(y)
(29)
where g( j y) is the posterior density of , f(y j ) is the likelihood function summarizing the
information about  contained in the data, g() is the prior density of , and f(y) is the prior
density of the data.
Baye's Rule illustrates how probabilities are updated with additional information. Bayesian
Model Averaging is a special case of Baye's Rule researchers use when faced with model uncertainty.
The Bayesian Model Averaging approach requires attaching a prior probability to each possible
model that reects the researcher's beliefs before seeing the data about the model being true.
Next, regressions are run for each possible model. Finally, the probabilities of a model being true
are updated using some function of each regression's summary statistics.
A rst step in deriving the BACE method is to rewrite Baye's Rule in terms of posterior prob-
abilities for the alternative models. Following Bryant and Davis (2008), the posterior probability
for the jth model is given as
P (Mj ; y) =
P (Mj)P (y jMj)
NP
i=1
P (Mi)P (y jMi)
(30)
where
P (y jMi) =
Z
L(y; i)P (i;Mi)di (31)
where i = ki is the parameter vector associated with model Mi, P (i;Mi) is the prior density
function for i underMi, L(y; i) is the likelihood function forMi, and P (Mi) is the prior probability
of Mi.
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Equation (30) gives the probability of model j being the true model relative to all other possible
models. Equation (31) will be analytically intractable, so SDM (2004) uses Schwarz's (1978)
approximation. In log form this is
logP (y jMi) = logL(y;bi)  0:5ki log T (32)
where the right hand side is the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), L(y;bi) is the estimated
log-likelihood function for model Mi, and T is the number of observations. When the model is
estimated by OLS, logL(y;bi) becomes  0:5T logSSEi, where SSEi is the sum of squared errors
for model i. This gives
logP (y jMi) =  0:5T logSSEi   0:5ki log T: (33)
As shown in Bryant and Davis (2008), exponentiating Equation (33) and plugging the result
into Equation (30) gives
P (Mj ; y) =
P (Mj)T
 kj
2 SSE
 T
2
j
2KP
i=1
P (Mi)T
 ki
2 SSE
 T
2
i
(34)
where y is the observed data, T is the sample size (number of countries), K is the number of
possible regressors, kj is the number of regressors included in model j, and P (Mj) is the prior
probability of model j being true. Equation (34) gives the posterior probability of each model,
which is a weighted likelihood formula where the weight of a given model is normalized by the sum
of the weights of all possible models. This measure reects the contribution of the variable to
the goodness-of-t of a model. The posterior inclusion probability gives the probability that the
variable is included in the true model (has a nonzero coecient).
Prior probabilities, P (Mj)'s, need to be specied for each model. These reect the researcher's
belief about the probability that the model is correct. The main diculty in the standard Bayesian
approach, and the reason it has not gained widespread popularity, lies in the specication of prior
probabilities. Bayesian Model Averaging requires giving a prior distribution to all variables for each
possible model. So, as the number of explanatory variables increases, specifying priors becomes
more cumbersome. Due to the complexity of this task, many researchers apply prior information
that is essentially arbitrary. A major advantage of BACE is that it avoids this problem by assuming
diuse priors for the explanatory variables. This assumption implies that the researcher has no prior
beliefs about the probability of a variable being included in the \true" model. This is where BACE
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connects to classical estimation|OLS is based on the assumption of diuse priors. Furthermore,
diuse priors reduce the eect of a researcher's prior information, which as just mentioned, is often
arbitrary anyway. In contrast to fully Bayesian methods that require priors for all variables, BACE
requires only one prior for mean model size, k. SDM (2004) refer to this as the \hyperparameter".
I will follow SDM (2004) and set the prior mean model size to seven, k = 7. This reects the belief
that models include an average of seven regressors. So, it follows that each explanatory variable
has a prior probability of kK of being included, independent of the inclusion of other variables. K
is the total number of possible regressors.
With such a large number of explanatory variables, running every possible regression is not
feasible. Therefore, only a random sample of regressions for the possible models is run. Models
are selected by randomly including each variable with an independent sampling probability of
Ps(i). The larger the number of random draws, the closer the posterior inclusion probability,
mean, and variance will be to their true values.
BACE takes into account estimates from all possible models, and a weighted average of regres-
sion coecients across all these models is generated. The posterior probability of each model, given
by Equation (34), gives the weights for the dierent models. Following SDM (2004), the weighted
average of each variable's coecient estimates are calculated with the OLS regression estimates
weighted by the posterior model probabilities. This is given as the expected value of j conditional
on inclusion in the model, or the posterior mean of the variable
E( j y) =
2KX
j=1
P (Mj ; y)bj (35)
where bj is the OLS estimate of j . The OLS estimate of j is written as
bj = E( j y;Mj): (36)
The variance of j is also calculated. The posterior variance of the coecient estimates is the
sum of the variance within a model and the variance between the dierent models. The square root
of the posterior variance is the standard deviation reported in the results section . The posterior
variance is computed as
var( j y) =
2KX
j=1
P (Mj ; y)var( j y;Mj) +
2KX
j=1
P (Mj ; y)(bj   E( j y))2: (37)
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The BACE results give the posterior mean and standard deviations conditional on the variable
being included in the true model along with the unconditional mean and standard deviation. The
unconditional mean is the weighted average of OLS estimates for all models including those that
do not include the variable (zero coecient)72.
As mentioned in Section 2, there are 3 sets of regressions run using the BACE method outlined
above. Set 1 includes all of the variables included in SDM (2004) along with the additional human
capital variables. Set 2 includes only the variables found to be signicant by SDM (2004) in addition
to the human capital variables. Set 3 examines each additional human capital variable individually
by adding each one separately to the full set of SDM (2004) variables.
18.1 Signicance Criteria
The goal when using the BACE method is to determine which of the many possible explanatory
variables are signicantly related to economic growth. This analysis focuses on using the BACE
approach to nd which human capital variables are important. Following SDM (2004), the posterior
inclusion probability of a variable is compared to the prior model probability to determine whether
or not the variable has a signicant relationship with growth. Variables that are declared robustly
signicant have a posterior inclusion probability that is greater than its prior probability. This
indicates that the variable has a higher probability of being included in the true model after the
prior probability is updated with the data. In other words, the belief that the variable belongs in the
model is stronger after seeing the data. A high posterior probability reects that models including
the variable perform better than those without the variable. A posterior inclusion probability that
is less than the prior probability indicates that there is little or no support for including the variable
in a growth model.
19 Results
The results of the two sets of regressions are reported separately in Table 17, Table 18, and in
the appendix. The tables give the results in rank order based on the variable's posterior inclusion
probability. The expected mean and standard deviation of the variable's coecient conditional on
inclusion in the true model are given as well. A variable is considered signicant for growth if the
posterior inclusion probability is greater than the prior inclusion probability. An asterisk indicates
72The unconditional mean and standard deviation are not reported in this paper.
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that it is a human capital variable added for this analysis.
19.1 Set 1 Results
The rst set of results, shown in Table 17 and Table A4 of the appendix, is for the set of regressions
run with the data set including all of SDM's (2004) and the additional human capital variables.
The prior probability of a variable being included in the true model for this set of variables is
equal to 0.07673. Variables considered signicant for growth have posterior inclusion probabilities
greater than 0.076. When interpreting the results, it is important to consider the high proportion
of developing countries in the sample.
The BACE results show that 23 variables are robustly signicant for growth. Of these variables,
5 are from the additional human capital data set and 18 are from the SDM (2004) data set. The
higher education enrollment rate is the only SDM (2004) human capital variable that I nd to be
signicant. SDM's (2004) analysis shows that the primary education enrollment rate is the only
signicant education variable, whereas my analysis shows this variable to be insignicant74.
The most signicant variables according to posterior inclusion probabilities are GDP in 1960,
IQ, the fraction of GDP in mining, real exchange rate distortions, and life expectancy. All of these
except IQ, which I added, are found to be at least marginally signicant in SDM (2004). However,
my study nds none of SDM's (2004) top 3 variables to be signicant75. Overall, there are four
variables that both SDM (2004) and I nd to be robustly signicant for growth. I also consider
8 variables to be marginally signicant76. Out of these variables, 2 are from the additional human
capital data set and 3 are variables found signicant by SDM (2004).
Of the variables shown to be signicant or marginally signicant, there are 4 from the attainment
and enrollment category, 2 from the input and policy category, and just one from the outcome
category. All of the signicant and marginally signicant variables are shown in Table 17, and
the insignicant variables are listed in Table A4 of the appendix. Each signicant or marginally
signicant human capital variable is described below77.
73The prior probability is equal to k
K
, which is equal to 7/92.
74SDM (2004) nd the higher education enrollment rate and government education spending to be insignicant for
growth.
75SDM's (2004) top three variables are East Asian dummy, primary education enrollment rate, and investment
price.
76Variables are considered marginally signicant if the posterior inclusion probability is greater than 0.060.
77See SDM (2004) for a discussion of the variables used in their analysis.
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Rank Variable
Post.
Incl. Prob.
Cond.
Post. Mean
Cond. Post.
Std. Dev.
1 GDP in 1960 (log) 0.972 -0.018882 0.005719
2 IQ* 0.968 0.001272 0.000384
3 Fraction GDP in Mining 0.728 0.047400 0.034902
4 Real Exch. Rate Distortions 0.605 -0.000083 0.000076
5 Life Expectancy 0.603 0.000633 0.000585
6 Govt. Share of GDP 0.290 -0.017673 0.030522
7 Govt. Cons. Share of GDP 0.266 -0.014095 0.026859
8 Sec. Educ. Duration* 0.189 0.001406 0.003301
9 Public Investment Share 0.171 -0.011761 0.033792
10 Higher Educ. Enroll. Rate 0.142 -0.020845 0.057780
11 Nom. Govt. Share of GDP 0.142 -0.008278 0.022727
12 Female Avg. Years High. Educ.* 0.116 -0.009479 0.030997
13 Political Rights 0.116 -0.000436 0.001376
14 Landlocked Country Dummy 0.112 -0.001232 0.003887
15 Fraction Catholic 0.099 -0.000989 0.003442
16 Fraction Pop. Less than 15 0.099 0.008049 0.028027
17 Fraction Pop. in Tropics 0.095 -0.001098 0.003912
18 Religious Intensity 0.094 -0.001730 0.006128
19 Hydrocarbon Deposits 0.087 0.000086 0.000322
20 Avg. Years Prim. Educ.* 0.083 0.000627 0.011336
21 Civil Liberties 0.082 -0.001203 0.004654
22 English Speaking Pop. 0.082 0.001761 0.006888
23 Prim. Educ. Duration* 0.080 0.000754 0.002994
24 Avg. Years of Educ.* 0.075 0.000212 0.011066
25 Fraction Pop. Over 65 0.074 -0.019260 0.081965
26 Male Avg. Years Prim. Educ.* 0.072 0.000392 0.005481
27 Fraction of Tropical Area 0.072 -0.000580 0.002546
28 Fraction Muslim 0.072 0.000776 0.003367
29 Fraction Hindu 0.065 0.001493 0.006689
30 African Dummy 0.062 -0.000839 0.003944
31 Pop. 0.061 0.000000 0.000000
Table 17: Set 1 Signicant and Marginally Signicant Variables.
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19.1.1 Signicant Human Capital Variables
IQ : The IQ score data is from Lynn and Vanhanen (2002). Their IQ measure is a country's
national average IQ score over the twentieth century with most scores from the 1950's to 1990. I
include this measure as an alternative to international standardized test scores which are excluded
due to limited data. The IQ measure is positively correlated with data from the two most popular
test score data sets{Barro and Lee (2001) and Hanushek and Kimko (2000){indicating that IQ and
other tests measure similar skills. It is important to include the IQ measure even though it is
not strictly a 1960 measure. The current human capital literature stresses the need to account
for dierences in the quality of education received across countries. Most agree that measures of
cognitive ability, namely standardized tests, are the best indicators of education quality78. Test
scores also have an advantage over other measures by reecting not just the eects of formal
education but also that of family, peers, and environment. As such, my analysis would be
incomplete without a measure of cognitive skill.
The sample of countries in this set of regressions has an average IQ score of 83.4 with a minimum
score of 64 and a maximum score of 105. IQ has the highest posterior inclusion probability of all
the human capital variables and ranks second overall. The high posterior inclusion probability of
0.968 indicates that IQ has a large marginal contribution to the regression model's goodness-of-
t. The positive posterior conditional mean suggests that higher IQ scores are related to higher
economic growth. This positive relationship could signal that schooling quality is important for
growth. In addition, the positive signicance might reect that individuals with higher IQ scores
are more productive or contribute more to innovation and technology. Jones and Schneider (2006)
examine the importance of IQ scores for economic growth using the BACE framework and also nd
a robustly positive signicant relationship.
Secondary Education Duration: The secondary education duration data comes from UNESCO's
Institute for Statistics. It gives the duration of compulsory general secondary education in years
according to regulations in place in each country in 1970. Most countries distinguish between
two levels of secondary schooling{lower and upper. Some amount of lower secondary education is
compulsory in most countries, but upper secondary education is often not required. The secondary
education duration measure reects the number of years required in both lower and upper secondary
78See, for example, Hanushek and Kimko (2000).
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schooling.
Secondary education duration is the second most signicant human capital variable and ranks
eighth overall. Countries in this sample require an average of 5.98 years of secondary education
with a minimum of 4 years and a maximum of 8 years. The posterior inclusion probability is 0.189
indicating that there is an 18.9% chance that secondary education duration is included in the true
model. The posterior conditional mean is positive, which suggests that the more years of secondary
education required, the faster a country's economic growth. The positive signicance of this
variable reects the importance of time spent in school. Higher years of compulsory education also
reect a greater commitment to education by a country's government. Government commitment
to education will most likely translate into other areas of education such as quality. Furthermore,
a longer length of required secondary education could reect the goal of better preparing students
for the labor market.
Higher Education Enrollment Rate: The higher education enrollment rate in 1960 is the only
SDM (2004) variable related to human capital that I nd robustly signicant for growth. The
sampled countries have an average higher education enrollment rate of 0.027 with a minimum of 0
and a maximum of 0.13. This variable ranks tenth overall with a posterior inclusion probability
of 0.142. The posterior conditional mean is negative, which is somewhat unexpected. There
are several possible explanations for the negative relationship shown between enrollment levels in
higher education and growth. First, many students enrolled in higher education will not complete
their education, so high enrollment rates do not necessarily translate into a more educated and
productive labor force. Second, as suggested by Mamuneas et al. (2006), structural obstacles exist
(particularly in developing countries) that can prevent the educated labor force from being eciently
employed. Much of the human capital gained from higher education requires complementary
technologies that are scarce in many countries. This can lead to an unproductive use of educated
labor. The third explanation expands on this idea. Kalaitzidakis et al. (2001) discuss evidence
that higher levels of education in some countries, particularly those with lower incomes, may be
used for rent-seeking activities or in the illegal economy. These explanations are especially relevant
considering the large number of developing countries examined in the analysis.
Female Average Years of Higher Education: The data for female average years of higher
education is from the widely used Barro and Lee (2000) data set. The measure reects the average
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years of higher education attained by the female population aged 25 and older in 1960. This is
the fourth most signicant human capital related variable and ranks twelfth out of all variables.
The average years of higher education for females in the sample countries is 0.029, the minimum
years is 0, and the maximum is 0.222. The posterior inclusion probability is 0.116, and the average
coecient across models is negative. This negative relationship between female average years of
higher education and growth is again somewhat unexpected, but the nding is not uncommon79.
There are still clear disparities between males and females in terms of education and labor
market experiences. The negative coecient indicates that highly educated women are not being
used eciently in the labor force. There are several possible explanations for this ineciency. First,
as suggested by Barro (2001), women might face discrimination that prevents them from holding
productive positions. Second, women are still mostly responsible for childcare and housework,
which can also prevent them from holding productive jobs or working as many hours as their male
counterparts. Finally, this result could again be a reection of the inecient use of higher education
in developing countries.
Average Years of Primary Education: This variable is a measure of average years of primary
education attained by a country's total population aged 25 and older in 1960 and is also from
the Barro and Lee (2000) data set. The measure is calculated using the percentage of the adult
population that completed primary education along with the duration of primary education. This
is one of the most popular measures of a country's human capital.
Universal primary education is a goal in all countries and has been reached in most developed
countries. Therefore, years of primary education mainly reects dierences in less developed
countries. For the countries in this set of regressions, the average years of primary education is
2.107, the minimum is 0.191, and the maximum is 5.471. Average years of primary education ranks
twentieth overall with a posterior inclusion probability of 0.083. The posterior conditional mean is
positive reecting the importance of primary education for growth. In particular, the more years
of basic education a country's population receives, the faster its economic growth. More years
of primary education could be important for growth for several reasons. As students complete
more years of primary education, they are more likely to continue on to secondary education and
therefore gain more human capital. Also, primary education provides a foundation of education
that can make subsequent schooling more productive. This concept of complementarity between
79See, for example, Kalaitzidakis et al. (2001) and Barro (2001).
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levels of education is discussed in Cunha et al. (2006).
Primary Education Duration: Primary education duration is the number of years of compulsory
primary schooling based on regulations in each country in 1970. The number of years of primary
education required signals the importance placed on basic education by a country's government.
These lengths have expanded as countries continue to strive for universal primary education.
The average duration of primary education for countries in this set of regressions is 6.06 with a
minimum of 5.0 and maximum of 8.0. Primary education duration is the last variable considered
to be robustly signicant for growth in this set of results. The posterior inclusion probability is
0.080. The positive posterior conditional mean again reects the importance of primary education
for economic growth. A longer duration of primary school required could positively impact growth
because of the stronger government commitment it reects and the higher level of human capital
it leads to.
19.1.2 Marginally Signicant Human Capital Variables
Average Years of Education: Average years of education is again from Barro and Lee's (2000)
popular data set. It is a measure of total education attained at all levels of education (primary,
secondary, and higher) of the total population aged 25 and older in 1960. It is a quantitative
measure of education reecting the average number of years of schooling completed by the labor
force. As with the other quantitative measures discussed so far, average years of education does
not account for dierences in quality of schooling across countries.
The average years of education for countries in the sample is 2.534, the minimum number of
years is 0.203, and the maximum is 6.988. The posterior inclusion probability ranks 24th at 0.075,
which barely misses the cuto for signicance of 0.076. The average coecient is positive, which
implies that a more educated labor force leads to higher economic growth. This nding reinforces
the importance of education in general.
Male Average Years of Primary Education: The average years of primary education measure
is from Barro and Lee (2000). Like the other attainment measures, data for years of male primary
education comes from national census and survey data. This measure gives the average years
of primary schooling attained by the male population aged 25 and older. The average for the
countries in this set of regressions is 2.443 with a minimum of 0.309 and a maximum of 6.059. The
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posterior inclusion probability is 0.073, and the posterior conditional mean is positive. This again
reects the importance of primary education for growth. The positive eect of male education in
particular could again reect the gender disparity in the labor market as discussed earlier.
19.2 Set 2 Results
The second set of results, shown in Table 18 and Table A5 of the appendix, is for the regressions
run with the data set including only SDM's (2004) signicant variables and the additional human
capital variables. The prior probability of a variable being included in the true model for this set of
variables is equal to 0.15680. This larger prior reects the increase in probability due to the smaller
number of possible explanatory variables in this set of regressions. Variables that are considered
robustly signicant for growth have posterior inclusion probabilities greater than 0.156. It is again
important to take into account the high percentage of developing or emerging countries included
in the sample of countries.
The BACE results show that 9 variables are signicant for growth. Of these, 2 are from the
additional human capital data set. Of the 7 SDM (2004) variables found signicant, none are
related to human capital. The top 4 variables based on posterior inclusion probability are GDP
in 1960, IQ, life expectancy, and fraction of GDP in mining. IQ is the most important human
capital variable in both Set 1 and Set 2. I also consider 4 variables to be marginally signicant for
growth81. Of these variables, 2 are from the additional human capital data set.
Of the variables shown to be signicant or marginally signicant, there are 2 from the attain-
ment and enrollment category, one from the input and policy category, and one from the outcome
category. The signicant and marginally signicant variables are shown in Table 18, and each
human capital variable is described below82. The variables found to be insignicant are listed in
Table A5 of the appendix.
19.2.1 Signicant Human Capital Variables
IQ : As with the rst set of regressions, IQ is the highest ranking human capital variable
in terms of posterior probability and second in rank overall. See the discussion above for details
regarding this IQ measure. In this set of regressions, the sampled countries have an average IQ score
of 84.1, a minimum score of 64, and a maximum score of 107. The posterior inclusion probability
80The prior probability is k
K
, which is equal to 7/45.
81Variables are marginally signicant if the posterior inclusion probability is greater than 0.10.
82See SDM (2004) for a discussion of the variables used in their analysis.
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Rank Variable
Post.
Incl. Prob.
Cond.
Post. Mean
Cond. Post.
Std. Dev.
1 GDP in 1960 (log) 0.954 -0.019283 0.006522
2 IQ* 0.890 0.001180 0.000522
3 Life Expectancy 0.826 0.001010 0.000566
4 Fraction of GDP in Mining 0.712 0.040106 0.030300
5 East Asian Dummy 0.246 0.003932 0.008195
6 Female Avg. Years High. Educ.* 0.227 -0.019297 0.047764
7 Govt. Cons. Share of GDP 0.205 -0.009348 0.021179
8 African Dummy 0.205 -0.002865 0.006713
9 Fraction Muslim 0.163 0.001926 0.005221
10 Prim. Educ. Entrance Age* 0.128 -0.000702 0.002190
11 Investment Price 0.121 -0.016398 0.052926
12 Spanish Colony 0.111 -0.000865 0.003024
13 Avg. Years High. Educ.* 0.109 -0.007160 0.052417
Table 18: Set 2 Signicant and Marginally Signicant Variables.
is 0.890, which again suggests that models including IQ perform much better than models without
IQ. The average coecient across models is positive as expected, indicating a higher average IQ
score contributes to higher economic growth.
Female Average Years of Higher Education: In line with the rst set of results, female average
years of higher education is found to be robustly related to growth. The average years of female
higher education for countries in this sample is 0.030 with a minimum of 0 and a maximum of 0.222.
The posterior inclusion probability is 0.227, and the average coecient is again negative. Refer
to the Set 1 Results section for a discussion of the measure and an interpretation of the similar
results.
19.2.2 Marginally Signicant Human Capital Variables
Primary Education Entrance Age: Primary education entrance age is the average entrance
age into primary school in 1970. This data was collected from UNESCO's Institute for Statistics.
The average age for the countries in the sample is 6.235 with a minimum age of 5 and maximum
age of 7. This variable ranks tenth with a posterior probability of 0.128. The posterior conditional
mean is negative, which implies that the lower the entrance age the better for economic growth.
This again reects the importance of primary education and the early years in particular. Recently
there has been a surge in research stressing the importance of a child's early years for learning.
For example, most research shows that IQ is essentially set by the age of 10 and is therefore most
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impressionable before that time83. Furthermore, it is likely that if a student starts schooling at an
earlier age they will ultimately receive more years of education.
Average Years of Higher Education: This attainment measure again comes from Barro and
Lee (2000) and is computed from the percentage of the total population aged 25 and older that
has completed higher education and the duration of higher education. The measure reects the
average number of years of higher education attained by the total adult population in 1960. The
sample countries average 0.049 years with a minimum of 0 years and a maximum of 0.291 years.
The posterior inclusion probability for average years of higher education is 0.109 and its overall
ranking is 13th. The average coecient across regressions is negative, which is somewhat sur-
prising but not unheard of in the literature84. This negative relationship with economic growth
indicates that additional education is not being put to good use. As discussed earlier with the
relationship between female higher education and growth, there is evidence from some countries
that higher levels of education is used for rent-seeking activities or in other unproductive ways.
Furthermore, many low income countries lack the technology to accommodate highly educated
workers. In developing countries, it is not uncommon for individuals with high levels of education
to be unemployed or working in the underground economy.
19.3 Set 3 Individual Results
Multicollinearity is a concern that is often raised when a large number of variables that are possibly
related are analyzed at once. It is likely that some of the human capital variables are correlated
with each other. This could cause these variables to show an insignicant eect when they are
actually important for growth. To account for this issue, each human capital variable is added
separately to SDM's (2004) original data set. Set 3 is comprised of individual sets of regressions
for each human capital variable. Thirty-ve sets of regressions are run{one set for each new human
capital variable. A variable is considered signicant for growth if its posterior probability is greater
than 0.10385.
The BACE results show that 5 additional human capital variables are signicant for economic
growth in their individual sets of regressions{government secondary education spending, IQ, test
scores, primary education teacher salaries, and government secondary education spending to GDP.
83See, for example, discussions in Jensen (1980) and Cunha et al. (2006).
84See, for example, Kalaitzidakis et al. (2001).
85The prior probability is k
K
, which is equal to 7/68.
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I also nd 5 additional human capital variables to be marginally signicant{secondary education
repetition rate, female illiteracy rate, total illiteracy rate, primary education teacher salary to GDP,
and female average years of primary education86. These results show that only one variable in
the education and attainment category is signicant or marginally signicant, while there are 4
from the input and policy category, and 5 from the outcome category. The primary education
enrollment rate is the only human capital related variable found signicant by SDM (2004). This
measure tends to remain signicant as an additional human capital variable is added to the set of
regressions. The primary enrollment rate is signicant for growth in 19 out of the 35 individual
sets of regressions and marginally signicant in another 8 sets.
The results from the individual regressions in Set 3 are quite dierent from Set 1 and Set 2
results. The only similar result is that all three sets of regressions nd IQ to have the highest
signicance of all the human capital variables. One reason for the diering results for Set 3 is
the inclusion of variables that were excluded from Set 1 and Set 2 due to missing observations.
These include the spending and salary variables as well as the repetition rates. Table 19 shows the
human capital variables in rank order by posterior inclusion probability for their individual sets of
regressions. The signicant and marginally signicant variables are described below.
19.3.1 Signicant Human Capital Variables
Government Secondary Education Spending: This spending variable is from Barro and Lee's
(2001) popular data set and measures government expenditures per student in secondary education
in 1960. This measure was excluded from the previous sets of regressions because missing values
caused the sample size of countries to be too low to analyze. The total sample of countries for
the individual set of regressions averages $826.20 per student with a minimum of $47.00 and a
maximum of $2,852.00. The individual BACE results show that this is the most important human
capital variable. The high posterior inclusion probability of 0.495 indicates that there is a 50%
chance that secondary government spending is in the true growth model.
The average regression coecient for this spending measure is negative, which suggests a that
increases in secondary government spending decreases growth. This negative relationship is not
uncommon in the growth literature where ndings are mixed regarding the impact of education
spending on growth87. Education spending is typically used to reect the quality of schooling in
86Variables are considered marginally signicant if the posterior inclusion probability is greater than 0.07.
87For example, Hanushek and Kimko (2000) nd an insignicant negative relationship between education spending
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Rank Human Capital Variable
Post.
Incl. Prob.
Cond.
Post. Mean
Cond. Post.
Std. Dev.
Coun-
tries
1 Govt. Sec. Educ. Spend. 0.495 -0.000007 0.000003 69
2 IQ 0.460 0.000990 0.000307 88
3 Test Scores 0.322 0.009629 0.004606 47
4 Prim. Educ. Avg. Teacher Sal. 0.119 -0.000001 0.000000 70
5 Govt. Sec. Educ. Spend. to GDP 0.105 -0.000045 0.000024 68
6 Sec. Educ. Rep. Rate 0.082 0.000445 0.000307 46
7 Female Illiteracy Rate 0.077 -0.000214 0.000152 70
8 Illiteracy Rate 0.074 -0.000284 0.000184 70
9 Prim. Educ. Avg. Teacher Sal. to GDP 0.072 -0.000009 0.000006 69
10 Female Avg. Years Prim. Educ. 0.072 -0.002281 0.001339 75
11 Govt. Prim. Educ. Spend. to GDP 0.055 -0.000349 0.000273 75
12 Male Illiteracy Rate 0.050 -0.000218 0.000171 70
13 Sec. Educ. Enroll. Rate 0.041 -0.018371 0.014249 86
14 Avg. Years Prim. Educ. 0.035 -0.001780 0.001445 75
15 Prim. Educ. Hours 0.029 -0.000006 0.000008 55
16 Female Avg. Years Educ. 0.028 -0.001095 0.001064 75
17 Govt. Prim. Educ. Spend. 0.024 -0.000004 0.000005 75
18 Male Avg. Years Sec. Educ. 0.022 0.001391 0.001573 79
19 Female Avg. Years High. Educ. 0.022 -0.014162 0.015845 80
20 Sec. Educ. Duration 0.021 0.001205 0.001651 85
21 Prim. Educ. Duration 0.021 0.000671 0.002873 84
22 Male Avg. Years Prim. Educ. 0.020 -0.000964 0.001417 75
23 Sec. Educ. PT Ratio 0.020 -0.000169 0.000223 85
24 Sec. Educ. Entrance Age 0.019 -0.000342 0.001958 85
25 Prim. Educ. PT Ratio 0.019 -0.000102 0.000165 87
26 Avg. Years Sec. Educ. 0.018 0.001371 0.001976 79
27 Avg. Years Educ. 0.018 -0.000508 0.001109 75
28 Prim. Educ. Days 0.017 -0.000059 0.000084 88
29 Prim. Educ. Drop Rate 0.017 0.000000 0.000088 81
30 Prim. Educ. Rep. Rate 0.016 0.000033 0.000130 55
31 Avg. Years High. Educ. 0.016 -0.008025 0.015481 80
32 Female Avg. Years Sec. Educ. 0.016 0.000646 0.002396 79
33 Prim. Educ. Entrance Age 0.015 0.000222 0.002527 84
34 Male Avg. Years Educ. 0.015 0.000058 0.000996 75
35 Male Avg. Years High. Educ. 0.015 -0.001415 0.014039 80
Table 19: Individual Results.
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a country. While the measure reects the amount of resources devoted to education, it does not
reect how eciently these resources are used. The negative coecient suggests that spending at
the secondary level is not being spent in an ecient way.
IQ : All three sets of regressions show that it is important to include IQ in a growth model.
As discussed above, Lynn and Vanhanen's (2202) measure gives a country's national average IQ
score. The sample of countries has an average IQ score of 82.28 with a minimum score of 63 and
a maximum score of 107. IQ ranks second among the human capital variables in the individual
regressions with a posterior inclusion probability 0.460. This high posterior inclusion probability
suggests that IQ has a large marginal contribution to the regression model's goodness-of-t. The
posterior conditional mean is positive, indicating that increases in IQ scores can increase economic
growth. This supports the work of Jones and Schneider (2006) who also nd a signicant positive
relationship between IQ and growth using the BACE framework.
Test scores: International standardized test scores are becoming a popular proxy for human
capital as more data becomes available. Many feel that these scores are the best measure of human
capital since they best reect cognitive ability88. The test score measure from this analysis is from
Hanushek and Woessmann (2009) and is a composite of average standardized test scores in math
and science from primary through secondary schooling for all years available. This variable was
excluded from Set 1 and Set 2 because of the large number of missing observations. The individual
set of regressions had the lowest sample size of all the variables. The average test score for this
sample is 4.51, the minimum is 0.60, and the maximum is 5.45.
The BACE results indicate that test scores are an important determinant of growth with a
posterior inclusion probability of 0.322. The average coecient on the test score variable is
positive indicating that increasing test scores can lead to higher economic growth. This nding
provides more support for using test scores to measure the quality of a country's education.
Primary Education Teacher Salary: This spending variable from Barro and Lee (2001) measures
the average real salary of primary school teachers in 1965. Teacher salary measures are often used
in place of total education spending since salaries represent the largest component of spending.
Like other spending measures, teacher salaries are commonly used to proxy the quality of schooling
and growth while Keller (2006) nds a signicant positive relationship.
88See, for example, Hanushek and Kimko (2000) and Barro and Lee (2001).
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received in a country. The total sample of countries pays their primary school teachers an average
of $8,584.62, with a minimum of $810.00, and a maximum of $47,391.00.
The BACE results give a posterior inclusion probability of 0.119 and a negative posterior con-
ditional mean. As discussed above, this negative coecient could be an indication of inecient
spending. The salary measure shows how much is spent on teachers, but does not reect the
quality of teachers or instruction.
Government Secondary Education Spending to GDP: This measure is the ratio of the govern-
ment secondary education spending variable above to real GDP per capita in 1965. The sampled
countries have an average ratio of 61.67, a minimum of 3.80, and maximum of 364.50. The pos-
terior inclusion probability of 0.105 barely passes the cuto for signicance. Like the spending
variables above, the coecient on the ratio of public secondary spending to GDP is negative.
19.3.2 Marginally Signicant Human Capital Variables
Secondary Education Repetition Rate: The repetition rate in secondary education in 1970 is
another variable that had to be excluded from the previous sets of regressions. Repetition rates are
considered education outcome variables and are used to reect the quality of a country's schools.
The countries in the total sample have an average secondary repetition rate of 10.0%, a minimum
rate of 0%, and a maximum rate of 30.0%. The BACE results give a posterior inclusion probability
of 0.082 and an unexpected positive average coecient. A possible explanation for this positive
coecient is that by repeating a grade of secondary schooling a student becomes better prepared
for the labor force or additional education than had they dropped out of school.
Female Illiteracy Rate: This education outcome measure from UNESCO is the percentage
of the female population aged 15 and older in 1970 that is unable to read and write a simple
sentence about everyday life. High illiteracy rates reect a deciency in very basic skills. The
sample countries have an average female illiteracy rate of 57.09% with a minimum of 2.28% and a
maximum of 89.77%. There is clearly a large disparity across countries in women's literacy skills,
reecting dierences in access to basic education.
The posterior inclusion probability is 0.077, and the posterior conditional mean is negative.
The negative average coecient suggests that increases in female illiteracy decreases a country's
rate of economic growth.
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Total Illiteracy Rate: This illiteracy rate reects the percentage of a country's total population
aged 15 and older in 1970 that is illiterate. The summary statistics show that the average illiteracy
rate is 48.83%, the minimum rate is 1.80%, and the maximum rate is 94.25%. Comparing these
to the female rates above, indicates that illiteracy is a larger problem for females than for males.
As mentioned previously, this suggests that males have higher access to basic education than do
females. The BACE regressions give a posterior inclusion probability of 0.074 and the expected
negative average coecient.
Primary Education Teacher Salary to GDP: The data for the measure of average real salary of
primary education teachers to GDP per capita in 1965 is from Barro and Lee (2001). The sampled
countries have an average ratio of 425.04 with a minimum ratio of 54.0 and a maximum ratio of
1,948.0. Like the salary and spending variables already discussed, the posterior conditional mean
for this salary ratio is negative. This, again, reects inecient spending and emphasizes that the
salary measure does not accurately reect the quality of teachers or instruction.
Female Average Years of Primary Education: This attainment variable is a measure of average
years of primary education attained by a country's female population aged 25 and older in 1960
from Barro and Lee's (2000) data set. The measure is calculated using the percentage of the female
adult population that completed primary education along with the duration of primary education.
For the countries in this set of regressions, the average years of female primary education is 2.31,
the minimum is 0.01, and the maximum is 7.33. The posterior inclusion probability is 0.072, and
the posterior conditional mean is negative. As with female years of higher education discussed in
Set 1 and Set 2, the negative coecient reects that educated women are not used eciently in
the labor force. This coecient could also be an indication that females are less likely to gain
additional education, perhaps due to limited access in some countries.
20 Conclusion
For this paper I employ the BACE methodology developed by SDM (2004) to determine which
of a variety of human capital related variables are robustly signicant for economic growth. The
BACE technique is ideal for addressing model uncertainty that arises from an extraordinarily large
number of possible explanatory variables. Rather than declaring a single model as correct as in
classical approaches, BACE gives each possible model a probability of being correct.
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The BACE approach has several advantages over other estimation methods. First, as just
mentioned, it is not conditional on one model. Settling on one model of economic growth is
very dicult given the large number of possible regressors. This is displayed in the empirical
growth literature where the model specication varies across papers and authors. The concept of
assigning probabilities to handle model uncertainty comes from the standard Bayesian framework.
Bayesian methods, while appealing, have failed to gain widespread popularity due to the diculty
in specifying priors for all parameters. Overcoming this diculty is another advantage of BACE,
which only requires the specication of one prior{mean model size. Finally, the methodology and
results are intuitive and easy to interpret even for those who are not Bayesian experts. This is
attributable to the fact that BACE combines Bayesian methods with the more familiar classical
OLS estimation.
I extend the work of SDM (2004) by focusing on human capital as a determinant of growth. The
main issue when studying the relationship between human capital and growth is the measurement
of human capital. There is no consensus in the literature as to the best way to quantify a country's
human capital, and therefore, many dierent measures have been used. I compile a data set of a
variety human capital related variables to add to the BACE analysis of economic growth.
Whether or not a variable is considered robustly signicant for growth is determined by the
variable's posterior inclusion probability calculated in the BACE analysis. The posterior inclusion
probability indicates the variable's marginal contribution to the growth model's goodness-of-t. A
high posterior inclusion probability indicates that models with the variable perform better than
models without. Specically, it gives the probability that the variable should be included in the
model after seeing the data. A variable is considered signicant for growth its posterior probability
is greater than its prior probability. The prior probability is based on the expected model size and
the total number of explanatory variables. A posterior inclusion probability that exceeds the prior
probability indicates the belief that the variable belongs in the model is stronger after seeing the
data.
I run three sets of BACE analyses. The rst includes all variables from SDM (2004) plus the
additional human capital variables, and the second includes only signicant SDM (2004) variables
plus the additional human capital variables. The ndings from both of these sets of regressions
are similar. In the rst set of regressions, 6 human capital variables are signicant for growth{
IQ, secondary education duration, higher education enrollment, female average years of higher
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education, average years of primary education, and primary education duration. In the second
set of regressions, 2 human capital variables are signicant{IQ and female average years of higher
education.
The measure of IQ scores is the highest ranking human capital variable in both Set 1 and 2 and
ranks second overall based on posterior inclusion probability. This nding provides more evidence
that measures of cognitive skills have an important relationship with growth. This idea can be
seen in the current growth literature where there is an emphasis on using test scores to measure
of human capital. There are several advantages and disadvantages of using IQ to measure human
capital. The main advantage is that IQ is a measure of cognitive ability, which aligns best with
economic theory and may reect the quality of early education. The main disadvantage is the
limited nature of the data and the possibility of biases that arise from the sample selected for
testing and the tests themselves. See my dissertation chapter titled \Measures of Human Capital
in Growth Regressions" for more details.
Several measures regarding higher education are found signicant or marginally signicant for
growth, however, for each the average coecient across models is negative. The negative coecient
indicates an inecient use of higher levels of education. This is likely to be the result of the sample
of countries examined, which is largely comprised of developing or emerging rather than advanced
countries.
In general, measures of years of education are found to be signicant more than any other type
of human capital variable in the analysis. These quantitative measures continue to be the most
common human capital measure used in the empirical growth literature. My ndings from Set 1
and Set 2 give additional support to this practice.
The third set of regressions examines the eect of each human capital variable individually.
This produces diering results from the rst two sets BACE results. One reason is that examining
the variables individually allows for the inclusion of some measures that were excluded from Set 1
and Set 2 because of missing observations. The sample of countries included in these regressions
is also larger than in the rst two sets. Five of human capital variables{test scores, government
secondary education spending, government secondary spending to GDP, secondary education rep-
etition rate, primary education teacher salary, and primary education teacher salary to GDP{are
found signicant or marginally signicant for growth. Surprisingly, no attainment variables are
found to be signicant in Set 3. The similar result from all sets of regressions is the importance of
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IQ for economic growth.
Taken together, the BACE analyses indicate that IQ should be included in models of economic
growth. Perhaps the most general conclusion from this analysis is that human capital is indeed
important for growth, and therefore, models should always include a measure of human capital.
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SDM (2004) Variable Description
Abs. Latitude Absolute latitude.
Air Dist. to Big Cities Log of min. distance (in km) from New York, Rotterdam,
or Tokyo.
Ethnoling. Fraction. Avg. of 5 indices of ethnolinguistic fractionalization.
British Colony Dummy Dummy for former British colonies after 1776.
Fraction Buddhist Fraction of pop. that is Buddhist in 1960.
Fraction Catholic Fraction of pop. that is Catholic in 1960.
Civil Liberties Index of civil liberties in 1972.
Colony Dummy Dummy for former colonies.
Fraction Confucian Fraction of pop. that is Confucian.
Pop. Density Pop. per area in 1960.
Pop. Density Coastal Coastal (within 100 km of coastline) pop. per coastal area
in 1965.
Interior Density Interior (more than 100 km from coastline) pop. per inte-
rior area in 1965.
Pop. Growth Rate Avg. growth rate of pop. between 1960 and 1990.
E. Asian Dummy Dummy for East Asian countries.
Capitalism Degree of capitalism index.
English Speaking Pop. Fraction of pop. speaking English.
European Dummy Dummy for European countries.
Land Area Land area in square km.
Landlocked Country Dummy Dummy for landlocked countries.
Hydrocarbon Deposits Log of hydrocarbon deposits in 1993.
Life Expectancy Life expectancy in 1960.
Fraction Land Area Near Naviga-
ble Water
Proportion of land area within 100 km of an ocean or an
ocean-navigable river.
Malaria Prevalence Index of malaria prevalence in 1966.
Fraction of GDP in Mining Fraction of GDP in mining.
Fraction Muslim Fraction of pop. that is Muslim.
Timing of Independence Timing of national independence.
Oil Producing Country Dummy Dummy for oil producing countries.
Table 20: SDM (2004) Variables
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SDM (2004) Variable Description
Openess Avg. ratio of exports plus imports to GDP from 1965 to
1974.
Fraction Othodox Fraction pop. that is Orthodox in 1960.
Fraction Speaking Foreign Lan-
guage
Fraction of pop. speaking a foreign language.
Prim. Educ. Enroll. Rate Enroll. rate in prim. educ. in 1960.
Avg. Ination Avg. ination rate between 1960 and 1990.
Square of Ination Square of avg. ination rate between 1960 and 1990.
Political Rights Political rights index.
Fraction Pop. Less than 15 Fraction of pop. younger than 15 years old in 1960.
Pop. Pop. in 1960.
Fraction Pop. Over 65 Fraction of pop. over 65 years old in 1960.
Primary Exports Fraction of primary exports in total exports in 1970.
Fraction Protestants Fraction of the pop. that is Protestant in 1960.
Real Exch. Rate Distortions Real exchange rate distortions.
Revolutions and Coups Number of revolutions and military coups.
African Dummy Dummy for Sub-Saharan African countries.
Outward Orientation Measure of outward orientation.
Size of Economy Log. of aggregate GDP in 1960.
Socialist Dummy Dummy for countries under Socialist rule for considerable
time during 1950 to 1995.
Spanish Colony Dummy for former Spanish colonies.
Terms of Trade Growth Growth of terms of trade in the 1960's.
Terms of Trade Ranking Terms of trade ranking.
Fraction of Tropical Area Proportion of land area within geographical tropics.
Fraction Pop. In Tropics Proportion of pop. living in geographical tropics.
Fraction Spent in War Fraction of time spent in war between 1960 and 1990.
War Particpation Indicator for countries that participated in an external war
between 1960 and 1990.
Years Open Number of years economy has been open between 1950 and
1994.
Tropical Climate Zone Fraction of tropical climate zone.
Table 21: SDM (2004) Variables Continued.
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Set 1 Set 2
Algeria Malawi Algeria Malawi
Argentina Malaysia Argentina Malaysia
Bolivia Mauritius Bolivia Mexico
Botswana Mexico Botswana Nepal
Cameroon Netherlands Cameroon Netherlands
Central Afr. Rep. Niger Central Afr. Rep. Niger
Chile Pakistan Chile Pakistan
Colombia Panama Colombia Panama
Costa Rica Pap. N. Guinea Costa Rica Pap. N. Guinea
Dominican Rep. Paraguay Dominican Rep. Paraguay
Ecuador Peru Ecuador Peru
El Salvador Philippines El Salvador Philippines
Ghana Senegal Ghana Senegal
Greece Spain Greece Spain
Guatemala Sri Lanka Guatemala Sri Lanka
Haiti Syria Haiti Syria
Honduras Thailand Honduras Thailand
India Togo Hong Kong Togo
Indonesia Trin. and Tob. India Trin. and Tob.
Israel Tunisia Indonesia Tunisia
Italy Turkey Israel Turkey
Jamaica Uganda Italy Uganda
Jordan Uruguay Jamaica Uruguay
Korea Venezuela Jordan Venezuela
Lesotho Zambia Korea Zambia
Lesotho
Table 22: Countries Included in Each Set of Regressions.
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Afghanistan Denmark Israel Oman Tanzania
Algeria Dominica Italy Pakistan Thailand
Angola Dominican Rep. Jamaica Panama Togo
Argentina Ecuador Japan Pap. N. Guinea Tonga
Australia Egypt Jordan Paraguay Trin. and Tob.
Austria El Salvador Kenya Peru Tunisia
Bahamas, The Ethiopia Korea Philippines Turkey
Bahrain Fiji Kuwait Poland Uganda
Bangladesh Finland Lesotho Portugal Unit. Arab Emir.
Barbados France Liberia Rwanda United Kingdom
Belgium Gabon Luxembourg Samoa United States
Benin Gambia Madagascar Saudi Arabia Uruguay
Bolivia Germany, West Malawi Senegal Vanuatu
Botswana Ghana Malaysia Seychelles Venezuela
Brazil Greece Mali Sierra Leone Yemen, N.Arab
Burkina Faso Grenada Malta Singapore Yugoslavia
Burundi Guatemala Mauritania Solomon Islands Zaire
Cameroon Guinea Mauritius Somalia Zambia
Canada Guinea-Bissau Mexico South africa Zimbabwe
Cape verde Guyana Morocco Spain
Cental Afr. Rep. Haiti Mozambique Sri Lanka
Chad Honduras Myanmar St.Lucia
Chile Hong Kong Namibia St.Vin. and Gren.
China Hungary Nepal Sudan
Colombia Iceland Netherlands Suriname
Comoros India New Zealand Swaziland
Congo Indonesia Nicaragua Sweden
Costa Rica Iran, I.R. of Niger Switzerland
Cote d'Ivoire Iraq Nigeria Syria
Cyprus Ireland Norway Taiwan
Table 23: All Possible Countries.
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Rank Variable
Post.
Incl. Prob.
Cond.
Post. Mean
Cond. Post.
Std. Dev.
32 Fraction Confucian 0.0574 0.002216 0.010900
33 Terms of Trade Ranking 0.0548 -0.001066 0.005488
34 Spanish Colony 0.0498 -0.000314 0.001817
35 Air Dist. to Big Cities 0.0482 0.000000 0.000000
36 E. Asian Dummy 0.0481 0.000578 0.003268
37 Pop. Density 0.0463 0.000000 0.000005
38 Illiteracy Rate* 0.0444 0.000000 0.000071
39 Outward Orientation 0.0422 -0.000233 0.001359
40 Prim. Educ. Enroll. Rate* 0.0389 0.000436 0.003931
41 Avg. Years High. Educ.* 0.0377 -0.002053 0.026452
42 Primary Exports 0.0371 -0.000442 0.002902
43 Fraction Buddhist 0.0370 0.000552 0.003570
44 Male Avg. Years Educ.* 0.0361 0.000090 0.005261
45 Capitalism 0.0337 0.000032 0.000304
46 Latin Amer. Dummy 0.0335 -0.000248 0.001952
47 Fraction of Land Area Near Nav-
igable Water
0.0305 0.000198 0.001610
48 Land Area 0.0303 0.000000 0.000000
49 British Colony Dummy 0.0303 0.000155 0.001183
50 Female Avg. Years Prim. Educ.* 0.0302 0.000063 0.002356
51 Female Illiteracy Rate* 0.0297 0.000000 0.000043
52 Avg. Ination 0.0295 -0.000004 0.000030
53 Prim. Educ. Entrance Age* 0.0290 -0.000111 0.000861
54 Square of Ination 0.0281 0.000000 0.000000
55 Years Open 0.0278 0.000255 0.002114
56 Terms of Trade Growth 0.0271 0.001452 0.011840
57 Size of Economy 0.0269 0.000036 0.000396
58 Fraction Speaking Foreign Lan-
guage
0.0267 0.000024 0.000887
59 Investment Price 0.0266 0.000001 0.000016
60 Govt. Educ. Spend. Share of
GDP
0.0264 0.001704 0.031751
61 Timing of Independence 0.0264 0.000055 0.000602
62 Female Avg. Years Educ.* 0.0261 -0.000055 0.002300
63 Ethnoling. Fraction. 0.0251 -0.000186 0.002095
64 Male Illiteracy Rate* 0.0250 -0.000002 0.000046
65 Colony Dummy 0.0247 -0.000162 0.001460
66 Prim. Educ. Days* 0.0242 -0.000003 0.000023
67 Pop. Density Coastal 0.0235 0.000000 0.000001
68 Sec. Educ. Enroll.* 0.0234 -0.000360 0.005541
69 Fraction Protestants 0.0231 0.000166 0.002836
70 Female Avg. Years Sec. Educ.* 0.0228 -0.000167 0.002999
71 Abs. Latitude 0.0225 0.000003 0.000044
Table 24: Set 1 Insignicant Variables.
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Rank Variable
Post.
Incl. Prob.
Cond.
Post. Mean
Cond. Post.
Std. Dev.
72 Fertility 0.022 5.23E-05 0.002481
73 Avg. Years Sec. Educ.* 0.022 -0.000151 0.011277
74 European Dummy 0.022 -9.85E-05 0.001603
75 Fraction Spent in War 0.022 -0.000344 0.003415
76 Interior Density 0.020 -3.88E-07 0.000005
77 Male Avg. Years Sec. Educ.* 0.019 -5.33E-05 0.005471
78 Malaria Prevalence 0.019 -9.17E-05 0.001202
79 Male Avg. Years High. Educ.* 0.019 0.000449 0.014160
80 Revolutions and Coups 0.019 -4.28E-05 0.001153
81 Sec. Educ. Entrance Age* 0.019 6.29E-08 0.000378
82 Sec. Educ. PT Ratio* 0.018 3.12E-06 0.000045
83 Pop. Growth Rate 0.018 0.000287 0.058801
84 War Particpation 0.017 3.59E-05 0.000562
85 Defense Spend. Share 0.017 1.34E-05 0.011951
86 Tropical Climate Zone 0.016 -4.40E-05 0.001155
87 Socialist Dummy 0.016 8.12E-05 0.001345
88 Prim. Educ. Drop Rate* 0.016 -5.94E-07 0.000014
89 Openess 0.015 1.34E-06 0.000995
90 Prim. Educ. PT Ratio* 0.014 -4.34E-07 0.000022
91 Oil Producing Country Dummy 0.014 2.95E-05 0.000953
92 Fraction Othodox 0.013 4.85E-05 0.001702
Table 25: Set 1 Insignicant Variables Continued.
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Rank Variable
Post.
Incl. Prob.
Cond.
Post. Mean
Cond. Post.
Std. Dev.
14 Fraction of Tropical Area 0.088 -0.000867 0.003740
15 Fraction Buddhist 0.088 0.001379 0.005517
16 Latin Amer. Dummy 0.078 -0.000640 0.003306
17 Prim. Educ. Enroll. Rate 0.069 0.001429 0.006928
18 Illiteracy Rate* 0.068 -0.000019 0.000164
19 Fraction Confucian 0.066 0.002056 0.010286
20 Female Avg. Years Educ.* 0.061 -0.000214 0.012470
21 Sec. Educ. Duration* 0.058 0.000189 0.001167
22 Malaria Prevalence 0.058 -0.000457 0.002640
23 Pop. Density Coastal 0.057 0.000000 0.000002
24 Male Avg. Years Prim. Educ.* 0.057 0.000281 0.015950
25 Female Illiteracy Rate* 0.056 -0.000007 0.000095
26 Ethnoling. Fraction. 0.055 -0.000588 0.003872
27 Male Illiteracy Rate* 0.051 -0.000009 0.000092
28 Male Avg. Years High. Educ.* 0.050 -0.000802 0.029429
29 Female Avg. Years Prim. Educ.* 0.050 -0.000124 0.012504
30 Avg. Years Prim. Educ.* 0.049 0.000225 0.013939
31 Sec. Educ. PT Ratio* 0.048 0.000007 0.000091
32 Male Avg. Years Educ.* 0.047 0.000043 0.015832
33 Avg. Years Educ.* 0.046 -0.000015 0.013618
34 Years Open 0.044 0.000311 0.002236
35 Prim. Educ. Days* 0.044 -0.000005 0.000031
36 Sec. Educ. Entrance Age* 0.041 -0.000060 0.000682
37 Female Avg. Years Sec. Educ.* 0.040 -0.000151 0.012765
38 High. Educ. Enroll. Rate 0.040 -0.000002 0.000018
39 Prim. Educ. Duration* 0.038 0.000065 0.000901
40 Sec. Educ. Enroll. Rate* 0.038 -0.000389 0.006251
41 Avg. Years Sec. Educ.* 0.037 -0.000092 0.014052
42 Prim. Educ. Drop Rate* 0.035 -0.000002 0.000023
43 Male Avg. Years Sec. Educ.* 0.034 0.000010 0.015969
44 Govt. Educ. Spend. Share in
GDP
0.031 0.002728 0.042292
45 Prim. Educ. PT Ratio* 0.029 -0.000001 0.000035
Table 26: Set 2 Insignicant Variables.
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